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Abstract of Thesis 
There are three parts to the thesis, the first two 
dealing wi th others' views of education, the third '-Ii th the 
author's own view. r~yola, Locke, Elyot, Quintilian and 
Dew'ey all assume that education is to be explained by refer-
ence to its relations with other things. Their point of' 
view is that of the "outsider" or "spectator". Spectator 
views com-.) to grief because rather than sho'\-I they simply 
assume that it is education that stands Ln the required rel-
ation. And, typically, they "miss the point". 
Downie et aI, Telfer, Oakeshott and Peters all assume 
that their views of education can be intrinsically justj-
fied, that is, by appeal to the nature of education itself. 
Their point of view is that of the "participant". Partici-
pant view5come to grief' because rather than show they simply 
assume that that to which they appeal is indeed the nature 
of education. And, typically, what they assume to be 
" '.~' 
education is only one aspect of it. 
Education, I think, is, in a phrase, preparation for 
independence. This thesis is a direct develoPQent of Peters's 
view, at least that view expressed in "The Justification of 
Education". It is, I argue, an improvement on that view 
because it takes better account of the relationships between 
education and upbringing (the most closely related extrinsic 
conc€'pt) and educatIon and training (the most closely 
related intrinsic concept), and because it involves a more 
plausible order of explanation as between rationality (which 
Peters takes to be fundamental) and autonomy or indepen-
dence. 
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Introducti.on 
The concept of education is not a topic 1"hich has 
received much in the way of sustained philosophical treat-
ment. Traditionally, what concern there was was generated 
only by a prior concern with The Good Man or The Good 
Society. Education was not seen for what it is, but merely 
as the necessary and suffLcient means of developing such 
men and such societies. And today, though educational 
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issues generally do receive independent treatment, the topic 
of education itself is only raised, if at all, as a ,yay of 
introducing other, less fundamental issues, the concern, 
even then, not so much conceptual investigation, as charac-
terization of the approach to be taken in dealing with the 
other issues. 
Nonetheless, there have been many who have contributed 
to our understanding of the concept by investigating either 
certain kinds of education or certain, important aspects of' 
t'7":. 
educati!>n generally. Locke and Loyola consider the education 
of, respectively, virtuous and reliGious persons, ,{hile 
Elyot and Quintilian give accounts of the education of 
governors. (Chapter 1) DOlvnie et aI, and Telfer, emphasize 
the theoretical, rather than the practical aspects of educa-
tion, while Oakeshott is concerned with initiation into a 
"human" rather than just a "local" world. (Chapter J) 
Institutions of educat~on have been, relative to 
other institutions, slow in developing. It is not surpr~s­
ing, then, that the development of an indepp.~dent conception 
of education should have been even slower. Education, in The 
Republic, is, as i.t were, the 'servant' of a certain soci.al 
order. Tn Democracy and Educdtion Dewey makes much of the 
independent "growth" of the child, but he also places educa-
tion in the Pl~tonic context of serving to maintain over the 
generations a certain, albeit very different, kind of 
society. (Chapter 2) Peter"s,·oD the other hand, concentrates 
hiB attention on the concept of education as that concept is 
held by educators themselves o Education is not made to serve 
such trinstrumental tl ends as social continuity. The investi-
gation is intrinsic rather than extrinsic. (Chapter 4) 
. "'-. 
The author's own contribution to understanding the 
concept of education is made in Chapter 5. After examining 
the relationships bet1veen education and upbringing, train-
ing and freedom, it is argued that edu~ation, in a phrase, 
is preparation for independence. In the final chapter the 
notion of preparation for indep~ndence is used to help 
clarify the recent debate on "indoctrination", that is, on 
mis-education. 
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Two final notes. First, as the views of others are 
all discussed in the ~ext, it seems advisable to include 
there the references as well. In order to avoid lengthy 
bracketing certain short-hand conventions have been adopted. 
Most are understandable in context, but note should be made 
of least one. n(10}" means "(P. 10)" in .the book, chapter or 
article mentioned in the text, with respect to which further 
information is found in the bibliography. Second, I have 
tried always to use 'English English', but where I have 
failed the usage is (or so I will claim) correct 'North 
American English'. It is not, for example, 'Author English' • 
Section I The Spectator 
Chapter 1 Individuals, Social Roles 
Education for the spectator is a phenomenon in the 
world, a human phenomenon. This is not to imply that with-
out man education could not exist. Something very like it 
occurs in other species as well. The spectator's interest, 
however, is limited. He is interested in education only 
insofar as it is a human phenomenon. 
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Only individual humans can be educated or uneduca-
ted. The descriptions, "an educated class" and "an 
uneducated people", for example, are generalizations based 
on the evidence of individual cases. If most members of the 
class were uneducated, and most of the people educated, 
neither description would be correct. 
No one is at birth, and yet some individuals become 
educated. Most undergo a series of changes as a result of 
which they become at least better educated than they were 
at birth. This is the process of education. The process 
begins roughly at birth and can, but need not, end only in 
death. Some individuals are no better educated at the end 
than they were years, perhaps even decades, before. For 
most, however, the process is continuous, if not usually 
evenly-paced, throughout life. 
The process 0f education in the individual depends 
upon cooperation among individuals. It is true that for 
individuals to become educated they must survive, at least 
for a time; and it is also true that their survival depends 
upon cooperation. But this is not the point. To become 
educated the individual must do some things--though not 
necessarily anyone list of things~-rather than others. The 
unedu~ated do not know what these are. They must cooperate 
with those lv-ho do. Further, on most, if not all, accounts 
of what is involved in education, without cooperation an 
individual could not become educated. 1-1i thout cooperation 
he could not, for example, learn a language. 
The process as a whole depends upon cooperation. 
Some aspects, however, need not. The process can continue, 
• 
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for example, after cooperation has ended. Under the 
guidance of another an individual learns to do some things 
rather than others, as a result of which he becomes better 
educated. He wight then continue doing these things on his 
o,Vll initiative, thus progressing still further. And, in 
fact, those who had cooperated with him might have wanted 
and taken steps to ensure this would happen. The individual 
would have been "learning how to learn". 
Education for the spectator is a puz?le. He wants to 
understand it. Why does the individual do what he does? Why 
do others cooperate with him? What is education? 
nThings"--objects, events, states of affairs--can be 
distinguished from relations between things~ Education for 
the spectator is a "thing" which is to be described and 
explained oy reference to its relations with other things. 
"Seeing" education is seeing it "whole". Seeing it whole is 
seeing how, as a whole, it relates to other th~ngs. The 
only point of view from which this can be done is that of 
the "outsider" or "spectator". 
Describing education in terms of its relations with 
other things is not, however, a task which can ever be com-
pleted. One can truly predicate of education an infinite 
number of relational properties because there are an infin-
ite number of things to which it stands in relation. An 
exhaustive description is impossible. All actual descrip-
tion must be selective. On what basis, then, does the 
spectator make his selection? To describe a thing to 
someone is to inform him about it. But is the basis what 
others do not already know? Few will find at all informa-
tive any of the statements made below, nor is there any 
suggestion this is ',/hat their authors intend. A relational 
property (for the most part truly) is predicated of educa-
tion. This might be called "descriptio!!". But why does the 
spectator give the description he does, rather than any 
other? 
The spectator wants to know why the individual, and 
those with whom he cooperates, do what they do. He wants an 
explanation of education. Explanations can seem, like 
descriptions, true or false, informative or uninformative. 
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A teacher asks for a particular explanation. A student, 
however, gives another. The teacher says, That is not the 
right explanation. The television weatherman smiles and 
says that the "cause" of our wet weather is the presense 
overhead of rainclouds. We say, Tell us something we don't 
already know. These examples obscure an important differ-
ence between explanation and description. Description is 
related to knowledge, explanation to understanding. If one 
seeks knowledge it must be accented that of two conflicting 
s ta temen ts (or des criptions) only one can be 't-.rha t one is 
after. If, on the other hand, one seeks understanding, it 
must be accepted that between two conflicting statements 
(or explanations) there might be nothing to choose. The 
former cannot both be true, but the latt,er might be equally 
good. The teacher in our first example was looking for a 
particular explanation. The student was not asked to 
explain anything, but to describe the explanation his 
teacher had in mind. And, rather t~an try to (perhaps 
because he couldn't) explain our wet weather, the weather-
man smiled and described a rather obvious causal link 
between it and rainclouds. 
One wants something explained because one is puzzled 
by it. A person might know "all there is to know" and still 
not understand, or understand even though he knows relativ-
ely little Q Explanations are made using statem~nts. These 
latter might be true or false, but the former can be only 
good or bad, better or worse than others. There are many 
kinds of explanation, each having to be judged at least in 
part by use of criteria relevant only to the sort of under-
standing being aimed at. There ere, however, criteria all 
explanation should meet. Some of the most important of 
these a~e the following: comprehensiveness: does ~t account 
for all it should, or does it leave something unaccounted 
for: completeness: does it answer all the questions it 
should, or does it raise, and fail to answer, further ques-
tions: simplicity: is the explanation itself understand-
able, or does it create, rather than solve, mis-understand-
ing: internal consistency: is it one explanation, or does 
it embody two or more cOhflicting explanations: internal 
coherence: is it one explanation, or does it embody two or 
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more unrelated explanations: and finally, implications and 
consequences: does it help rather than hinder attempts to 
understand other, related phenomena, does it imply (and are 
there) problems in other, related explanations. Two con-
flicting explanations, as has been said, might be equally 
good. \1hat one sacrifices in completeness (0r "depth"), for 
instance, it might make up for in comprehensiveness (or 
"breadth"). There might be nothing to choose between a 
shallow but comprehensive explanation and one which, though 
profound, is partial. Evaluating explanation is not a 
simple task. It can be said, however, that the best possi-
ble explanation is the one which on the whole sacrifices 
the least. 
Spectator accounts have the form,. Education is X, 
"XU standing in place of some relational property. They 
are sometimes criticized because, it is said, ~hey assume 
education is one thing, whereas in fact it is a complex of 
many things. Some snectator accounts no doubt are less 
simple than simple-minded, but as a general point the crit-
.... ; .... 
icism is not well-founded. First, Educa~ion is X is not 
itself an explanation--it stands in place of one. And what 
it stands in place of might be very complex. Second, all 
explanation should be as ~imple as is possible. Education 
is X is a spare and partial description, but, straightfor-
wardly elaborated, ~t might make a very good explanation. 
Third, and most important, unless an explanation can be 
reduced such that it has the ~orm, Education is X, it must 
be internally inconsistent or incoherent. If it is said, 
Education is X £E Y, the question arises, Which is it? And 
if it is said, EducLtion is X and Y, the questions arises, 
How are X and Y related? Phenomena need not, but explana-
tions ot' phenomena should ha-V'3 "essences". And, though 
education need not have a single overall "aim", explana-
tions of educa~ion should. 
Education for the spectator is something which has a 
certain relationship with something else. The relationship 
is, means to a certain end or, part of a certain whole. And 
the end or wnole can be described as "individual" or 
"social". Education is either, (i) the means by which a 
1 1 
certain sort of individual is developed, (ii) something 
which plays a certain part in the life of the individual, 
(iii) the means by which a certain sort of society is 
developed (or maintained), or (iv) somathing which plays a 
certain part in society. Loyola and Locke think of educa-
tion as the means by which a ce~tain sort of individual is 
develop~d, Elyot and Quintilian as playing a certain part 
in society. Dewey (discussed in Chapter 2) gives both sorts 
of account, relating the latter to the general, but not 
distinctively educati0nal aim of social maintenance. A 
view of education as something which plays a part in the 
life of the individual, namely, the part of upbringing, is 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
Perhaps most influential in the history of educa-
tional thought is the view that education is the means by 
which a certain sort of individual is developed. The 
educated person has been understood in many ways. Can he be 
understooe as a religious or a virtuous person? Today moral 
and religious education are possible aspects of education. 
'Ii-;-, 
The view that education is nothing but them is generally 
not taken seriously. Today, however r morality and religion 
are parts, whereas traditionally they were seen as ways of 
life. Everything one thought and did was moral or immoral, 
religious or irreligious. Nothing could be non-moral or 
non-religious. 
In the Constitutions of the Society of Jesus, Loyola 
says that "the end of learning acquired in this Society is, 
with the help of God, to aid the souls of its own members 
and those of their neighbours. This, therefore, is the 
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criteriJn to be used in deciding, both iri general and in 
the case of individual persons, what subjects members of 
the Society ought to learn, and how far they ought to 
progress in them.1t (Rusk, 73) And he goes on to say that 
"t!:e humane letters of the various languages, and logic, 
natural philosophy, metaphysics, scholastic theology, posi-
tive thaology, and Sacred Scripture are helpful." (Ibid) 
Education for Loyola is the means by which a religious per-
son is developed. 
On the other hand, in his Thoughts Concerning 
Reading and Study for a Gentleman, Locke says it is "virtue 
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••• which is the hard and valuable part to be aimed at in 
education ••• AII other accomplishments should give way and 
be postponed to this." (Rusk, 142) The implication, how-
ever, is that, though the most important, the development 
of virtue is nonetheless only a part of education. But, 
elsewhere Locke explains that "our business ••• is not to 
know all things, but (only) those which concern our 
conduct." "The extent of knowledge of things knowable is so 
vast ••• that the whole time of our life is not enough to 
acquaint us with all those things, I will not say which we 
are capable of knowing, but which it would be not only con-
venient but very advantageous to know." (Ibid, 139) We can-
not learn all there is to be learned. We must be selective. 
On what basis, then, is selection to be made? Locke thinks 
very little of what he calls "learning", but which now 
might be called "learn':"ng for learning's sake". "This may 
seem strange in the mouth of a bookish man; and this making 
usually the chief, if not only hustle and stir about 
children, this being almost alone which is thought on when 
p60ple tal~ of educa tion, makes ita gre.a ter paradox." But t 
Ira gentleman's proper calling is in the service of his 
country, and so is most properly concerned in moral and 
political knowledge; and thus the stUdies which more immed-
iately belong to his calling are those which treat of 
virtues and vices, of civil society and the arts of govern-
ment." (Ibid, 142-3) The criterion for selecting what is to 
be learned makes rei'erence to the "gentleman". Education is 
to be moral and political. When Locke says Uvirtue ••• is the 
hard and valuable part to be aimed at in education" he is 
saying that, in the education of the gentleman, moral is to 
take precedence over political learning (just as both are 
to take precedence over, or, more accurately, to supercede, 
learning for learniLg's sake). 
Locke of course is concerned only with the e~ucation 
of the gentleman. He does not deny, however, that someone 
other than a gentleman can be educated. He only says that 
"a prince, a nobleman and an ordinary gentleman's son, 
should have different ways of breeding" (Ibid, 137); but, 
the principle involved--education should differ a~cording 
to the "station if life" into which the educand is born--
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applies to everyone, gentlemen and others alike. To gener-
alize, then, because not everyone will come to be "in the 
service of his country", at least not in the way Locke 
intends, not everyone need engage in "studies ••• which treat 
of ••• civil society and the arts of government". But, 
because everyone, regardless of his station, can be either 
good or bad, everyone should engage in "studies ••• which 
treat of virtues and vices". For Locke, then, the educated 
gentleman is the virtuous gentleman, the educated person a 
virtuous person. Everyone does what it is "given" he should 
do, but only the educated person does it virtuously. And 
education is the means by which a virtuous person is devel-
oped. 
These traditional accounts are both strong and weak. 
They are strong in that there is little doubt individuals 
who develo¥ in the ways prescribed do in fact become 
educated. On the contrary, the 17th century Virtuous Man 
and, for example, men and women today educated at Jesuit 
schools and colleges, on the whole are very well educated. 
The accounts, ho~~ver, are also weak. There is equally 
little doubt not everyone who does not develop in the ways 
prescribed is uneducated. The accounts describe two kinds 
of education. There can be other kinds. 
Not everyone who is educable has the potential tv 
develop into a religious person. And, in fact, not surpris-
ingly, the Society, according to Loyola, is not to under-
take thg education of just anyone. "It is needful" he says 
If tha t those ,.,ho are admi tted to aid tha Society in 
spiritual concerns be furnished with these following gifts 
of God. As regards their intellect: of sound doctrine, or 
apt to learn it; of discretion in the manner of business, 
or, at least, of capacity and judgment to attain to it. As 
to memo::'y: of apti tude to perceive, and also to retain 
perceptions. As to intentions: that they be studious o~ all 
virtue and spiritual perfection; calm, steadfast, strenuous 
in what they undertake for God's service; burning with zeal 
for the salvation of souls, and therefore attached to our 
men to the attainment of the ultimate end, from the hand of 
God, our Creator and Lord." And, Loycla goes on, "In exter-
nals: facility of language, so needful in our intercourse 
with our neighbour, is most desirable. A comely presense, 
for the edification of those with whom we have to deal. 
Good health, and strength to undergo the labours of the 
Institute." (Rusk, 70-1) 
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Religious life· in the 16th century depended for many 
on living in a separate community. Virtuous life in the 
17th century might have been a luxury reserved for the 
gentleman, that is, for the politically dominant and eco-
nomically independent. Virtue for the very poor might mean 
starvation, for the politically dependent it wight be 
considered "criminal". But, of those who, because of the 
sort of person they are, are incapable of being religious 
or virtuous, and of those who, because of the circumstances 
in ,.,hich they live, are simply unable to. be ei ther, not all 
of them necessarily are badly educated. They might have 
received a non-religious, non-moral, but nonetheless an 
equally good education. The general view, of which these 
are but two instances, is that edur.ation is the means by 
which a certain sort of individual is developed. The view 
fails because ed~cation, at least in pa~t, depends on the 
sort of person educated, and on the sort of society in 
which it takes place. Thus, for example, neither Loyola nor 
Locke could be taken seriously if they were supposed to be 
prescribing for contemporary Russia. The view implicitly 
denies what is in fact obvious, namely, many d~fferent 
sorts of individual can all be equally well educated c 
In The Language of Education, Scheffler discusses, 
amongst others, the "shaping, forming or molding" metaphor. 
"The child,1f he says, Ifin one variant of this metaphor, is 
clay and the teacher imposes a fixed mold on this clay, 
shaping it to the specification of the mold. The teacher's 
initiat~ve, power, and responsibility arc here brought into 
sharp focus. For the final shape of the clay is wholely a 
product of his choice of th~ given mold. Tnere is no 
independent progression toward any g1ven shape ••• Nor is 
there any mold to which the clay will not conform. The clay 
neither selects nor rejects any sequence of stages or any 
final shape for itself." (50-1) Education, according to the 
metaphor, is the developruent of a certain sort of person, a 
person 'vi th a certain "shape". 
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Scheffler says that though the "molding metaphor 
does not fit the biological-temperamental develpment of the 
h · ld" . t II d c 1 ,1 oes ••• seem ~ore appropriate than the growth 
metaphor (discussed in Chapter 2) as regards cultu~al, 
personal, and moral development." "But, even here, the 
molding metaphor has its limitations": "In ~he case of the 
clay, the final shape is wholely a function o£ the mold 
chosentt--Itthe clay neither selects nor rejects any given 
mold lt : tithe clay is 9 •• homogeneous throughout, and thorough-. 
ly plastic": "the shape of the mo:'d is fixed before the 
molding process and remains constant throughout". "Each of 
these points represents a dissimilarity with respect to 
teaching. For, even if there are no laws of cultural, 
moral, and personal development, there are nevertheless 
limits imposed by the nature of the pupils" (and, it should 
be added, the nature of the society in which they live). 
"Ii'urther, these limi ts vary from student to student and 
from group to group. Tne student population is not 
thoroughly homogeneous nor thoroughly plastic. ft "Finally, 
"1" .. , 
if the teacher is indeed to pay attention to the nature of 
his students, he will modify his methods and aims in the 
course of his teaching and in response to the process 
itself. His teaching is, then, not compatable to a fixed 
mode, but rather to a plan modifiable by its own attempted 
execution." (51) Th:1.t is, assuming the teacher is to "pay 
attention to the nature of students", and assuming these 
not to be "thoroughly homogen~ous nor thoroughly plastic", 
education cannut be the development of a certain sort of 
person. 
Thomas Elyot, in concluding The Governour, modestly 
proclaims: "Now all ye readers that desire to have your 
children to be governours, or in~any other authority in the 
public weale of your country, if ye bring them up and 
instruct them in such form as in this book is declared, 
they shall then seem to all men worthy to be in authority, 
honour and noblesse, and all that is under their governance 
shall prosper and come to perfection." (Rusk, 62-3) 
Education, for Elyot, is that part of society the function 
of which is to prepare the young to occupy positions of 
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authority, those subject to authority being, of course, not 
in need of education. In the many centuries which preceeded 
universal, compulsory schooling, it was perhaps the 
. " 
single most influential view of education. 
Who, then, is best prepared to be in a position of 
authority? Who is the educated ~erson? QUintilian, not 
without reason, thinks he must be an "orator". And, in the 
Institutio aratoria, he says that "the perfect orator must 
be a man of integrity, the good man, otherwise he cannot 
pretend to that character ••• We therefore not only require 
in him a consummate talent for speaking, but all the virtu-
ous endowments of mind. For an upright and an honest life 
cannot be restricted to philosophers alone; because the man 
who acts in a real civic capacity, who has talents for the 
administration of public and private concerns, who can 
govern cities by his counsels, maintain them by his laws, 
and meliorate them by his judgments, cannot, indeed, be 
anything but the orator ••• Let therefore the orator be as 
the real sage, not only perfect in morals, but also in 
science, and in all the requisites and ~owers of elocution." 
(Rusk, 40) 
Between authorities (or leaders) and those subject 
to authority (followers) there is a relationship of mutual 
dependence. Without followers to follow there is no one for 
the leader to lead. Elyot and Quintilian take followers for 
granted. They assume (correctlY) that leaders must be 
prepared for what they do, but ~hey also assume (incorrect-
ly) that followers take care of themselves. Enlisted men 
might throw down their arms--or turn them on their 
officer3. People might take to the streets--perhaps for the 
palace. And workers might leave their machines--running, at 
least until tools find their way down to the gears. ·'One 
might become prepared for followership as a result of hav-
ini:, been born into a family of followers. This is "home 
education". Regular church attendance might prepare humble 
servants, people believing they serve God ~est in serving 
others well. This is Irreligious education". Or, as a result 
of one's early experience of others one might learn it is 
better to be the apparently-contented follower than the 
transparently-frustrated leader. This is the "School of 
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Life" • 
Further, good leadership depends in large part on 
good ~ollowership. If leaders, as Quintilian says, must be 
good speakers, followers must be good listeners. And, if 
leaders must be virtuous and knowledgable, fOllowers must 
at least pretend not to despise what for them might be 
moralism and knowingness. Good followers must be prepared. 
Would this be education? Given followers of a certain, not-
uncommon description, a good leader would have to be 
ignorant, immoral and all but mute: the brutalized might 
follow only the brute. Would he be educated? 
Given that leaders and followers are mutually depen-
dent, one can assume that preparing leaders also involves 
preparing followers, or that it does not. If it does, then 
the view that education is that part of society the func-
tion of which is to pr~pare the young to occupy positions 
of authority is incoherent. It says that education prepares 
both leaders ~ followers, and thus embodies two distinct, 
and unrelated explanations. If preparing leaders is not 
t~ken to i~volve~-preparing followers as weIJ., then the view 
is inconsist&nt. It allows that education prepares either 
knowledgable, virtuous, well-spoken, or ignorant, immoral, 
mumble-mouthed persons, and thus embodies two distinct and 
conflicting explanations. One only escapes these difficult-
ies by allowing that both sort5 of leader are equally well 
educated, not a move, one suspects, either Elyot or Quin-
tilian would be pre~ared to make. 
The general view, of which the above is an l~stance, 
is that education is that part of society the function of 
which is to prepare a person to occupy a-certain social 
role. The view fails, and for the same reason as the view 
that education is the means by l~ich a certain sort of 
individual is developed. Education depends, in part, on the 
sort uf individual being educated and on the sort o~ 
society in which education takes place. Some individuals 
can neither lead nor follow. They can only cope as one 
equal amongst many. Such individuals, however, are not nec-
essarily badly educated. Further, a particular society 
might not be one of leaders and follo,vers. In son.a democra-
cies and, perhaps more clearly, in relatively autonomous 
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communes, no individual leads (though all contribute) and 
what people follow is not an individual but decisions taken 
by the group as a whole. Such behavior is not uncommon. 
Even in a rigidly hierarchical society it might be that 
within each level of the hierarchy the dominant mode of 
behavior is democratic or communal. Education in such soc-
ieties, however, is not impossible. The views that educa-
tion develops a certain kind of individual, or prepares 
individuals to occupy a certain social role_ both fail, 
then, for lack of comprehensiveness. The individual 
described might well be educated. But others not described 
are educated as well. Preparing a person for a particular 
social role might well be educating him (see Chapter 5 for 
a discussion of the difference between education and train-
ing), but preparing him for another role might be educating 
him as well. 
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Chapter 2 Individual Development, Social Preparation 
Education is not the means by which a particular 
individual is developed. Nor is it that part of society the 
function of which is to prepare individuals to occupy a 
particular social role. In Democracy and Education, Dewey 
gives both individual and social accounts of education. He 
says tha t educa tion is individual development, or It grow"th U , 
but not the development of any particular individual. He 
also says that education is the means by which is achieved 
social continuity over the generations, education being 
that part of society the function of which is to prepare 
the young to take their place in society. itself, not in a 
particular social role. This is what Dewey says specifi-
cally about the nature of education. On the basis of a 
detailed analysis of what he says about other, less funda-
mental aspects of education, one might conclude that, with 
respect to the above, what he says is not exactly what he 
..,... 
means. There clearl:'" is a thesis to be wri tten here, but 
this is not it. 
Central to Dewey's conception of education is the 
notion of growth. In Democracy and Education he says, "the 
educative process is a continuoDs process of growth, having 
as its aim at every stage an added capacity of growth." 
(54) "Since growth is the characteristic cf life, education 
is all one wi th gro"\.;ing; it has no end beyond itself. The 
criterion of value of school education is the extent in 
which it creates a desire for continued growth and supplies 
means for making the desire effective" (53). Again, "since 
in real~ty there is nothing to which growth is relative 
save more growth, there is nothing to which education is 
subordinate save more educa~ion. It is a commonplace to say 
that education should not cease when one leaves school. The 
point o~ this commonplace is that the purpose of school 
education is to ensure the continuance of education by 
organizing the powers that ensure growth. The inclination 
to learn from life itsell and to make the conditions of 
life such that all will learn in the process of living is 
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the finest product of schooling." (51) "Our net conclusion 
is that life is development, and that developing, growing, 
is life. Translated into its educational equivalents this 
. , 
means (i) that the educational process has no end beyond 
itself; it is its own end; and that (ii) the educational 
process is one of continual reorganizing, r~constructing, 
transforming." (59) 
Education, like life, is said to be a continuous 
process of growth a~d, again like life, is to be understood 
for what it is, not (at least so rewey says here) for what 
relations it might have with other things. The process can-
not be taken for granted. The purpose of school education 
is to provide conditions which are necessary for growth, 
but which otherwise might not obtain, and to ensure that 
the young, on reaching maturity, will continue to grow when 
the special conditions provided by the school are removed. 
Finally, Dewey suggests that the school will have truly 
fulfilled its purpose ~nly when it so changes society that 
"all will learn (grow, become educated) in the process of 
.".' 
living" in it, when society itself becomes "educational". 
In The Language of Education, Scheffler devotes a 
chapter to wha t he calls "Educational Metaphors". As ,.;ell 
as the metaphor of "molding" or "shaping", he discusses 
tha t 0 f "growth If. He says that II there is an obvious analogy 
between the growing child and the growing plant, between 
the gardener and the teacher." "The developing organism 
goes through phases that are ~elatively independent of the 
efforts of the gardener or teacher" ,. though "in both cases 
••• the development may be helped or hinderen by these 
efforts." "In neithrr case is the gardener or teacher 
indispensable to the development of the organism and, after 
they leave, the organism continues to mature." "The growth 
metaphor" he says "embodies a modest conception of the 
teacher's role, which is to study and then to indirectly 
help the development of the child, rather than to shape him 
into some preconceived form." (49) 
All metaphors break down at some point. "Where" 
Scheffler asks "does the growth metaphor break down? It 
does seem plausible with respect to certain aspects of the 
development of the .. child, that is, the biological or con-
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sti.tutional aspects." (Ibid) "If we once ask, however, how 
(the) capacities (of the child) are to be exercised, toward 
what the ••• energy of the child is to be directed, what 
sorts of conduct and what types of sensitivity are to be 
fostered, we begin to see the limits of the growth meta-
phor." "For these aspects of development, there are no 
independent sequences of stages pointing to a single state 
of maturity. That is why, with regard to these aspects, it 
makes no Ii teral sense to say, "Let us develop all the 
potentialities of eve~y child'. They conflict and so all 
cannot be developed." We must "decide in one way rather 
than another ••• responsibility for such a decision cannot be 
evaded." (50) Dewey is right in thinking that education is 
not the development of a particular indiyidual. Is he 
wrong, however, because he thinks the development of any 
individual is education? 
In Experience and Education, Dewey as it were "anti-
cipates" Scheffler's criticism. He says, "the objection 
made is that growth might take many different directions: a 
man, for example~ who starts out on a career of burglary 
may grow in that direction, and by practice may grow into a 
highly expert burglar. Hence it J..S argued tha t 'gro1vth' is 
not enough; we must also specify the direction in which 
growth takes place" (28). UBut" Dewey says, "the question 
is whether growth in this direction promotes or retards 
growth in general. Does this form of gro1vth create condi-
tions for further growth, or d08s it set up conditions that 
S~lt off a person ••• from the occasions, stimuli, and 
opportunities for continuing growth in new directions?" 
(29) DeTvey denies that education is growth is any direc-
tion, that becoming educated is developing into any kind of 
individual. Scheffler asks for a criterion ey which we can 
distinguish educational from non- and from mis-educational 
growth. De1vey says we must ask ",vhether growth in this 
direction promotes ••• growth in general." It will be recal-
led that, for Dewey, "the educative process is a continuous 
process of growth, having as its aim at every stage ~ 
added capaci ty of gro1vth." If growth in a particular direc-
tion fails to promote general growth, it is non-education-
al. If it retards general growth, it is mis-educational. 
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It would appear that Dewey views education as that 
part of the life of the individual the purpose of which is 
to prepare him for the future, that educational growth pre-
pares the individual for future growth. Dewey, however, 
denies this. "Education" he says "means the enterprise of 
supplying the conditions which insure growth ••• regardless 
of age." "Since life means growth, a living creature lives 
as truly and positively at one stage as at another, with 
the same intrinsic fullness and the same absolute claims." 
"Living has its own intrinsic quality and" he says "the 
business of education is 'iith that quality.1f (Democracy and 
Education, 51) There is, however, "the idea that education 
is a process of preparation or getting ready. What is to be 
prepared for is, of course, the responsi~ilities and 
privileges of adult life. Children" hersays "are not 
regarded as social mem0ers in full and regular standing. 
They are looked upon as candidates; they are placed on the 
waiting list. The conception is only carried a little fur-
ther when the life of adults is considered as not having 
meaning on its o~naccount, but as a prepar~tory probation 
for 'another life'." (Ibid, 54) 
But, should children be regarded as tlsocial members 
in full and regular standing", that is, as having all the 
"respoT.1sibilities and privileges" of adults? And to suggest 
that the preparation view has children as tlcandidates" on a 
trwaiting list" is to suggest that for want of preparation 
some children will ~e "rejected". But, if adulthood is 
viewed not as an achievement but as something which, as 
Langeveld says, is "thrust upon" children, then the notions 
of winning, losing and competition do not applyo Finally, 
Dewey associates the preparation view with a view of adult-
hooc. as a "preparatory probation for 'another life'." But, 
• if there is another life, the association is far from being 
discreditable. And, if there is not, the associatio~ should 
be with preparation for death, which again is not, as Dewey 
apparently would have us believe, discreditable. 
Education, it will be argued in Chapter 5, is best 
understood as a kind of preparation. Dewey disagrees. \fhy? 
Dewey thinks the idea of preparation is "but another form 
of the notion of the negative or privative character of 
2) 
of growth", which latter he says has been "already criti-
cized" ,Cop cit). The criticism here being referred to is as 
follows. "Our tendency to take immaturity as mere lack, and 
growth as something which fills up the gap between the 
immature and the mature is due to regarding childhood 
comparativelx, instead of intrinsically. We treat it simply 
as a privation because we are measuring it by adulthood as 
fixed standard. This fixes attention upon what the child 
has not, and will not have till he becomes f\ man." 
(Ibid, 42) Yes? Dewey admits that the "comparative stand-
point is legitimate enough for some purposes", though he 
does not say which ones. "But", he goes on , "if we make it 
final, the question arises whether we are not guilty of 
overweening presumption. Children, if they r.ould express 
themselves articulately ••• , would tell a different tale; 
and there is excellent adult authority for the conviction 
that for certain moral and intellectual purposes adults 
must become as little children." (op cit) But, if this is 
the case, the implication is that children, at least in 
some respects, are not to grow; whereas, in preparing 
children for an adulthood so conceived, the educator would 
want to ensure, as part of his preparation, that certain 
qualities of the child remain unchanged. 
There are tw·o possible prepara tion views. Dewey here 
criticizes the view that education is preparing an adult 
(as a chemist prepares, makes or develops a compound). A 
second view, however, is that education is preparatior. for 
adulthood (as a chemist prepares, or gets ready, to open 
his shol?). ItAdult ll , in the former, refers to qualities a 
person might have (eag., a mature attitude). "Adulthood", 
in the latter, refers to a state of affairs in which a per-
son might be (e.g., one in which, according to Langeveld, a 
person is held to be responsible for what he does). Dewey 
trades on this ambiguity in the notion JI preparation. lIe 
begins by describing the view, "preparation or getting 
ready ••• for ••• the rgsponsibilities and privileges of adult 
life": goes on to say that the prepara tion vielv is "but 
another form of the notion of the ••• privative character of 
growth": and then criticizes the view "tecause he says "for 
certain moral and intellectual purposes adults must become 
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as little children." One can, however, prepare a person for 
adulthood by preparing (or making) a person with the quali-
ties of a child. 
Dewey's second criticism is as follows. "The 
seriousness of the assumption of the negative quality of 
the possibilities of immaturity is apparent when we reflect 
that it sets up as an ideal and standard a static end. The 
fulfillment of growing is taken to mean an accomplished 
growth: that is to say, an Ungroyth, something \{hich is no 
longer growing. The futility of the assumption is seen in 
'the fact that every adult resents the imputation of having 
no further possibilities of growth; and so far as he finds 
that they are closed to him mourns the fact as evidence of 
loss ••• Why an unequal measure for child and man?" 
(Ibid, 42) The criticism is well-taken, at least as it 
applies to "the assumption of the negative quality of the 
possibilities of immaturity". But, is the preparation (or 
getting ready) view, as Dewey says that it i.s, "another 
form of the of the notion of the negative ••• character of 
growth"? Dewey says:, correctly, that "normal chIld and 
adult alike ••• are engaged in growing. The difference 
between them is not the difference between growth and no 
growth, but between modes of growth appropriate to differ-
ent conditions." (Ibid, 50) But, if this is the case, a 
possible preparation view is, in Dewey's terms, of those 
growing in a child's mode for growth in an adult mode. 
Dewey does not say what exactly he takes to be the 
difference between the two "conditions", or the "modes of 
growth" appropriate to each. It is at least suggestive, 
however, to compare his remarks on school education and his 
"technical definition" of education generally. The signifi-
cant di~ference is that, in the former, erowth is directed 
by someone other than the educand, lv-hereas, in the la ttei.', 
ultimately growth is to be Relf-directed. The school, 
according to Dewey, has three main functions: (i) to, as it 
were, break "into portions" a complex civilization in order 
that it may be "assimilated piecemeal, in a gradual and 
graded way": "to eliminate, so far as is possible, the 
unworthy features of .the existing environment from influ-
ence on mental habitudes lt : and (iii) "to balance the 
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various elements of the school environment, and to see to 
it that each individual gets an opportunity to escape from 
the limi ta tions of the group in ,.;hich he was born, and to 
come into living contact with a broader environment. 1t 
(Ibid, 20) (With respect to (iii), see also Oakeshott in 
Chapter J.) The implication is that the child has need of 
a specifically educational institution because, left to his 
own devices, in a social environment Dewey no doubt sees as 
significantly mis-educational, he would not grow in a way 
appropriate to his condition. He would not be able to 
assimilate a complex civilization, resist unworthy features 
of the social environment, or escape from the limitations 
of the social group into which he was born. Later, having 
had the main features of the thesis reviewed for us, "we 
reach a technical definition of education." Education "is 
that reconstruction or reorganization of experlence which 
adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases 
ability to direct the .::ourse of subsequent experience. 1t 
(89-90 ) Education is growth which leads to further growth. 
~-, 
But it is also, Dewey implies, growth which leads to (or 
prepares one for) specifically self'-directed growth, growth 
for which the educand rather than the educator is responsi-
ble. 
In fact, Dewey says that Hit is not •• oa question 
whether education should prepare for the future. If 
education is growth, it must progressively realize present 
possibilities, and thus make ~ndividuals better fitted to 
cope with later requirements. Growing is not something com-
pleted in odd moments; it is a continuous Ip.Rding into the 
future o " Dewey goes on to say, however, that "if the 
environment, in school and out, supplies conditions which 
utilize adequately the preseat capacities of the immature, 
the future which grows out of the-present is surely taken 
care of. The mistake is not in attaching importance to 
preparation for future need, but in making it the main-
spring of present effort. Because the need of preparaticn 
for a continually developing life is great, it is impera-
tive that every energy should be bent to making the present 
experience as rich and significant as possible. Then as the 
present e~perience merges insensibly into the future, the 
:future is 26 taken care of." (Ibid, 56) Two points should be 
made here. First, one need only think of the history of 
many veterans before one realizes that "rich and signifi-
cant" present experience does not alwa"ys make individuals 
"better fitted to cope with later requirements", especially 
the requirements of a life which, in comparison, is poor 
and insignificant. 
But, Dewey aiso says--and this third would also 
appear to be his fundamental criticism--that "the mistake" 
is in "making (preparrttion) the mainspring of present 
effort.!' Dewey thinks there are "evil consequences which 
flow from putting education on (the) basis of (preparation 
for the future)". "In the first place, it involves loss of 
impetus~ •• To get ready for something, on~ knows not what 
nor why, is to throwaway leverage that exists, and to seek 
for motive power in a vague chance." "In the second place, 
a premium is placed on shilly-shallying and procrastina-
tion. The future prepared for is a long way off ••• Why be in 
a hurry about getting ready for it?" "A third undesirable 
result is the suB~titution of a convent~onal average 
standard of expectation and requirement for a standard 
which concerns the specific powers of the individual under 
instruction. For a severe and definite judgment based upon 
the strong and weak points of the individual is substituted 
a vague and "\"avering opinion concerning what youth might be 
expected, upon the average, to become in some more or less 
remote future." "Finally, the principle of preparation 
. 
makes necessary recourse on a large scale to the use of 
adventitious motives of pleasure and pain. The future 
having '0 stimulating and directing power when severed from 
the possibilities of the present, something must be hitched 
to it to make it work." (Ibid, 55) 
The first, second and fourth points all concern a 
po~sible problem of motivation. The third does not. Here, 
Dewey again confuses preparation, or getting ready, for 
adulthood, and preparing or making what he Rays must be an 
"average" adult. In fact, if preparation, in the former 
sense, is, as Langeveld says it is, preparation for taking 
responsibility for what one does, the only limitations 
which should (ideally) prevent a person from becoming well 
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prepared for adulthood are his own "strong and weak 
points". Making a success of a life for which one has 
assumed responsibility is not an easy task. The person who 
is well prepared, however, is the one who lives that life 
which emphasizes his strong points, and minimizes the 
influence of whatevgr weak points he might have. 
Dewey's criticisms of the preparation view are based 
on two fundamental confusions. He confuses, as has been 
said, preparing with preparation for. But, he also confuses 
the gener~l purpose of an enterprise (e.g., preparation), 
and the possible motivation of a participant (e.g., prepar-
ation, interest, fulfillment). The soccer player might be 
motivated by monetary gain, the desire to achieve excellence 
or dislike for his opponents. But, the purpose in playirg 
the game of soccer is simply to score more goals than the 
other team, that is, to win. Regardless of the educand's 
motj.vation, the purpose of education might still be prepar-
atory. Further, if the latter is to be achieved it might be 
best to allow for individual differences with respect to 
'"'7 •• 
the former. Some-·soccer players are best motivated by the 
desire to win. Some students are best motivated by the 
desire to prepare themselves for the future. But, just as 
the desire to win might encourage some players to be overly 
aggressive, and thus of less value to their teams than they 
would have been otherwise, motivated only by preparatioL 
"for something, one knows not what nor why", for something 
which, in any case, is "a long way off u , some students, if 
there is not to be Ushilly-shallying and procrastination", 
will have to be whi!1ped on by "adventitious motives of 
pleasure and pain". In fact, Dewey himself makes use of the 
motivation/purpose distinction when he says that the best 
preparation for the future is a "rich and Significant" pre-
sent, that is, for Dewey, a present which consists in 
actions not one of which, taken individually, is mo~ivated 
by the desire to prepare. He might be right. But, in being 
right he has no argument against the view that education is 
a kind of preparation. 
Education, for Dewey, is not the development or 
growth of a particular individual, neither is it the devel-
opment of just any individual. But, of the sort of person 
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he has in mind, Dewey both asserts and denies that he 
develops in such a way that he is well prepared for future 
development; he both asserts and denies that education is 
that part of the life of the individual the purpose of 
which is to prepare him for the future. Why? It will be 
recalled that, for Dewey, "growth is the characteristic of 
life" (emphasis mine). A person has reached physical 
maturity--is he dead? A person, though active, has ceased 
developing mentally--is he dead of mind? A person develops 
only sporadically--is he alive only now and again? Schools 
according to Dewey are to create the desire for continued 
growth--are schools for the dead, and, if so, what does 
Dewey propose they do about it? Dewey, of course, is making 
a philosophical ra ther than an empirical. claim. "Growth is 
the characteristic of life" is, in a phrase, his philosophy 
of life. Feople are even advised to live in a continuing, 
"rich and significant" present, and that, if they do, the 
future will "take care of itself". All very we.:'l. But, from 
a philosophy of life Dewey deduces a philosophy of educa-
~ t,' 
tion. He says that·"since growth is the ~characteristic of 
life, educa tion is all one wi th gro\ving". And, It Life is 
development, ••• developing ••• is life. Translated into its 
educational equivalents, this means ••• " But, the deduction 
cannot be made. For the argument to be valid it must be 
assumed that education is "all one" with life. Education, 
however, is an aspect of, not the same as life. Dewey might 
have concluded it is that aspect the purpose of which is to 
prepare for the future. But, if one is thinking, as Dewey 
is, of education ~ life, to say it is a kind of prepara-
tion is clearly only part of the story. (That it is part of 
the story might lead one to doubt Dewey's philosophy of 
life. But that is aaother matter.) 
ln Democracy and Education Dewey says that education 
is growth. The claim, as it stands, is ~ncomplete becauze, 
as Scheffler says, it only serves to raise, and to fail to 
the f urther question: growth in what direction? In answer, 
Experience and Education Dewey says that educational growth 
is growth which invites, rather than precludes, further 
growth, a claim which we have tried ~o interpret,· education 
is preparation for the future, that is, in Dewey's terms, 
for future life, future growth. Dewey, it was argued for 
the wrong reasons, denies this. Scheffler's criticism , 
then, though differently applied, remains valid. The pre-
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paration view would have allowed for a plausible distinc-
tion between educational and non- and mis-educational 
growth. For, depending on the sort of future life the 
educand comes to li~e, he was either prepared well, not at 
all, or very. badly. Dewey's view, on the other hand, does 
not allow for a plausible distinction. For, if educational 
gro,.,.th is simply growth which invi tesfuture growth, the 
implication is that future growth of whatever sort is 
evidence of (successful) education. One is again forced to 
ask, (future) growth in what direction? And, to avoid an 
infinite regress, one must, at, some point, £;ive an answ'er 
Dewey has failed to give. Dewey, I think, is right when he 
implies that having the capacity for further growth is 
evidence of (successful) education. He :.s ,.;rong, how'ever, 
in thinking it sufficient, let alone the only possible 
evidence. But, is this what he thinks? _. 
'~. 
Education, it was argued in Chapter 1, is not that 
part of society the function of which is to prepare a 
person to occupy a particular social role. Is it (amongst 
others) the means by which is achieved social continuity 
over the generations, education being that part of society 
the function of which is to "prepare" the young to take 
their place in society itself, rather than in a particular 
social role? Dewey begins Democracy and Education with the 
observation that "the most notable distinction between 
living and inanimate beings is ~hat ~he former maintain 
themselves by renewal." That is, "the living thing ••• tries 
to turn the energie3 which act upon it into means of its 
own further existence." (1) Dewey then derives what he 
calls "the principle of continuity through renewal" (2). He 
claims that the principle app~ies to all and only living 
things, a claim he supports with evidence from plant, 
animal and from individual human life. The principle is 
then applied to human social life. The continuity o~ social 
life over the generations, it is said, is only possible if 
it is renewed in each succeeding generation. Dewey then 
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says, "Education, in its broadest sense is the means of 
this social continuity of life." "Everyone of the constit-
uent elements of the social group, in a modern city as in a 
savage tribe, is born ••• helpless, without language, 
beliefs, ideas, or social standards. Each individual, each 
uni t who is the carrier of the life-experiel ... ce of his 
group, in time passes away. Yet the life of the group goes 
on." (2) 
Dewey distinguishes "mature" and "immature" members 
of a society. The mature are either those "who possess the 
knowledge and customs of the group" (3), or, alternatively, 
those ,-.rho are "able ••• to share in its common life" (8). The 
immature are those who, though they neither possess the one 
nor share in the ot"ler, because "immaturity designates a 
I 
positive force or ability" (50), are capable of achieving 
both. There is a "gap" between the mature and the immature, 
and, Dewey says, "education~ and education alone, spans the 
gap." (3) Education is thus concerned either with the 
"transmission" to the immature 0-[ the kno,-.rledge and customs 
possessed by the rna ture, or 'vi th the "ini tia ti.ontt' of the 
one by the other into the common life of the group, educa-
tion, amongst other things, serving the purpose of social 
continuity over the generations. 
Education, according to Dewey, is a social necess-
i ty. "The primary iJ"leluctable facts of the birth and death 
of each one of the constituent members in a social group 
determine the necessity of education. On the one hand, 
there is the contrast between the immaturity of the 
new-born m~mbers of the group--its future s~le representa-
tives--and the matu::.:ity of the adult members who possess 
the knowledge and customs of the group. On the other hand, 
there is the necessity that tnese immature members be not 
merely physically preserved in adequate numbers, but that 
they be initiated into the interests, purposes, informa-
tion, skill, and practices of the mature members: otherwise 
the group will cease its charRcteristic life." (Ibid) "Even 
in a savage tribe, the achievements of adults are far 
beyond what the immature members would he capable of if 
left to themselves. With the growth of civilization, the 
gap between the original capacities of the immature and the 
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standards and customs of the elders increases ••• Deliberate 
effort and the taking of thoughtful pains are required. 
Beings who are born not only unaware of, but quite 
indifferent to, the aims and habits of the social group 
have to be rendered cognizant of them and actively 
~nterested. Education, and education alone, spans the gap.1t 
(Ibid) 
The continu~ty of a social group depends on at least 
some members being mature. All, however, inevitably die, 
and all new-born membors are immature. If the "characteris-
tic life" of the group is not to come to an end, its 
knowledge and customs must be transmitted, new members must 
be initiated into its shared life. It is, Dewey claims, a 
rna tter of "necessi tylt. "If the members wp,o compose a _" 
society (i.e., the mature members) lived on continuously, 
they might educate the new-born members, but it would be a 
task" Dewey says "directed by personal interest rather than 
social need. Now it is a work of necessity." (4) Education, 
for Dewey, is the means by which a society is maintained 
",.; 
over the generat~ons. lt is, specifically, that part of 
society the function of '\ihich is--not to put too fine a 
point on it--to socialize new members. 
Dewey's argument is twice invalid. There is, 
hO,\iever, a second related argument he might have used. 
First, he fails to show the principle of continuity through 
renewal to apply to all living things, and thus that it 
applies, as he says it does, to human social life. Dewey 
illustrates the principle's application to plant, animal 
and to individual human life. But--supposing this to be an 
argumen~--even assuming he could illustrate its application 
to all living things as it were one by one, to complete the 
argument he would have to show that it applies to human 
social life. And in doing this he would be assuming the 
tr~:th of what the argument purports to demonstrate. 
Independent support for the principle might come from an 
analysis of what it is for something to be a living being. 
But, rather than analyse, Dewey only assumes that "the most 
notable distinction between living and inanimate beings is 
that the former maintain themselves by renewal." 
Second, and more important, the principle is said to 
apply to all and only living things. Human social "life" 
, 
however, is not itself a living thing. Dewey confuses a 
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characteristic of human life, that is, society, social 
behavior, social life, a~d a form life might take, that is, 
plant, animal, human. A society cannot "turn the energies 
which act upon it into means of its own further existence". 
Neither energies, nor anything else for that matter, 
act upon it, because society does not "exist" in the 
that would be required. 
can 
sense 
The argument Dewey appears to give, however, is not 
necessary. Though societies are not living things, humans 
are. And with this in mind the argument can be reconstruc-
ted as follows. Society is a human necessity. Given the 
sort of creature he is, and given the sort of world in 
which he must live, without cooperative or social behavior 
man could not survive. But, as all men die, and as all men 
are born non- or only potentially-social, the continuity of 
the species over the generations depends upon renewal in 
the young of social behavior. Dewey's "argument" is both 
invalid and unnecessary. It is invalid because it attempts 
a deduction common sense alone shows cannot be made. In a 
deductive argument no more can be said in the conclusion 
than is said in the premises. And to speak of society in 
his co~clusion is clearly to say more than can be said of 
any and a~l living things. The argument is unnecessary--in 
fact it is less argument than perhaps illuminating analogy 
--because the facts of individual birth and death, 
immaturity and the uninevitability of maturity, at least as 
Dewey understands it--these facts alone, quite apart from a 
principle thought to apply more generally, are sufficier.t 
to establish the necessity of education, or, at least of 
socjalization, if society is to continue over the -. 
generations. 
The first point to be made about Dewey's account of 
the social nature of education--a point which is made by 
both Archambault, in his Introduction to John Dewey on 
Education, and Frankena, in the relevant chapter of Three 
Historical Philosophies of Education--is that it is perhaps 
best described as "vague". Dewey, as do many othE..r 
h treats the topic of the nature of education philosoP ers, 
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only by way of introducing more detailed discussion of less 
fundamental (though not for that reason necessarily less 
important) topics. Introductions, of course, only introduce 
problems; they are not themselves intended to be problema-
tic. When looked at critically, however, they typically 
seem cu~sory, inadequately argued, vague. Dewey says that 
education is the means of social' continuity. But, what is 
"social continuity"? To identify an instance of continuity 
one would have to be able to distinguish th~se changes as a 
result of which a society ceases to exist, and those 
changes which do not have this result. One would have to 
know what it is for something to be a society. Dewey does 
not, however, at least not in Democracy of Education, give 
us his social philosophy. He implies that a society exists 
when a group "shares a common life". But, is the latter any 
more readily understandable than the former? A group might 
share a common life either if they all live much the same 
life, or if their lives are governed by rules (laws, 
conventions) they have all played ~ part in creating. And 
~ .. 
there are other plausible candidates. What, then, does 
Dewey mean by a group which "shares a common life"? Dewey 
also implies tha t a socie ty exis ts ,.,hen a group shares 
"common knowledge and customs ll • But, even if one has an 
independent understanding of Itknowledge" and "customs", 
neither ttcommon knowledge" nor Ucommon customs" is any 
clearer than what they might be used to explain. If a 
society is not a group each member of which has the s~me 
knowledge and customs--perhaps the least plausible of all 
possible alternatives--then "common" is left undefined and 
thus open to a wide variety of interpretaticns. 
Without a clear understanding of what it is to share 
a common life it ca:"l.not be dete~mined into what the 
immature are to be initiated, no~what is to count as 
successful initiation. Would success in701ve getting thorn 
to live much the same kind of life as the mature? Or would 
it involve preparing them to take part in determining under 
what rules the group is to live? Again, without a clear 
understanding of "common know'ledge and customs" it cannot 
be determined what is to be transmit"ced to the immature, 
nor, of course, what is to count as successful transmis-
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sion. I£ it is not to be whatever knowledge and customs, i£ 
any, happen to be in the possession o£ each and every 
member o£ the group, it is not clear what it is to be. 
Educators make decisions about what they are to do: they 
consider a range o£ possibilities: argue the merits o£ 
various courses o£ action: decide one way rather than any 
other. On Dewey's account, however, just because it is 
vague, within very wide limits all argument is non-rational 
(if not irrational) and, again within wide limits, all 
decisions are arbitrary. One course o£ action cannot be 
shown to be more or less educational valuable than any 
other. 
A vague account is always incomplete. It raises as 
many questions as it answer~ Consider th~ question, who is 
to be educated? Dewey says the immature. But, does he mean 
all the immature? or is he simply observing that because, 
on his account, only the immature are uneducated, only they 
can be educated, and thus leaving the question only 
partially answered? Depending on what exactly Dewey means 
by "social contiii'ui ty" each of the follo.wing is possible: 
all the immature: one immature male and one immature 
female: none of the immature. The second 1S possible 
because, on one interpretation, it would only take one 
mature male, and one mature female, to carryon the customs 
and knowledge, the shared li£e of the group. The third is 
possible because, on another interpretation, social contin-
uity might be guaranteed, not by education, but by 
selective immigration. This would be analogous to the 
situation, which Dewey mentions, in which the mature live 
on forever. In such a situation, Dewey says, education 
"might" occur, "but it would be a task directed by personal 
interest rather than social need. It But, ~":()uld it? or ''Iould 
a need arise even here because of changes which might 
result as over time the percentage of immature (or 
uneducated) members of the group increases? Who is to be 
educated? is an answerable question. But, because Dewey's 
account of the social nature of education is vague, no de£-
initeanswer is suggested, let alone implied. 
The second point ~o be made is that, even if it were 
not vague, Dewey's account 'vould s till be problema tic. 
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Assume, for the moment, that ed to ° 
uca ~on ~s to be understood 
as something which has a certain social function. Why, it 
might be asked, is that function the continuity of social 
life over the generations? Social life, or behavior, can be 
distinguished from a particular form social behavior might 
take, society in general from a particular society. Without 
society generally, of course, there cannot be a particular 
society, but society generally does not depend on there 
being any particular society--only that there be at least 
one. And, though a particular society cannot survive the 
demise of society generally, society might well continue 
even if a particular society does not. 
Given the procedure he follows, it is almost 
impossible to decide (as Frankena finds) whether and, if 
so, in what way, Dewey might be a social relativist. He 
begins Democracy and Education by discussing a general, 
non-socially relative concept of education. He then 
proceeds to a discussion of education in a particular, what 
he calls a "progressive" and "democratic" society. In the 
latter, education is said to involve, depending on how one 
interprets him, either preparing (or making) progressive, 
democratic individuals, or preparing (or getting ready) an 
individual to participate democratically in making deci-
sions which will determine how the society is to progress. 
The Republic, in contrast, is static and oligarchic. 
Education involves selecting and preparing individuals to 
occupy a certain number of pre-determined social roles, the 
point being that these roles, and thus the Republic, are to 
be continued over the generations. "Social continuity", in 
the Republic, has a specifiable meaning. In a progressive, 
democratic society, on the other hand, what meaning it has 
is limited. Within very wide limits, what roles are to 
continue is a matter for individual choice, and thus cannot 
be pre-determined. Given that he discusses education in a 
progressive, democratic society, and given that he does not 
discuss it as he thinks it might take place in a 
non-progressive, non-democratic society, though it is clear 
Dewey is, in some sense, a social relativist, it is not 
clear what exactly that sense is. Would he, for example, 
presribe for the Republic, assuming it to exist, prepara-
tion for already-existing social roles, as Plato does, or 
would he prescribe preparation for making decisions, 
perhaps radical ones, co~cerning what future roles there 
will be? It is, I think, reasonable to assume the former. 
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Dewey assumes, correctly, that no one lives just in 
society generally. To play SOCCdr is to play in a 
particular position. To be in society is to be in a parti-
cular society. But, Dewey also assumes, incorrectly, that 
"social continuity" must refer to the continuity of that 
particular society. EJucation, it is assumed, can only 
succeed, or not, in continuing the society in which it 
takes place. And, applying the criterion as it were society 
by society, education (in the non-socially relative sense) 
guarantees social continuity only by guaranteeing the 
continuity of particular societies. Thus, for Dewey, 
education is the transmission of the knowledge and customs, 
or initiation i!lto the shared life, of the group within 
which education takes place. 
In Dewey's social ontology individual societies are 
assumed to be isolated. He speaks of a group without 
reference to other groups, and of a "progressive", 
"democratic" country, that is, of the United States, 
without reference to other countries. (It is, if you will, 
a view of the world from the point of view of "isolation-
ist" AlTi9rica prior to 19170) Individuals depend for their 
survival solely on the continuity of the society into which 
they happen to haife been born. There is not, for example, 
thH possibility of emigration. And, though a society might 
progress, there 1S not the poss~bility of radical transfor-
mation, that is, change which is such that a new society 
comes into being. 
The social world is not now, nor was it in Dewey's 
time, as this ontology describes it. Individual societies 
ar~ not isolated, nor are they incapable of radical 
trans~ormation. A group of people might emigrate because 
they cannot forsee that the society into which they were 
born, a society in which they have no place, will do 
anything other than continue as it is. One thinks of many 
of the Europ'eans who populated America. A group might 
collectively decide that the form of the society in which 
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they live has been imposed upon them against their will, 
and that its continued existence is neither necessary nor 
justified. They might th~n adopt, even create for them-
selves, a radically new society. One thinks of, amongst 
many other examples, revolutionary America. More commonly, 
a group might be fo~ced by external pressures to change the 
sort of society they have--as has happened in Eastern 
Europe, or, more positively, ceasing opportunities made 
available by general changes in the social order, a group 
might traasform their society in a way they thillic to be to 
their advantage--as has happened in some "Third 'forld" 
countries where, due to, for example, Soviet-American 
rivalry, funds and expertise are available for industrial 
development. 
In some societies education, as Dewey says, is used 
to guarantee social continuity. In others, however, it 
bec0mes an instrument of social change. In contrast to how 
it might have been used, indeed, to how perhaps it is stili 
used in the United States, one thinks of how it was used in 
~ ... 
Russia after 1917; in China after 1949, and in Kampuchia 
between 1975 and 1979. If education generally is to be 
understood as something which has a certa~n social 
function, then, that function cannot be social continuity 
over the generations. 
Education does not necessarily concern the contin-
uity of a particular society, that is, of the society in 
which it takes place. Night it concern the continuity of 
society generally? ~ather than prepare or make a person of 
a certain social type; rather than prepare or get a person 
ready for l~fe ~n a particular society; perhaps education 
conc€rns making social persons, getting people ready for 
society generally. 
In Philosophy of Education, McClellan says that 
"looked at in one way, education is simply a natural 
phenomenon, subject to study by the methods of natural 
science. Education is a necessary condition for the surviv-
al of the human species: marvellous as our genetic 
are they do not ensure the learning of the processes , 
myriad skills, knowledge, and other dispositions which make 
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it possible for people to live in societies. And people 
either liv~ in societies, or they do not live at all. If we 
mean by • education' whatever happens to a bunch of human 
protoplasm such that it eventually becomes a person-in-
society (and we have to put it that broadly to account for 
the suc~ession of social roles that constitute being a 
person-in-society ••• ), then eduriation is clearly an object 
for study by the social sciences." (11-12) Such a view, 
though it overcomes the problems mentioned \,'"i th respect to 
Dewey's social account, itself raises at least four new 
problems. Two of these are mentioned by McClellan. 
"If we use the term ('education')" he says "just as 
a social scientist might use it ••• then a sentence 
constructed on the model 'B is an educated rerson' can go 
wrong in only two ways: (i) the name for 'B' does not 
designate a person at all, or (ii) the name for 'B' desig-
nates some feral person who has no role whatsoever i~ human 
society ••• In either case, if two persons shculd disagree OD 
whether B is an educated person, their dispute would be 
~', '. 
equivalent to disagreement on wl,ether B ~s a person-in-
society. But that simply is not what we ordinarily mean 
'\V'hen 've affirm or deny tha tapers on is educated. It (1 J) 
"When we talk about education, we ordinarily mean a parti-
cular way of becoming a person-in-society. l{hen '-Ie say that 
a person is educated or uneducated, we ordiLarily mean that 
he's one kind of person-in-society or that he's not.'t (14) 
One need not hold w:i,th McClellan that education is a 
"particular" way of becoming a person-in-society, nor that 
being erlucated is being one "kind" of person-in-society. 
The criticisms he makes 'are valid given only that education 
is not any way of becoming a person-in-society, that being 
educated is not being any persoc-in-society, points argued 
in general terms in Chapter 1. 
In effect, NcClellan argues that, in two respects, 
the view is incomplete. It is incomplete in a third respect 
as well. Educatio.n, it '-las argued above, is not necessarily 
concerned with a particular society. What was not argued, 
but which is, nonetheless, quite obvious, is that education 
depend~,atleast to a certain extent, on the society in 
which it takes place. There is a difference between English, 
American and Soviet education, for 
example, and criticism 
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would be justified if they occured . ~n, respectively, China, 
England and the United States. The view that becoming 
educated is becoming a pers' . t on In SOCle y, McClellan says, 
ra~ses and fails to answer the questions, what way of 
becoming? becoming what kind of person? The third question 
it raises and fails to answer is, to use McClellants 
terminology, becoming a person in what society? All three 
questions, however, can be re-stated in (it was argued in 
Chapter 1) a more justifiable form. The questions are: by 
what criteria is it to be decided: in what way does an 
educated person become a person-in-society? what kind of 
person-in-society is an educated person? and, an educated 
person is one lvho has become a person in what society? 
Education depends on the society in which it takes 
place. It also depends on the person being educated. This 
brings us to the final problem with the view which identi-
fies education with lvhat might be r.::alled "socialization". 
It is true, as McClellan says, that in order to survive 
people must live~in societies. What is not the case, 
however, is that all people must be social, or that all 
people must be well prepared to cope with society. Society, 
upon which everyone depends, does not itself depend on 
everyone. The question then arises whether the educated 
person must be "socialized". McClellan argues, in effect, 
that the socialized need not be educated. Hust the 
non-social, or even the anti-social, be uneducated? If cne 
thinks of education from the point of view of the person 
being educated, it seems possible--indeed, it seems actual-
ly to be not-infrequent--that erlucation can proceed 
regardless of the fact that the person in question is both 
unable ~nd unwilling to cooperate with others. And if, 
despite these admitted shortcomings, the educator can 
forsee the possibility of an adequate future for his pupil, 
he might try to educate without socializing him. The person 
would receive only a particular kind, not a general educa-
tion, but in its way, because of its appropriateness, it 
might be better than any alternative. One thinks of 
academic education for t:le "lone intellectual". The view 
that be"coming educated is becoming a person-in-society, 
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then, is not only thrice-incomplete, it also lacks compre-
hensiveness, failing, as it does, to account for the 
possibility of what might be called a "non-social" educa-
tion. 
There is a third and, with respect to the first two, 
a more fundamental point to be made concerning Dewey's 
social analysis of education. It has already been argued to 
be vague, and thus incomplete, and also, given the place it 
accords to social continuity, at ~est only part of the 
story, that is, uncomprehensive. The third point is as 
follows. Education, for Dewey, is, as has been seen, social-
1X fundamental. Without education society could not exist, 
because education, and education alone, ~enews social life 
over the generations, thus ensuring its continuity. Dewey, 
however, does not just claim that education is socially 
fundamental. He also claims it is fundamentally social. The 
transmission of knowledge occurs in training. Upbringing is 
at least partially concerned with the transmission of 
customs. And init'iation into a shared li:fe occurs -when a 
person joins a club. For Dewey, however, education is the 
means of soc,.ial continuity, rather than, say, the contin-
uity of certain skills, family customs or the traditions of 
a particular club. Again, it might be argued that education 
is fundamentally a puman ~nterprise. The relationship 
between education and society, on this argument, would be 
indirect. Society is an imporT-ant, but only one of many 
important features of human life. The relationship for 
Dewey, however, is direct. Education is a social enterprise. 
There is, th'"1n, in Dew'ey's argument (as we- have 
re-constructed it) a certain order of explanation. 
Empirically, human continuity is exp~ained by reference to 
social continuity, and the latter by reference to education. 
And, philosoph; cally, society must be pre-supposed to 
explain human continuity, and education to explain social 
continuity. In assuming one order of explanation, Dewey 
implicitly denies a second. This is, empirically, social 
continuity is explained by reference to human continuity, 
and the latter by reference to education. Or, philosophical-
ly, man must be pre-supposed to explain social continuity, 
and education to explain human continuity. Given this 
second order of explanation education might either be an 
instantiation of social behavior, or even have as one of 
its aims the development of social behavior. It would, 
nonetheless, fundamentally be a human not a social enter-
prise. 
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Finally, in giving one order of explanation Dewey is 
assuming, perhaps incorrectly, that a single order of 
explanation is possible. Human and social continuity, 
rather than one depen~ing on the other, £E vice versa, 
might be mutually-dependent. If this is the case neither 
can be used to explain the other without its being at the 
same time used to explain itself. Similarly, if education 
and man. or education and society, are m~tually-dependent, 
neither of the latter can be used to explain education 
without education at the same time being used to explain 
itself. 
De¥ey--if perhaps only in the introductory chapters 
of Democracy and Education--is part of what might be called 
'\::"', 
the "Platonic Tradition". The Tradition's primary concern 
is society. The concern with education is only secondary. 
The primary concern is the question, how is the ideal 
society to be conceived? But, secondarily, given the ideal 
society, the questions arise, how is it to be realized? 
and, once realized, how is it to be maintained? The ideal 
society is seen to be one composed of variously-conceived 
ideal individuals. All individuals at birth fall short of 
thase ideals, and thus the questions of the realization and 
the maintenance of the society become, at least in part, 
questio~s of how ideal individuals are to be developed, 
that is, questions concerning education. Education, in the 
Tradition, is seen to be the necessary and 5ufficient means 
by which ideal individuals are developed, and thus one of 
the means of rea11zing and maintaining the ideal society. 
The Tradition, however, is either meaningless or 
self-contradictory~ Education cannot be both a means to and 
a part of the ideal society. Nothing can be a means to 
itself. But, if education is a means to, and thus not a 
part of the society, then it is not clear to what, in the 
. 'educatl.·on' could refer. And if, on the other Traditl.On , 
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hand, education is not a means to, but a part of the ideal 
society, because what it would involve is, on any plausible 
account, somewhat less than ideal, it must be supposed that 
the ideal society contains a less-than-ideal part. The same 
point can be made with reference to the person being educa-
ted. Education, according to the Tradition, is the 
development of ideal individuals. But, if, as is obvious, 
only less-than-ideal individuals can be so developed, eith-
er children, or others, are not part of society, or the 
ideal soc"Lety is more than half composed of less-than-ideal 
individuals. The ideal society is of course unrealizable. 
But, in the modern equivalent--the best of all possible 
societies--the problems mentioned above remain, even if 
they are not problems of meaninglessness. and self-contrad-
iction. Put briefly, the problem is taking education and 
the educand seriouslYr~nough to allow the possibility that 
society could have as one of its purposes the education of 
the young. 
Consider two implications of the Tradition. First, 
if' the Tradi tion-i',.;ere sound it would have tr.e implication 
that a distinctive philosophy of education is impossible. 
When education is seen as the means to a certain kind of 
society, though there remains the question of how that 
society is to be conceived, the question of education 
becomes empirical rather than philosophical. Education 
becomes whatever is, empirically, necessary and sufficient 
to re~lize and to maintain over the generations what is 
seen to be the ideal or the best possible society. Social 
philosophy displaces philosophy of education. 
Second, and perhaps more important, 'education', ~s 
it is understood in the Tradition, would involve mis-educa-
tior-. Suppose the Republic to bL the best of all possible 
societies. The problem for the educational theorist 
concerns its realization and maintenance. One of tht:' 
questions to be asked, as indeed Plato does, is, how are 
individuals to be developed who believe that their's is the 
best of all possible societies, that is, individuals who 
will have no reason to change their society, thus making it 
less than the best? The' belief, ,.;e are assuming, is true, 
and thus individuals might come to accept it as a result 
of rational argument and persuasion. What means are to be 
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employed, however, with those who for wh t 
, a ever reason, are 
unable or unwilling to accept it? Plato suggests that the 
educator tell stories (what he calls "expedient" (159) fic-
tions) which, though not themselves true, would, perhaps, 
result in the recalcitrant holding the correct belief. (78, 
158ff.) And yet, one would have thought, education central-
ly concerns the transmission of knowledge, that is, not 
just true belief, but true belief rationally supported. 
(See the discussions in Chapters 4 and 6.) Further, suppoee 
fiction not to be "expedient", suppose, in other words, the 
educand remains recalcitrant. What then? Plato does not 
say_ But, if the continuity of the best of all possible 
societies is to be guaranteed, it seems inevitable that at 
least some educands will have to be indoctrinated with the 
belief. '£Jucation' will involve mis-education. Indeed, as 
any significant change in the society might result in its 
becoming less than the best, one would suppose indoctrina-
tion would have to be relatively wide-spread, involving not 
just the recalc~trant, but anyone who has doubts. Social 
~ontinuity would have to be made predictable. 
Understanding education, however, is not just a 
matter of first understanding society and then conducting 
the appropriate empirical research. Education is a part of 
society, and thus one cannot understand the latter without 
a t the s arne time understanding the fo rmer. And, though j_ t 
is true educatiori depends in part on society, it is also 
and equally true that society in part depends on education. 
It makes just as much sense--that is, very little--to set 
about understanding society by first understanding educa-
tion and then conducting empirical research to determine 
what results its pr~duces, the results, of course, bp,ing 
~ ~.' 
'societyf. Education and society are two mutually-depen-
dent human phenomena. And it is only be~ause there are two 
distinct, interacting phenomena that distinct, and some-
times conflicting philosophies are possible", ttExpedient" 
fictions are problemmatic for Plato only because, though 
they might be socially desirable, they might also be 
educationally undesirable. And, in o~-der to realize and 
maintain a progressive, democratic society, De'vey might 
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have to indoctrinate progressive, democratic beliefs. It 
will be recalled, however, that h d. 
e says e ucatlon involves 
the transmission of know~edge. Nei ther Dew'ey nor, for tha t 
matter, Plato are wholely a part of what we have called the 
Platonic Tradition. Both, at least in some aspects of their 
work, accept that the socially and educationally desirahle 
might conflict, and thus their theories are distinctively 
philosophical rather than merely empirical. At the theore-
tical level, the conflict is between the Platonic and what 
would have to be called the ttAnti-Platonic" Traditions, 
each of which, when taken separately and thus without the 
possibility of conflict, is equally implausible. According 
to the Anti-Platonic Tradition society would be the means 
of educational continuity, the "whole pO.int" of society 
being, say, to guarantee the continuity of knowledge over 
the generations. But, society, it must be admitted, has 
non-educational aims. And education, contrary to the 
Platonic Tradition, must be admitt~d to have non-social 
aims. 
.'<.' 
Dewey says that education is the.means of social 
continuity over the generations o This is (so far as it 
goes) true; but it is not, as we have been arguing, a very 
good explanation of education. Dewey, in fact, no doubt 
unintentionally, admits that this is the case. He says, it 
""ill be recalled, that education might 9ccur even in a 
society in '\-lhich adult members live on forever, that is, in 
a society in which it is not education ,¥'h; ch guarantees 
social continuity over the generations o Dewey also says--
and this perhaps is what he has in mind--that education is 
the transmission of common kno,v.'_edge and customs, an 
initiation into a shared life o These claims will be discus-
sed in Chapter 4. Imagine now, however, a society composed 
of 100,000,000 educated adults, and 1 uneducated child, a 
child who, it is known, will not outlive the last of his--
it must be added--sterile elders o Transmitting knowledge 
:and cus.toms, ini.tiating him in to the life his elders 
share, cannot serve the purposes of the society. And yet if 
in doing so the child, as Dewey says he is, is becoming 
educated, then education cannot at least fundamentally be a 
social enterprise at all. 
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There are many possible relationships betw·een ~ 
education and society. Education is, for the most part, an 
instantiation of social ~ehavior: the possibility of educa-
tion depends on the existence of society: a general, though 
not universal aim of education is the development of social 
behavior: educational practice, especially 0n a large 
scale, clearly has social consequences. Education is a part 
of society. It is not, hOliever, fundamentally social. Dewey 
gives a social account of the direction in which individual 
development or growth must go if the latter is to be 
educational. The account is, depending on how it is inter-
preted, either uncomprehensive or incomplete. It is incom-
plete if it is interpreted as emphasizing social continuity, 
for then, as we have argued, though it says to what educa-
tion is a means, it does not say specifically the sort of 
means it is. If it is interpreted as emphasizing the trans-
mission of common knowledge and customs, and the initiation 
of the young into the shared life of their elders, it is 
then both incomplete (because vague) and, as will be argued 
~;. 
in Chapter 4, uncomprehensive, education involving more 
than just these. 
Education, for the spectator, is explained in terms 
of its relations with other things. The explicanda are other 
than, or extrinsic to, education itself. Extrinsic explana-
tion assumes (correctly) that education is in part what it 
is because the individual and society are what they are, 
and thus the former can in part be explained in terms of 
the latter. But, it also assumes (incorrectly) that the 
individual and society are not what they are in part 
because education is what it is. It denies that the former 
can in part be explained in terms of the latter. Society 
and the individual are seen as independent phenomena, 
education being dependent on them. Given a certain kind of 
individual, a certain kind of society, education follows. 
But, the individual, society and education are mutually-
dependent. It is equally true--that is, it is false, that 
given a certain kind of education, the individual and 
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society follow. 
This has always been the case, but there is good 
reason why it has not always been seen to be the case. 
Tradit~onally education served family, church, country. It 
was whatever was thought to be required to develop a good 
son, a good man, a good citizen 3 Now, however, education 
has been for the most part institutionalized. It has 
acquired a "life", that is, a history of its own. It has 
acquired a definite place both in society generally and in 
the life of the indiv~,dual. It has establ~shed an indepen-
dent existence. And what is true of social practice is also 
true of social theory. Traditional theorists re-made 
society by re-making man; and they accomplished the latter 
by the simple expedient of describing 'e~ucation' in a 
certain way. Now, ho,,,ever, it is recognized that such 
schemes are for the most part eith~r impossible or at least 
undesirable. They depend, not on education, but on some-
thing which, when seen for what it is, is either ~mpossible 
or, because it involves individuals spending a good part of 
their lives doini certain, usually quite disagreeable 
things, make men and their societ~es on the whole worse 
rather than better. 
Given a relationship, not of dependence and indepen-
dence, but of mutual-dependence, extrinsic explanation of 
itself is impossible. In seeking an explanation in terms of 
some greater whole one assigns rather than examines the 
part education is to play. Our social explanations, for 
example, ranged from socialization to the maintenance of a 
certain pattern of social roles. There is no way of decid-
ing whi~h is correct. To know that X is a part of Y is to 
know only what part X could, not what part it does play. 
And both the above are possible. Similarly, in seeking 
explanation in terms of what results from education, selec-
ti0n from all which might result is arbitrary. Our 
individual explanations, for example, ranged from growth or 
development to the development of virtuous or religious 
persons. All are, in a sense, "correct". All can and have 
resulted from education. To know that Y results from X is 
not to know it is the only result, nor that it can only 
result from X. But, it is only the latt"er which "could fully 
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explain X. 
If something seems mysterious, and thus invites 
explanation, one way to explain it is to show how it relat-
es to other things, things already understood. And for 
particular purposes the result may very well be a good 
explanation. If, however, a perfectly general, philosophi-
cal understanding is desired, extrinsic explanation can be 
at best only partial, at worst misleading. Further, unless 
there is already some understanding of what the thing is 
apart from how it relates to other things, it cannot be 
known what part in a general explanation a particular 
extrinsic explanation is to play. It is only because we 
already have some understanding of education that we can 
single out for criticism, because they are more important ~han 
others, a few of the infinite n~mber of extrinsic explana-
tions tha t might be gi ... ren of educa tion. Extrinsic 
explanation assumes, but a possible explanation must 
examine, the part education plays in other things, the 
means • 4-:1.." is which results in other things. Extrinsic explan-
ation must be cOfJlplementedby intrinsic explanation. 
48 
Section II The Participant 
Chapter J Self-Realization, Autonomy 
world. 
Education for the spectator 15 a phenomenon in the 
It is something which happens. For the participant, 
on the other hand, lOt lOS so thO d I ° me lng one. t lS something 
"we" do. The process of education occurs in individuals. It 
only occurs, however, as a result of what individuals do. 
Education is to be distinguished from maturation. Only the 
mature, perhaps, are educated, but then maturity is a pre-
condition of, neither the same as nor part of what it is to 
be educated. If it were discovered that much of what is now 
thought to result from what individuals do in ~act results 
from, say, the maturation of the brain, rather than change 
his notion of education the participant would accept that 
its range of application is rather more limited than once 
he thought it was. 
The process of becoming educated results directly 
from ,.,ha t the individual does, only indi,rectly from wha t 
vthers might do. If the individual does nothing he cannot 
become educated. Changes might be affected by hypnosis, 
injections, or by lecturing the individual when he is not 
listening, but these cannot be the changes which occur in 
his becoming educated. Education, for the participant, 
necessarily involves 'learning'. Learning only results from 
texperience'. And experience necessarily involves doing, 
even if it is only listening or--assuming consciousness to 
be in the required sense 'intentional'--being aware. 
The individual might become educated without intend-
ing to do so. If studying is acting with the intention to 
learn, the individual need not be a student. Even in 
school, where he occupies the role of student, and where 
much is learned because the teacher intends it should ~e, 
the individual in fact studies very lit~le. The teacher 
wants him to learn to read better, learn to solve a certain 
kind of mathematical problem, learn to play and to 
appreciate music. The student, however, reads stories, 
solves, or tries to solve, algebraic problems, listens to 
and plays classical music. He learns from what he does, but 
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what he does is not done with the intention to learn. 
The individual, to become educated, must cooperate 
with others. Those with ~hom he cooperates, however, need 
not intend that he-should learn. If teaching is acting with 
the intention that, as a result, someone else acts, the 
result of which is that the latter learns, the person with 
whom the individual cooperates need not be a teacher. The 
parent, for example, loves, cares for, befriends, amuses, 
excites, comforts and disciplines the child. The child 
learns from what he does, even though this is not what the 
parent intends. 
Education for the participant, however, is something 
we do. The educator is a teacher, and the educand a student. 
The participant wants to know what we should do. What 
should the student do to become educated? What should be 
done by the teacher to help? 
Education for the participa~t, unlike the spectator, 
is something we do, something which, if we decide, can be 
changed or stopp~d Rltogether. The participant, unlike the 
spectator, is involved in and thus responsible for 
education. Depending on whether he thinks it justified, not 
all it should be, or unjustified, he will prescribe its 
continuation, changes, or its termination. He is sometimes 
criticized for this. The philosopher, it is said, is not 
competent to prescribe. 
Philosophy is seen, by the critic, ~s a kind of 
conceptual investigation. And, he says, prescription 
depends in part on empirical investigation. Not being com-
petent to make judgments on empjrical matters, the 
philosopher cannot know whether his prescription is sound. 
Re therofore ought not to make it. But, lihat does this 
argument establish? It does not question the assumption 
that prescription also in pqrt depends on conceptual 
investigation. Not being competent to make judgments on 
conceptual matters, the empiric~l investigator cannot know 
whether his prescription is sound. Therefore, neither he 
-
nor the philosopher should prescribe. The argument estab-
lishes two things. First, neither the empirical nor the 
conceptual investigator should prescribe. But, second, 
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prescription should not be made without the . prl0r partici-
pation of both. The philosopher is not the only, but he is 
a participant. 
The most fundamental issue the participant can raise 
concerns the justification of education itself. The issue 
can be raised in either one of two ways. First, partici-
pants agree on what education is. They ask, is it always 
justified? and, if not, under what conditions, if any, is 
it justified? Second, and more commonly, participants do 
not agree- on what education is. They ask, can it be under-
stood in such a way that it is always justified? Regardless 
of how it is raised, the issue is resolved in one of three 
ways. In either all, only some, or in no circumstances 
should a person educate or, at least, do that which can be 
understood as educating. 
Justification can be too strong or too weak. It is 
too strong when it justifies more, and too weak when it 
justifies less than it can. The former implies that a 
person should do what in fact he should not. 'Education is 
unconditionallyj'ustified' might be an example of this sort 
of error. The latter implies that a person should not do 
what in fact he should. Failure to give a sufficiently 
strong justification is evidence of the (mistaken) belief 
that such a justification cannot be made. 'Education is 
never justified' mi~ht be an example of this sort of error. 
Assuming the nature of education to be problematic, a 
strong justification is the s::=eme as justifying a 'wide', 
and a weak-jus~ification is the same as justifying a 
'narrow' concept of education. Both fail because it is not 
education they have shown to be justified. 
Justification, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, 
always has the form, X is jU3tified because it is, or is 
related to Y, and Y is justified. All justification, then, 
~s open to criticism on one or both of two grounds. First, 
what X is said to be, or what it is said to be related to, 
that is, Y, might not be justified. Second, X might not be, 
or it might not be related to Y. It might be argued, for 
example, that education is justified because it is the same 
as socializai;ion. The argument fails to support the conclu-
sion either if education is not socialization, or if social-
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ization is not itself justified. 
The spectator, as we have seen, attempts extrinsic 
explanation of education. The participant, on the other 
hand, attempts intrinsic"justification. He does not want to 
know how education relates to other things, or even whether 
in being so related it is for that reason justified. He 
wants to know whether what he does is in itself justified. 
To_ this end he is inevitably forced to raise and to answer 
the question, what is education? or, to make it personal, 
what am I doing? 
In "Education and Self-Realization" Telfer asks 
whether the aims of education can be "summed upl1 as, or 
whether tre aim of education is, self-realization. (216) 
She assumes educativn is justified and asks whether self-
realization is justified as well. tn Education and Personal 
Relationships Downie, Loudfoot and Telfer examine several 
arguments which purport to show education justified. One, 
the "redes cription argument", is as follo1';s. "If we assume 
that the educated man and the self-realized man are one and 
the same, then if we assume, as it is natural to do, that 
self-re~lization is a state which does not require further 
justification we have ipso facto shown that educatedness 
does not require further justification." (56) What is it, 
then, to be self-realized? 
Both Telfer and Downie et al make two preliminary 
claims. First, 'self' in 'self-realization' does not refer 
to an agent, and thus self-realization is not realization 
~ the self (of something else). The self is what is 
realized. Second, 'realization' does not .refer to the 
process of becoming alvare, and thus self-realization is not 
becoming self-aware or acquiring self-knowledge. Realiza-
tion is becoming real or actual. Self-realization, then, is 
the "process lV'herp-by some aspects of the potential self 
become actualized or made real." (Telfer, 217) The question, 
what is it to be &elf-realized? becomes, for Telfer and for 
Downie et aI, what is it to have actualized "some aspects" 
of the self? 
The authors, though they reach, as one might suppose, 
similar conclusions, now follow different lines of argument. 
52 
First, Downie et ale They say, IIpresumably a person 
achieves self-realization when he fulfills his nature as a 
person, or, in Mill's phrase, the 'distinctive endowment of 
a human being,.n (56) They might have presumed otherwise. 
'Self-realization' might refer to the actualization, not of 
personhood, but, as Telfer suggests, of a person's 
"individual self". "Traditionally it has been assumed" 
Downie et al continue, "that basic to the distinctive endow-
ment of a human being is his reason, and we accept the 
tradi tion~,l assumption and shall try to explain our version 
of it.u (57) They might have accepted other'vise, say the 
modern "assumption" that man's distinctive endowment is his 
capacity for language. trUe hold in the first place that 
reason has a theoretical aspect U , and, in the second, that 
there are "practical aspects of reason" as well. (Ibid) 
They might hold otherw~se, for instance, that theoretical 
and practical reason are essentially the same. 
HIf 've assume tha t this characteriza tion of the 
nature of a person is roughly acceptable we can now raise 
the ques tion of ,ihether the s ta te of educa t€'dness will 
constitute the realization or fulfillment of this nature." 
(59) "No,v there is clearly no difficulty at all about 
saying that educatedness realizes the aspects of the person 
involving theoretical reason o " (61) And practical reason? 
"It mus t by now be clear tha t 'ole do not accept tha t on ('ur 
account of the educated man the whole nature of a person 
can b9 realized through education. We are adopting a narrow 
view of what it is to be educated, and therefore if it 
emerges, as it will. that education cannot bring about the 
realization of all aspects of the self our withers remain 
unwrung, for on our view education is not of the 'vhole man." 
(68) 
They might have adopted otherwise. Some theorists 
(Rousseau for example--see Chapter 4) argue that be~_ng 
educated involves being able to choose and to act for one-
self generally. Downie et aI, on the other hand, say that 
"outside the sphere of intellectual activity the educated 
man is logically no more likely than any other to stick to 
his guns, form his o'\m plans and so forth. tt (69) And some 
theorists (Dewey for example) argue that being morally educ-
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ated involves choosing and acting morally. But, Downie et 
al ~ay that "whereas the educated man is necessarily well-
eqipped to know what he ought to do, he is no better able 
to do it than the less well-educated. 1t (Ibid) How, then, do 
they justify their view? 
"By 'education' we mean 'the cUltivation of the mind 
or theoretical reason, and the transmission of culture'." 
"This narrow, descriptive account ••• will rule out as part 
of education various activities which go on in schools, so 
, 
a question might be raised as to the justification of our 
stipulation. The justification is that a number of activi-
ties have in common that they exercise ••• theoretical reason 
and it is convenient to use the term 'education' as a way 
of referring to (them). The term ••• is, ~f course, used in 
other ways, but our view is that clarity is a casualty of 
the attem~t to broaden the concept of education. 1I The 
"alternative for school policy and individual choice can be 
considered more clearly if, for example, we co~trast the 
benefits to society of spending money on education with 
those of spending it on outdoor adventure courses, rather 
"than say that (the latter) are 'part of education'." (5) A 
"narro' .... " definition is justified, they say, on the ground 
of "clarity". They do not say, nor is it obvious, why this 
should be the case. A broad definition is not necessarily, 
nor is its being broad a reason for thinking it vague. Nore 
important, though clarity (or simplicity) is one, it is not 
the only criterion of good "definition". Some theorist:s 
would argue that Downie et al have given a definition which, 
though perhaps clear, is also partial. What Downie et al 
take to be an issue of "social policy and irdividual choice" 
other theorists would take to be an educational issue. 
This might b3 little more than a verbal quibbl~. 
Here, however, it is much more. Rather than justify their 
view, Downie et al simply assume it is justified. No men-
tion is made of those theorists with whom they are in 
disagreement, nor are their arguments taken up and rebuted. 
And what "justification" is offered is in fact only a 
reason for "stipulati.on". This is unfortunate. The view 
Downie et al arrive at through presu"lption, acceptance, 
holding, adoption and assumption, rather than through argu-
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ment, is one which is both important and at least poten-
tially justifiable. Even if, as will be shown below, the 
actualization of what might be called the "theoretical self" 
has no important connectl°on °th If ° Wl se -reallzation, the 
notion that the former, to the exclusion of the "practical 
self", constitutes the whole of education is, in fact, one 
of the recurring themes in the history of educational 
thought, a view held with more reason than Downie et al 
seem willing to allow. 
What is it to actualize the self? Both Downie et al 
and Telfer assume that the problem is solved in discovering 
that aspect of the self which is actualized. But, whereas 
Downie et al assume this to be an individual's personhood, 
Telfer considers, rather than assumes, s~veral possibili-
ties. The criterion with reference to which candidates are 
accepted and rejected is that of prescribability. Not all 
aspects of the self will do, Telfer says, for then it would 
be "vacuous H to say that people "f)ught to realize them-
selves tt , that is, one would then be prescribing what people 
cannot do. Telfer considers, either singly or in combina-
tion, prescribing actualization of the "higher", :'balanced", 
"individual" and "autonomous" selves. The argument is 
cursory and unsystematic, but, in rejecting at least some 
candidates two reasons (if not two justifications) are 
given. 
First, in one sense of "higher", and on a substan-
tive rendering of "balanced", two possibilities are 
rejected because, it is saj,d, not everyone can actualize 
the aspect of self in question. (219-20, 221-22) Telfer 
does not say why this is a reaS0n. She might have in mind, 
however, the view that prescription must be universaliz-
able. Assuming this to be the case, she ~"ould have to argue 
that the population in which actualization is possible, 
though included in, is not ~xhaustive of, the population 
for which the prescription is universal. Thus, for example, 
if education can be prescribed for all men, and if all men 
cannot actualize their "higher" or "balanced" selves, then 
education cannot be the same as the actualization of these 
aspects of the self. 
Second, in one sense of' "independent"--nidiosyncra-
t·" t 
:I.C ra her than "autonomouslt--the actualization of a 
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person's independent self, ~t is said, might be only a 
"trivial" achievement. (221) Tho view rejected is that 
"everyone starts with his own unique combination of poten-
tialities--his own personality--and what is most important 
is that he should foster this uniqueness by concentrating 
on what is 'given' in this way.1t (Ibid) Perhaps, though, 
the "idiosyncratic self" shares something of the importance 
psychologists claim for 'personal identity'. And, if this 
is the case, perhaps the possibility of triviality is only 
that, granted the importance of identity, the individual 
involved might himself be trivial. Would Telfer prescribe 
that all men should become important? A person can never 
become more than he has the potential to become. He can 
only become less. To develop on~y those potentialities 
un~que to the individual concerned would be, o::.-_e might say, 
"idiosyncratic". But, to develop all the potentialiti8s a 
person has, his "unique combina tion tf , ,.,ould be, if it were 
possible--and, as Scheffler says, it is not--it is to do no 
less than can be~_done. 
There is one vie,., Telfer does :not reject, at least 
not completely. Though necessary, it is not, she says, 
sufficient for education. "I have suggested that the 
achievement of ••• intellectual self-realization--which is a 
narrow form of the realization of the higher self--is a 
necessary condition of being educated." "What is missing is 
quite simply the requirement that the educated person must 
have a certain range of knowledge." (Ibid) In support of 
this conclusion Telfer "appeal(s) ••• to what seems to me a 
rough concensus on what kind of person we would call 
educated" (226), an appeal which, she notes, is also made 
by Peters. This characteristically participant argument 
will be discussed fully in Chapter 4. Two di~ficulties, how-
ever, should be noted here. First, not everyone would agree 
with Telfer's "rough concensus". In response to their 
cri ticisms Teli·er would seem to be in a posi tion where she 
can only repeat herself: "Well, we call such and such a 
person educated!" Second, assuming the argument to be valid, 
it is open t~ criticism only on the ground that it mis-
represents the sort of person "we" would call educated. But, 
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who are "we"? Telfer does not say. Not knowing how he might 
show her wrong, the potential critic cannot know whether 
she is right. 
Both Downie et al and Telfer assume that the problem, 
what is it to actualize the self? is to be interpreted, 
what a.spe~t of the self is actualized? Downie et al discuss 
the actualization of personhood,. Telfer those of the higher, 
balanced, independent and autonomous selves. Downie et al 
conclude that education is justified because being educated 
is having actualized what we called the "theoretical self", 
the latter being, we are to assume, itself justified. 
Telfer concludes that education, at least in part, is just-
ified. Becoming educated necessarily involves, but is not 
exhausted by, the actualization of the Uintellectual self", 
the latter being, again we are to assume, itself justified. 
Downie et al deny, and Telfer--for whom the intellectual 
and theoretical selves are much the same--hesitates to 
accept, that the notion of education is such that becoming 
educated might also involve, to use their language, the 
actualization of····the "!-,ractical self". 
Self-realization is here used to help analyse, and 
thus to help intrinsically justify education. If, however, 
one assumes, as Downie et al and Telfer do, that self-real-
ization is the actualization of some aspect of the self, 
analysis is impossible, This is the case because one then 
allows the possibility of interpreting the problem as, what 
is it to actualize the educated self? Rather than help to 
solve, one merely re-states the problem. And, if one consid-
ers, as Downie et al and Telfer do, any other aspect, the 
problem again remains unsolved. It can always be asked what 
connection, if any, exists between education and the 
actualization of that aspect. In neither ca~e has the 
notion of self-realization done any analytical work~at all. 
Nonetheless, even if self-realization has not helped 
them get there, Downie et al and Telfer are clearly on to 
somethi~g important. The theory/practice distinction is not, 
as it were, a particularly "happy" one. Some people "do 
theory", that is, they theorize, others, doing non-theoreti-
~al work, are, nonetheless, only able to do it because they 
have an understanding of theory. Something should be said, 
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however, about the relevance of the distinction to thought 
about education. The p0sition Downie et al and Telfer adopt 
cannot be dismissed simp~y by pointing out that very few 
people ever become able to do theoretical work, though it 
must be said that Telfer, the only one who actually attempts 
to argue for the pOAition, does not say why the actualiza-
tion of the "intellectual self" is any more prescribable 
than those of the "balanced" or, for that matter, the 
"higher" (of ,{hich the intellectual is a part) selves. It 
is at lea~t arguable that everyone, not just the theorist, 
can profit from an understanding of theory and, further, 
that everyone can have at least some, if perhaps only intui-
tive, understanding of theory. To understand the theory 
"behind" something's occur}'\i'JG) or one's doing something, in 
a certain way, is to be in a position to stop its occuring, 
to do it in a different, perhaps be~ter way. Not to have an 
und~rstanding of theory is to be, as it were, a slave to 
one's skills, a victim of chance. The difference is one 
between, as Oakeshott might say, having or not having a cer-
tain kind of "autonomy", OT, as I would say, a certain kind 
of ttindependence". 
So far, however, only the weak aspect of the Downie 
et aI/Telfer thesis has been accounted for. Skills, "prac-
tice", give a person a different, but equally valuable sort 
of autonomy or independence. Being able to do things foz" 
himself, he is not dependent on others to have them done 
for him. W-hy, then, is education seen to be the actualiza-
tion only of the theoretical self? In the absence of an 
argument to the con~rary, let 1t be said that the view is 
not uninfluenced by the approach from which it derives. 
Hany so-called "life skills" are precisely the sort of 
thin€;' a child learns without having to be taught. For the 
participant, then, their acquisition cannot count as part 
of the child's education. Further, many more of the~e 
skills are the sorts of things a child learns at home, and 
thus has no need to be taught them in schOOl. liould the 
Downie et aI/Telfer thesis seem at all plausible if the 
parent was accepted as a full participant in the education 
of his child? 
But, what of self-realization? If it is no help to 
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ask, what aspect of the self is actualized?, what is it to 
actualize the self--itself? Can any sense be made of the 
claim that a person has ~ actualized his self? that a 
person is not himself? It might be thought that each indivi-
dual has as it were a "personal destiny", a way of being 
that is uniquely and appropriat0ly his. But, if it is 
d~stiny, what can stop him achi~ving it? What need is there 
for an educator? And if he can fail, what senseis to be 
made, in this context, of "destiny"? The educand is develop-
ing. The question ari~es, as Scheffler says, in what 
direction is he to develop? If the thought behind self-
realization is that the educand is to develop in that direc-
tion which is most appropriate, given the sort of person he 
is, the thought is both blamelessly correct and only part 
of the story. The educator must take into account other 
factors as well--for example, the sort of society in which 
the educand livps--factors which might lead to conflict and 
thus compromise. 
There are, ho,\vever, individuals abou t whom it might 
be said that they have not realized "themselves". Ambitions 
outstrip achievement--dreamers and deadbeats: wants and 
desires take second place to the wants and desires of 
others--the timid and the despairing: minor characters from 
• long forgotten novels--Itcarlcatures", "stereotypes", people 
who are "two-dimensional", "flat". Each of these qualities, 
it must be admitted, might be evidence of educational 
failure. But, until it is known: what dreams are unrealized: 
wha.t wants and what desires remain unsatisfied: and 
until it is known what sort of ~9rson would be three-dimen-
sional, rounded--it cannot be known whether or not the 
person in question is educated. Self-realization, used to 
help analyse education, is a tool too blunt to serve its 
purpose.It cannot help one to better understand the content 
of education. There is thus no obvious contradiction in 
sayin~ of a person, he is both fully-realized and quite 
uneducated, a person who, one might say, har- realized his 
"uneducated self", has fully developed in the direction of 
"vast" ignorance, Itlimitless" mis-understanding, woeful in-
eptitude, a person who, nonetheless, has achieved all his 
ambi tions, lvants and desires, is three-dimensional, rounded. 
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In "Education: The Engagement and its Frustration" , 
Oakeshott says that "education in its most general signifi-
cance may be recognized as a specific transaction between 
the generations of human beings in which new-comers to the 
scene are initiated into the world they are to inhabit." 
(43) "If a human life ••• were a process in which an organism 
reacted to its circumstances in terms of a genetic equip-
ment, there would be no room for a transaction between the 
generatio~s designed expressly to initiate the new-comer 
into what was going on and thus enable him to participate 
in it. But such is not the case." (45) "Thus, for example, 
when in a late medieval formulation of the duties of human 
beings there appears the precept that parents should 
educate their children, education was being recognized as a 
moral transaction, something that may (but ought not to) be 
neglected, and distinguished from the unavoidable natural 
processes in w'hich all living things grow up ••• It (43) For 
Oakeshott, then, education "in its most general signifi-
cance" is to be understood as follo\-Is. I't ie., first, some-
thing done, unlike a process which simply occurs. Second, 
it involves initiating "neH-corners" into lithe world they 
are to inhabit". And third, its purpose is to enable 
new-corners to "participate" in that \-Iorld. 
Education "in its most general significance", ho,,~­
ever, is to be distinguished from education "properly speak-
ing". "Educa tion, pJ.. .. operly speaking, begins when ••• there 
supervenes the deliberate initiation of a new-comer into a 
human inheritance of sentiments, beliefs, imaginings, 
understandings and activities." (48) (emphasis mine) And 
education properly speaking is to be contrasted with 
"socialization", that is, with I'the apprenticeship of the 
new-comer to adult iife (which is) an initiation, not into 
the grandeurs of human understanding, but into the ~kills, 
activities and enterprises which constitute the local world 
into which he is ••• actually born." (second emphasis mine) 
"This I will call the substitution of 'socialization' for 
education." (59) Why? "Socialization" is to be "recognized 
as a frustration of the educational engagement ••• because it 
attributes to the teacher and learner which comprise this 
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apprenticeship an extrinsic 'end' or 'purpose'; namely, the 
integration of the new-comer into a current 'society' 
recognized as the manifold skills, activities, enterprises, 
understandings, sentiments and beliefs required to keep it 
going." (59) Education "properly speaking", on the other 
hand, 
"cannot be said to have any extrinsic 'end' or 
'purpose'. For the teacher it is part of his engagement of 
being human; for the learner it is the engagement of becom-
ing human." (51) (It might be imagined that Oakeshott, the 
participant, is arguing with Dewey, the spectator, Oake-
shott claiming that Dewey fails to distinguish "education 
properly speaking" from "socialization".) 
Oakeshott says that "socialization", but not "educa-
tion properly speaking", has an "extrins;ic 'end' or 
'purpose'." It is to "keep ••• going" the "current 'society'''. 
But, he then seems to contradict himself. He says that he 
wants to "display education (i.e., education proper) as a 
human engagement of a certain kind and as a tr~nsaction 
upon which a recognizably human life depends for its contin-
uance." (43) (ern~hasis mine) If both have extrinsic ends, 
the fact that socialization has them cannot be a reason for 
lIeducation"o Oakeshott might say that human 
continuity is an effect, not the end, of "education". But, 
the advocate of socialization might respond, social con~in­
uity is, likewise, only an effect, the aim heing to initiate 
the new-comer into his societyo More important, though 
socialization is said to have an extrinsic end or purpose, 
Oakeshott does not say to what it is extrinsic. Extrinsic 
to education? If this is the case, Oakeshott has succeeded 
in saying, "education" is to be preferred tc "socializa-
tion ll because the latter is extrinsic to, other than, not 
education. Rather t:lan argue for he would merely havo 
restated his claim. 
Oakeshott does not deny that 1vit1:1out "local worlds" 
there can be no "human world". Nor does he deny that the 
new-comer only enters the latter by entering one of the 
former, the route to his "human inheritance" running in and 
through one of its local variants. Perhaps Oakeshott is 
arguing that education includes, but extends beyond, 
"socialization", that only socialization plus something 
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more is "education proper", that socialization is poor, not 
something other than education. In what respects, then, 
does "socialization" fall short of "education proper"? 
A person can come 'to participate in his local world 
without anyone's intending that he should. But, "education, 
properly speaking, begins when ••• there supervenes deliber-
ate initiation" (48). "Socialization" can occur with or 
without schools, and the learning involved need not result 
from any intention to learn. But, "education, properly 
speaking, begins when ••• the transaction (between the genera-
tions) becomes 'schooling', and when learning becomes 
learning by study, and not by chance, in conditions of 
direction and restraint. It begins with the appearance of a 
teacher with something to impart wilich i~ not immediately 
connected with the current wants or 'interests' of the 
learner. If (Ibid) Whereas Dewey thinks of schooling as only 
a possible aspect of education, Oakeshott identifies it with 
"education proper". Nonetheless, their understanding of 
'school' is remarkably similar. "The idea 'School''', 
Oakeshott says, II'is tha t of a place apar.t where a prepared 
new-comer may encounter (an "historic inheritance of human 
understandings and imaginings") unqualified by the particu-
larities, the neglects, the abridgements and the corruptions 
it suffers in current use ••• " liTo corrupt 'School' by 
depriving it of its character as a serious engagement to 
learn by study, and to abolish it either by assimilation to 
the activities, 'interests', particularities and abridg-
ments of a local world, or by substituting in its place a 
factory for turning out zombies, are ••• two sides of the 
current project to destroy educC4tion." (58) 
Rather tired, participant rhetoric, at least here, 
stands in place of justification. How does Oakeshott 
justify his preference for education proper over sociali~a­
tion? He says that "an educational engagemant is at once a 
discipline and a release; and it is the one in virtue of 
being the other. It is a difficult engagement of learning 
by study in a continuous and exacting redirection of 
attention and refinement of understanding which calls for 
humility, patience and c0urage. And its reward is an 
emancipation from the mere Ifact of living', from the immed-
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iate contingencies of place and time of birth, from the 
tyranny of the moment and from the servitude of a merely 
current condition; it is the reward of a human identity and 
of a character capable in some measure of the moral and 
intellectual adventure which constitutes a specifically 
human life." (74) Through the now empty participant rhetor-
i-c the following justification flies into view. The 
socialized, according to Oakeshott, are determined by the 
here and now, . the "merely current condition". The educated, 
on the other hand, are self-determining, are capable of the 
"moral and intellectual adventure which constitutes a 
specifically human life." Elsewhere, Oakeshott says that 
the educated are "autonomous" (51). A pre-condition of 
autonomy from the here and now is unders~anding of possible 
alternatives. Initiation into the local world is thus to be 
extended to include initiation into the human \.orld general-
ly, learning by chance--necessarily, only of the local 
world--suppl".mented by learning through study, that is, by 
'schooling' • 
In justifying "education proper", Oakashott first 
dra,v-s a distinction between it and "lv-helt he calls "socializa-
tion". He then argues that the former, but not the latter, 
is justified because its purpose is, as he says, "emancipa-
tion", something which, we are to assume, is justified. 
Education is seen as a kind of liberation, either a prepara-
tion for autonomy, or the making of an autonomous person. 
It has been already argued (in Chapter 1) t~at education is 
not the making of anyone kind of person. Is it then prepar-
ation for autonomy? What is autonomy? In On Liberty Mill 
speaks of :rthenotion of autonomy, or self-direction, 
according to which an individual's thought and action is 
his own, and not determined by agencies or causes outside 
his control." Nill gives both an equivalent--self-direction 
--and a defini tion of I autonorrlY·. The latter is ambiguous. It 
contains two propositions--thought and action are his 
own, not determined by agencies or causes outside his 
control--which, though admittedly in conjunction, can be 
related in either one of two ways. 
The r~lationship might be either a simple conjuction 
(X and Y), or it might be an explanatory conjunction 
( X that;s Y). If ;t . . , ==-, -L. 1..S a s~mple conjunction then 1'-lill is 
asserting both, not determined by agencies or causes out-
side his control and, thought and action are his own. But, 
on this interpretation autonomy is the same as independence. 
Not to be determined by agencies and causes outside one's 
control, as will be seen in Chapter 5, is to be independent, 
and one's thought and action being one's own is vacuous. If, 
on the other hand, it is an explanatory conjunction, as 
indeed seems more plausible, then Mill is asserting, thought 
and action are his 01Yn, that is, determined by agencies and 
causes within his control. On this second interpretation, 
however, autonomy is the same as freedom. (See Chapter 5.) 
There remain two further possibilities. First, autonomy 
might be explicated in terms of self-direction or, second, 
there might be a non-vacuous, and thus non-conflating sense 
in which a person's thought and ac :"ion can be uhis o'\"n". 
Thought and action being his own cannot simply be a 
matter of whose they are. They are (analytically) his, it 
bei-ng he and no other who does his own acting and thinking. 
It might, howevei;:.;, be a ques tion of the ~rela tionship bet,.;een 
thought and action and the person whose thought and action 
they are. If there is "agreement" or IIf.;ttr if 
-L., , that is, 
the thought and action accurately reflect the sort of 
person he is, then, and only then, can they be said to be 
"his own". The question is thus one of authenticity. The 
individual is the unique product of a unique history, and 
in his thought and action this ~_s either reflected or not. 
Bu-t, because authentici.ty is not directly concerned wi th 
the sort of person one is, but only with the relationship 
between who one is and how one thinks and acts, it is 
always possible for the educated to be inauthentic, and the 
uneducated authentic. The well educated Sovjet dissident 
might be just that person who, c:.mongst other talents, has a 
trained capacity ~or perhaps near-constant inauthenticity. 
And perhaps the most authentic individuals of all, that is, 
very young children, are also the least well educated. If, 
for an adult, authenticity is an achievement, it is only 
because in growing up he was also able to achieve inauthen-
ticity. Authenticity, however, is clearly not the 
autonomy. 
same as 
'Autonomy', I believe, originally referred to the 
self-governmen~-of Greek city-states. Might it be, more 
generally, that autonomy is, as the Concise Oxford say it 
is, self-direction? Self~gov~rnment, to return for the 
moment to the original, is of course not necessarily wise 
government. It is an open question whether, for example, 
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the newly-autonomous nations are better governed now than 
they were as European colonies. But, in deciding who is to 
do something, though it is a relevant consideration, it is 
not always over-riding to ask, what would be done? It might 
be rational to sacrifice at least some wisdom in government 
if as a result government comes into the hands of those who 
are subject to its authority. Self-government, or political 
autonomy, is essentially an inter-personal notion. Self-
direction, on the other hand, ia essentially personal. 
Sometimes, however, whqn an individual is said to be 
"autonomous" the analogy ,.;i th poli tical autonomy proves 
irresistable. Aspects of the individual are assigned the 
roles of governor and governed. Reason, for example, governs 
what are n0 doubt ~massesff .of passions. What might have 
been thought "missing" in political autonomy, namely, wise, 
good or rational government, is thus "found" in personal 
autonomy. The autonomous person is the person "ruled by 
reason". Dearden, for example, in "Autonomy as an Education-
al Ideal", says that "autonomy is in one way or another an 
activity of man as a rational animal", and goes on to 
cri ticize "contemporary versions of autonomy" ,.;hich "break 
this connection" (4). But, what is the connection? There 
are two significant possibilities. First, 'autonomous' 
mig~t refer to a certain sort of person, a rational person, 
or, 
my, 
second, it might refer, as it does in political autono-
to the sort of relationship a person has with other 
persons, in which case the connection with rat£onal~ty is 
indirp.ct. And, if education is not the making of a certain 
sort of person, the place of rationality in education needs 
furth~r justification. In preparing a colony for political 
autonomy one of the main concerns would be to develop wise 
or rational governors. Perhaps, then, it is in preparing 
pers:ons for self-di.rection, or personal autonomy, 
makes rationality educationally relevant. 
that 
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Personal, like political autonomy is self- as oppos-
ed to other-direction. The autonomy of former colonies is 
comparable with the child's growing autonomy from parents 
and teachers. Autonomy i~ closely related, but not the same 
as independence. They are similar in that both involve 
doing for oneself what might otherwise be done by others. 
They are, however, dissimilar in that independence, 
unlike autonomy, also involves not needing to be done by 
anyone, including oneself, what might otherwise be done by 
others. A nation becomes autonomous when it becomes self-
governing, but, on the analogy wi.th the individual, it 
becomes independent either when it can govern itself £E 
when it is not in need of governing at all. Hany former 
colonies have acquired both autonomous government and an 
increased dependence on government. Whereas, before, what 
little gov~rnment there was, and was needed, was in the 
hands of others, now, though self-governed, the nations 
have so altered (perhaps for the better, perhars not) as to 
be much more dependent on government. 
The reasorl' for preferY,w~ independence to autonomy 
in giving a general explanation of education is that the 
educand inevitably will be faced with a situation in which, 
either because he has not the talents required, or because 
his behavior is socially restricted, he will not be abl& to 
direct himself in all thingso But, if the educand is such, 
or his society is such, that in some respects he cannot be 
autonomous, it is not here that the educator finds the 
limits of his responsibility. It is tru9 that part of what 
is learned in schools, for example, consists in the sorts 
of skills, attitudes and understanding whicb, when acquired, 
equip the student for the sort of learning he will have to 
do lvhen, having left. school, he is to direct his Olin 
affairs.~But, a second part of what is learned in schools 
consists in those things few students could or would ~dnt 
to learn on their own, but which, nonetheless, are essen-
tial if the student is to cope on his own and lihich, once 
learned, are unlikely to be forgotteno Learning to read and 
to 1vri te liould only be the mos t obvious examples. And what 
appli.es to other- as opposed to self-directed learning also 
applies to other aspects ofclife. If one becomes ill or 
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suffers injury, for example, one relies either on oneself 
or on others for help. A part, but only a part, of the 
health educator's responsibility is to teach one what to do 
when these happen. A second, and perhaps more important 
part, however, would be to teach one how to live such that 
the chances of suffering illness and injury are minimized. 
One is then no longer dependent on anyone, including one-
self, for help when they occur. An individual's progress 
might be likened to his walking a road. At first he walks 
only with the help of others. He becomes autoromous when he 
can walk the road alone. He becomes independent either when 
walking alone or when, with the help of others, he has 
arrived. 
" "-
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Chapter 4 Knowledge, Understanding, Rationality 
If I understand him correctly Peters has given one 
and is, and has been for some years, developing a second 
analysis of the concept of education. The fjrst, "begun" in 
Authority, Responsibility and Education (1959), and 
"completed" in "The Justification of Education" (1973), is 
the main subject of this chapter. The second, of which for 
example "Democratic Values and Edrcational Aims" (1979) is 
a part, is I think as yet incomplete and is, in any case, 
not sufficiently well understood to be de~~ with here. I 
will thus in large part be defending a thesis the author 
himself no longer finds convincing. 
In Ethics and Education Peters concludes a prelimin-
ary analysis by giving three criteria which he says are 
"implicit in central cases of 'education'" (45). These are: 
n(i) that 'education' implies the transmission of what is 
worth-while to those who become committed to it; (ii) that 
'education' must'Yinvolve knowledge and understanding and 
some kind of cogni tive perspective, 'tvhich are not inert; 
(iii) that 'education' at least rules out some procedures 
of transmission, on the grounds that they lack wittingness 
and voluntariness on the part or the learner ll tt (Ibid) The 
analysis whieh is given in support of these conclusions 
makes reference to how "we" use the terms 'education' and 
its cognates. 
(i) If' Ec_uea tion' ••• implies tha t something worth 
while is being or has been intentionally transmitted ••• It 
would be a logical r.ontradiction to say that a man had been 
educated but that he had in no way changed for the better ••• 
This is a purely conceptual point" (25), that is, a poifit 
concerning "our" concept of education. And Ucommitment"? 
The commitment -::riterion is the same as the second of the 
two "non-inertness" criteria. See (ii) below o 
(ii) "We do not call a person 'educated' who has 
simply mastered a skill.llcHe must also have some body of 
knowledge and some kind of conceptual scheme to raise this 
above the leV'el of disjointed facts. This implies the under-
standing of principles for the organization of facts." 
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Further, u've would not call a man who was merely well 
informed an educated man. He must also have some understand-
ing of the 'reason why' of things." But, even so "what ••• 
. , 
is lacking which might make us withhold the description of 
being 'educated' from such a man? It is surely a lack of 
what might be called 'cognitive perspective'." There is a 
"conceptual connection between 'education' and seeing lvhat 
is being done in a perspective that is not too limited." 
(32) Finally, the "kind of knowledge which an educated man 
must have ••• cannot be inert in two senses. Firstly, it must 
characterize his way of looking at things rather than be 
hived off ••• ·Education' implies that a man's outlook is 
transformed by what he knows." Secondly, nit must involve 
the kind of commitment that comes from being on the inside 
of a form of thought and R\vareness ••• AII forms of thought 
and awareness have their own internal standards of apprai-
sal. To be on the inside of them is both to understand and 
to care. 1I (31) 
(iii) Though "a child might be conditioned ••• or 
"'~;'. 
induced to do something by hypnotic suggestion ••• we wou:d 
not describe this as 'education' if he was not conscious of 
something to be learnt or understood. The central uses of 
• education' are tasks in which the individual who is being 
educated is being led or induced to come up to some 
standard, to achieve something. This must be presented to 
him as something which he has to grasp." (41) 
On the basis of an analy~is of how "we" use the 
te~cms I education 1 and i ts cognates, Peters gives cri teria 
for what he calls "central case~ of educationH. "Central" 
to "our"' concept of education are: 'vorthwhileness: non-
inert knolvledge, understanding, cognitive perspective: 
wittingness and voluntariness on the part o~ the learner. 
The implications are that there are other, "peripheral" 
elements in our concept, and other concepts entirely. 
Peters does not say, at least not in Ethics and Education, 
what it is for a It~aselt of education to be "towards the 
centre". Nor does he say to 'vhom "we" is intended to refer. 
Firs t, who are "'ve"? 
The first two chapters of Ethics and Education--
"Criteria of Educati.on" and "Education as Initiation"--are 
developed from the earlier work , IIEducation as Initiation" 
in Authority, Responsibility and Education. Education, 
Peters says in the latter, has been taken to be "a commod-
ity in which it is profitable to invest": school has been 
said to have Ita role of acting as a socialization agency in 
the community" (81): and of teachers it has been proposed 
that "their main concern should be for the mental health of 
children. 1I (82) But, Peters sayo, "these economic and 
sociological descriptions of education ••• are made from the 
point of view of a spectator pointing to the 'function' or 
effects of education in a social or economic system. They 
are not descriptions of it from the point of view of 
someone engaged in the enterprise." (83) (emphases mine) 
"Education is different from social work, psychiatry, and 
real estate. Everything is what it is and not some other 
thing. 1t (82) The impli~ation is that Peters intends his 
description to be made from the point of view of "someone 
engaged in the enterprise", that is, from the point of 
view of a participant. 
In a la ter"work ("Aims of Educa tio.n--A Conceptual 
Inquirylt) Peters distinguishes tw'O uses of the term 
I education I, one of which implies lvorthlY'hileness, and a 
"derivative" use 'l",ith respect to which the worth\vhileness 
criterion does not applyo He says, "anthropologists can 
talk of the moral system of a tribe; so also can we talk as 
sociologists or economists of the educational system of a 
community. In employing the concept in this derivative 
sense, we do not think that what is going on is worth while, 
but members of the society, whose system it is, must think 
it is lvorth while" If (16) Peters' s claim concerning the 
worthlvhileness of education is, in the same article, taken 
l,lp and criticized by Dray. Dray says that "at one point 
(Peters) ende~vov~ to display this aspect by claiming that 
it would be logically contradictory for a father to say, 
'My son has been educated but nothing desirable has happen-
ed to him'. I find this difficult to accept." It does not 
"seem to violate the logic of the concept to imagine the 
same judgment being expressed by an anti-intellectual 
religious fundamentalist, who has no difficulty r9cognizing 
the marks of the educated man in his university-trained son, 
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but thinks them in themselves all to the bad." (36) In his 
"Reply" Peters merely points to the distinction mentioned 
above. He says that the father is Itusing 'education' in an 
external, descriptive so~t of way" (40-1), that is, as a 
sociologist, economist or, generally, as a "spectator" 
might use it. The implication is that Dray's criticism is 
ill-founded because it misses the point. It assumes, incor-
rectly, that Peters's analysis is intended to cover those 
aspects of the concept ""hich are revealed in "external, 
descriptive" uses of 'education'. 
In "Further Thoughts on the Concept of Education", 
the final part of "Aims in Education", Peters reconsiders 
the "serious objection" to the "desirability condition tt that 
"many regard being educated as a bad state to ~e in". 
"Their objection is not to a particular system of educa~ion, 
but to any sort of education. They appreciate that 
'education' has something to do with the transmission of 
knowledge and understanding ••• And this is ",,,hy they are 
against it; for they think of it either as useless or as 
corrupting.»- (50) Peters says that ttit could be argued, with 
Rome cogency, that people who think that being educated is 
a bad state to be in lack our concept of being educated ••• 
They have ~ concept of education; for they use the term to 
refer to what goes on in schools and universities. But they 
have not our concept. The only trouble about this way of 
dealing with the objection is that people who lack our 
concept of education are, at the moment, rather numerous. 
'We', in this context, are in the main educated people and 
those ,,,ho are professionally concerned wi th education." "So 
it is doubtful whether the desirability condition of 
'education' is a logically necessary condition of the term 
that is in current use." (51) 
~he question of whose concept of e~ucation the 
philosopher is to analyse is taken up below. The point to 
be made here is that the concept for which, in "Criteria of 
Education", Peters claims worthwhileness, non-inert 
knowledge, understanding, cognitive perspective, and 
wittingness and voluntariness on the part of the learner 
al.i to be criteria, is that concept held by "educated people 
and those who are professionally concerned with education", 
that is, by those who are or have been participants in 
education. 
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Wh t· . t f It a ~s J.. or a case" of education to be "towards 
the centre"? Peters's description of the participant's con-
cept is not intended to be arbitrary: it is at least a 
philosophical description. Nor is it intended to be 
complete: there are other, ftperipheral" elements he does 
not mention. Further, Peters does not employ the triangle 
metaphor: knowledge, etc. are !lot said to be "basic" to the 
concept: the intention then is not to give a description 
which, straightforwardly elaborated, results in a complete 
description. The metaphor used is that of the circle. The 
implication is that those elements of the concept implied 
in some but not in all uses of 'education' are "peripheral", 
whereas those elements implied in all participant uses are 
"central". The latter are central because, unlike peripher-
al elements, if they are ~ implied 'e~ucation' is being 
used to refer to something other than education. From the 
point of view of the participant, then, kno"\vledge, etc., 
are logically necessary conditions of education. 
This interpretation is implied by two, but only two, 
of the arguments Peters uses to support his criteria. With 
respect to the worth"\.".hilenes s cri terion he says that "i t 
would be a logical contradiction to say that a man had been 
educated but that he had in no way changed for the better". 
'vi th respect to the ,,,i ttingness, voluntariness cri terion he 
says that "a child might be conditioned ••• or induced to do 
something by hypnotic suggostion ••• (but) we would not 
describe this as 'education' if he was not conscious of 
something to be learnt or under3tood." (emphasis mine) 
Would not, or could not? Conditioning might involve a kind 
of lear'ning, that is, learning without necessarily coming 
to understand. (See Chapter 6.) Being "induced to do some-
thing by hypnotic suggesticn", however, does not involve 
d · "C"t learning. Though the point is somewhat obscure J..n rJ.. er-
ia of Education", it is I think being made. The point, made 
clearly in "Democratic Values and Educational Aims", is 
that though "the concept of education may be contestable ••• 
it is not completely so. We cannot call anything we like 
education ••• At least it denotes some kind of learning ••• " 
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(463) And it is, I think, the logical necessity of learning 
that the wittingness, voluntariness criterion is intended 
to express. (See below, pp. 84-5.) 
Peters, in the above, is explicitly concerned with 
the distinction between education and non-education. In 
arguing for the various knowledge criteria, however, he 
uses a distinction between sufficient and insufficient educ-
ation. He says: "we do not call a person 'educated' who has 
simply mastered a skill ••• He must also have some body of 
knowledge ••• ": "'lve would not call a man who was merely well-
informed an educated man. He must also have some understand-
ing ••• ": "what is lacking which might make us withhold the 
description of being 'educated' ••• is surely ••• what might be 
called 'cogni tive perspective' II. To argue that know·ledge, 
understanding and cognitive perspective are II central" , in 
the sense tha t any enterprise which ignors theI: cannot be 
education, Peters would have had to continue employing the 
education/non-education distinction. He would have had to 
contrast knowledge with false and unevidenced belief, not, 
as he does, wit~:practicalknowledge: understanding with 
either a lack of it or with mis-under3tanding, not with 
"mere information u : cognitive perspective w·ith, for example, 
the perspective of an infant, not that of a "narrow 
specialist". Had he employed the education/non-education 
distinction Peters would have been in a position to say 
(",·hat I think he would want to say): for instance, It "tvould 
be a logical contradiction to say that a person is educated 
but that he knows nothing, understands even less, and has a 
perspective on things which allows room for little more 
than the protuberance positioned in front o~ him. Finally, 
with respect to ~he two non-inertness criteria, Peters uses 
the term "mustlf: the IIkind of knowledge which an educated 
man must have mus~ also satisfy further reqeirement ••• It 
cannot be inert in two senses ••• " 
In his "Further Thoughts", in "Aims of Education li , 
Peters says that he will be "probing to see whether any 
conditions that even begin to look like logically necessary 
conditions have been provided (by the author) for the use 
of the term 'education'." (50) Later, under the heading 
"Objections to knowledge condi ti.ons", he says, "we migh-c 
talk of Spartan education, or of education in some even 
more primitive tribe, when we know that they have nothing 
to pass on except simple skills and folk-lore ••• As there 
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are a lot of people who talk in a quit9 unabashed way about 
Spartan education, it is difficult to maintain that the 
knowledge conditions are logica~ly necessary conditions of 
the term in general use. 1t (52) "It looks, therefore, as if 
the concept of 'education' is a very fluid one", one which 
includes an "older and undifferentiated concept ,.,..hich 
refers just to any pr0cess of bringing up or rearing in 
which the connection ••• with knowledge is purely contingent. 1t 
(55) The implication is that in the earlier "Criteria of 
Education" Peters intended the knowledge criteria to be 
logically necessary conditions for the p'articipant's use of 
, education' • 
The connection between educd.tion and kno,.,..ledge will 
be discussed below. It should be noted here, however, that 
Pe ters is ,.,..rong in thinking tha t u talk of ••• educa tion in 
some ••• primitive tribe" implies that knowledge is not a 
necessary condition of 'education'. There is a difference 
between transmitting "simple skills", that is, practical 
kno"\.;ledge, and transmitting "folk-lore", that is, what is 
(albeit incorrectly) assumed to be true, and transmitting 
ways of doing things known not to work, and beliefs known 
to be false. The former, to use Peters's o,.,..n argument, 
might be insufficient or even bad education, but it is 
educat~on nonetheless. To seriously doubt the logical nec-
es~ity of the knowledge conditions it is not too much of an 
exaggera tion to say that one ,{ould have to doubt whether 
the following is a contradiction: The tribe succeeded in 
educating their young, but as a result not one of them 
d t 1 . °t to ThJ..·s J..·s not 1~he doubt that escape men a J..DcapaC:L a :Lon. -
occurs to Peters. 
Peters gives three, or rather three groups of criter-
ia for education. Taken together, how good an understanding 
do they represent? First, the worthwhileness criterion. 
Peters says that one of the criteria trimplicit in central 
cases of 'education'" is the IItransmission of what is worth-
while". That is, from the point of view of Iteducated people 
and those who are professionally concerned wl"th 
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education", 
worthwhileness is a logically necessary condition for the 
use of the term 'educati~n'. Meaning and necessity are 
contextually-bound. A spea~er's meaning is related to his 
intention, and to his belief that the hearer will recognize 
that intention. And a speaker uses the term "necessarily" 
when he thinks that, because of his other beliefs the , 
hearer, to be consistent, must accept what he (the speaker) 
is saying. ItEducation is worthwhile" might be, as PeterB 
implies, ~nalytically true. Depending on the context in 
which it is used, h01vever, it might also be: synthetically 
true, as, for example, when understood as a qualification 
for the "Good Life": synthetically false--when, say, 
identified with schooling and Itthus rt tho~ght to do more 
harm than good: analytically false, as, for example, in 
Dray's illustration wh~re education is believed to be incom-
patable with faith, and thus intrinsically evil. 
ttEduca tion is 'vorth'vhile" is, however, a t least in 
some contexts, analytically true. The context required is 
one in which peo~le share a belief, and beILeve they share 
a belief, in the worth,..,rhileness of education. The first 
condition might be met in any context. But the second, 
apart from personal knowledge, is likely to be met only 
amongst "educated people and those professionally concerned 
with education'! and, of these, especially the latter. 
Educators, at least in a minimal sense, have 'committed' 
themselves to the w0rth of education. Evidence of their 
commitment comes in public, not to say, communal activity, 
and thus a context exists in which both conditions are met. 
A particular educator might not believe that education is 
worthwhile. But he knows that, apart from personal know-
ledgE', other educators will assume he does. Even he will be 
able to make use of the linguistic convention amongst 
educa~ors which links 'worth' and 'education' analy~ically. 
Conceptual analysis only clarifies belief Q It cannot 
itself determine whether belief is true. Educators on the 
whole believe education to be worthwhile. Others do not. 
The philosopher, in trying to understand something, must 
beg~n somewhere. If he begins with someone else's under-
standing, or concept, hi.s beginning is only as good as the 
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understanding of the person he selects. The philosopher of 
history makes a poor start if he begins with the views of 
those ",·ho have no knowledge of or interest in the past. The 
aesthetician makes an especially poor start if he begins 
with the views of those for ",·hom, say, literature is a 
"closed book", disastrous if they themselves closed the 
book. Peters begins his enquiry into education by noting 
that many theorists seem unable to distinguish education 
from "social work, psychiatry and real estate". He does not 
stop to analyse their concept of education. Instead, he 
analyses the concept held by educators, that is, by those 
who are interested in, committed to and who have experience 
of education. 
The wide-spread institutionalizat~on of education is, 
as was noted in Chapter 2, only a relatively recent pheno-
menon. It ~s only recently that a distinct participant's 
concept of education has emerged, the institutions provid-
ing the sort of context in which a shared understanding can 
develop. A part of that understanding is the view that educ-
ation, because of' what it is, is worthwhile. In ttAims of 
Education" Peters says that "the concept of 'education' is 
a very fluid one. At one end of the continuum is the older 
undifferentiated concept ••• in which the connection ••• with 
'lv-hat is desirable ••• is purely contingent ••• The more rec6nt 
and more specific concept ••• (involves) the development of 
states of a person that ••• ~ desirable." (55) (emphasis 
mine) And there seems little question that Peters is cor-
rect. To begin, as Peters does, 1v-i th all analysis of the 
"more recent and more specific conceptlf is just to begin. 
It is, nonetheless, without doubt to begin well. 
Whether the participant is correct in thinking that 
education is intrinRically 'lv-orth'lv-hile depends of course on 
'lv-hat he takes education to be, and whether the latter is 
intrinsically worthwhile. Thus, second, the knowledge con-
ditions. 
Peters says that, for the educator, 11 'education' must 
involve knowledge and understanding and some kind of 
cogni"tive perspective, which are not inert." Why? Why is it 
that education cannot involve false beliefs, mis-understand-
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lngs, narrow perspective, all of which ~ inert? It might 
be argued that only the former are worthwhile, and, as 
Peters says, "'education' implies the transmission of what 
is worthwhile't. It will be recalled, however, that Peters's 
earlier emphasis on the distinctiveness of education--its 
being other than social work, psychiatry and real estate--
was made in terms of its descriptive, not its evaluative 
features. Peters was not implying that social work, psychia-
try and real estate are not worthwhile. Further, if it is 
assumed that worthwhileness is the more fundamental 
condition it cannot be argued that education is worthlvhile 
because it involves knowledge, understanding, cognitive 
perspective. But, as will be seen below, this is just what 
Peters does. And finally, so far tnere is warrant for claim-
ing that education is worthwhile only from the point of 
view of the educator. The claim is open to sceptical, even 
cynical interpretation. 
The educational situation, as Peters describes it, 
involves: a 'transmitter' (the educator): a 'receiver' (the 
educand): a 'mes~age' (non-inert knowledge, untierstanding, 
cognitive perspective). What the educand is to receive will 
in part dep~nd both on what he already has and on what he 
is likely to get either on his own or from persons other 
than the educator. The educator, then, supplements or 
corrects what the educand already has or is likely to get 
elsewhere. In what sort of state does Peters suppose the 
educand to be prior to his encounter with the educatcr? 
He is without, and otherwise is unlikely to acquire: skill, 
or at least sufficient skill--or practical knowledge: true, 
or at least well-supported true belief--or propositional 
knowledge: understanding, that is, he lacks understanding 
or is confused, mystified, mis-understands: cognitive per-
spective, that is, what he understands is understood in 
only a limited number of ways: and, finally~ even if he has 
knowledge, understanding, cognitive perspective, they are 
not, at least in some ways, evidenced in his thought and 
action, that is, they are inert. 
What sort of state is this to be in? Unskilled, the 
educand cannot do--at le~st not well--what he, what others 
want him to do, what he should do. Ignorant, he does not 
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kno~ what to do or, if he does, cannot do it. Believing 
what is false, he thinks he is, but is not, acting in this 
world. He does what he cannot do, limits himself to what he 
cannot do. Believing what he cannot support, he is not in a 
position to alter his beliefs in the light of contrary 
evidence. Inevitably, as the world changes his beliefs 
become outmoded. Not understanding how things are, and thus 
how they might be, both action and inaction are inappro-
priate, perhaps tragic. lvithout cognitive perspective, he 
acts on an insufficient basis of Lelief, doing well a matter 
more of luck than calculation. And, finally, if what 
knowledge, understanding and cognitive perspective he has 
is inert, though the educand is able to act correctly, 
appropriately, effectively, rationally, ~n fact he does not. 
He acts as if he '\vere wi thout knowledge, understanding, 
cognitive perspective. 
The educand,prior to his encounter with the educa-
tor, is assumed to be in a certain state. Given this state, 
the educator, according to Peters, is to transmit skills 
the edu~and othe~wise would not acquire,' or improve those 
skills he already has: transmi t \vha t knowledge and under-
standing the educand otherwise is unlikely to come by: 
correct false and support unevidenced belief: exorcise con-
fusion, mystification, mis-understanding:· widen the 
educand's perspective on things by initiating him into ways 
of thinking which otherwise he would not acquire, or 
acquire only imperfectly. The educand, then, to use Sidney 
Hook's terms, i.s "powerless", and education is "power". 
Peters says that non-inert knowledge; understanding 
and cognitive persp~ctive are, from the point of view of 
the educator, necessary to education. What does he not say? 
And why does he not say it? Peters's account of what is 
transmitted in education is, insofar as we now have it, 
open to critici<>m on at least tliO grounds. It might be crit-
icized, first, for not being comprehensive, for being, as 
is sometimes said, '\narrowly cogni tive tt • And, second, it 
might be criticized for being incomplete, for not saying, 
and for not giving a criterion by which it can be decided, 
what knowledge, etc., is to be transmitted. 
Consider the following three cases. First, there are 
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two adults, one good, the other morally evil. The latter 
does his evil deeds not because he lacks knowledge and 
understanding--he is in fact what is sometimes called a 
"sophisticated egoistU--but because he is a sadist, that is, 
like the good man he does what he does because it pleases 
him to do so. Assuming an equality of knowledge, etc., are 
we to assume that these two are equally well educated? 
Second, there are two adults, one law-abiding, the other a 
criminal. The latter, unlike most criminals, has a high 
level of knowledge, understanding, cognitive perspective. 
He knows the risks he takes, but takes them regardless. 
Crime is his "way of life", the only way of life in which 
he can, pace Dewey, fully realize himself. Is he then 
better educated than his law-abiding, b~t less knowledge-
able friend? Finally, there are two adults, one active in a 
number of different ways, the othe ... · more less chronically 
inactive. In "Aims of Education lt , responding to criticism 
by Woods, Peters says that if a person's "outlook ••• on life 
generally was very little influenced by 'the matters he had 
proper time for ~n his youth', I would say that he was 
uneducated. If, however, the precipitates of them were not 
altogether 'inert', why, in my view, should he not be 
called educated?" (47) (emphasis mine) In other words, even 
if a person does very little, if what he does do is charac-
terized or informed by knowledge, etc., then Peters would 
say the person is educated. But is the knowledgeable lay-
about as well educated as his far more active and equally 
kn0wledgeable neighbour? 
Some theorists--including Peters (see, for example, 
his writings on moral education)--would count what a person 
does as direct evidence of education or its lack. Typically, 
if not universally, evil, criminal or just lack of behavior 
are all thought to be reasons fvr.supposing a person badly 
edl~cated. And thu~, as was seen in Chapter 1, for some 
theorists education becomes the development of persons who 
both act and act for example virtuously and within the law. 
But, deciding to act one w"ay or another can be distinguish-
ed from the basis upon which decisions are made. The 
educator's role, Peters implies, is not to decide for the 
educand what subsequently he is to do; rather it is to tran-
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smit to him the knowledge, understanding and cognitive per-
spective with which the educand can decide for himself. The 
educand subsequently might turn to evil, crime or to 
inactivity. That is his responsibility. It is only if he 
does so because he lacks knowledge, etc. that it becomes 
the responsibility of the educator as well. Thus, subse-
quent evil, 
Education", 
crime or inactivity, at least in "Criteria of 
would only count as indirect evidence of a lack 
of education. In ttCriteria of Education", then, there i~ an 
implicit ~espect for freedom of choice. And what is here 
implicit is, as will be seen below, made explicit in ItThe 
Justification of Education". 
Suppose, at least for the moment, that respect for 
freedom of choice is as it were "built into" the concept: of 
education. It might still be the case--as his later writings 
on moral education wouid seem to indicate--that Peters's 
ana l.ysis is "narrowly cogni tive", the reason being that the 
notion of decision-making is itself narrowly cognitive. 
There is a difference between deciding to do something and 
doing it. A pers6n o might decide to do X~but, for reasons 
other than having decided to do so, do Y. He might, for 
example, lack persistence, emotional strength, courage, all 
of which, as it happens, are required if he is to carry out 
his decision to do X. And thus, without intending to do so, 
the person might find he has succeeded in doing only Y. 
Supposing Y to be disastrous, some theorists would argue 
that responsibility for its being done must be shared 
between the educand and the educator, that, short of deter-
mining for him that he is to do !, the educator has a 
responsibility to help the educand in learning how to act 
with persistence, strength and courage 0 
Peters's analysis in "Criteria of Edvcation lt might 
be "narrowly cognitive" in a second respect" Good decision-
making does not just depend on knowledge, understanling and 
cogni-tive perspective. The educator cannot forsee every 
situation the educand subsequently will find himself in. He 
cannot transmit to him, then, all the knowledge, etc. he 
will require to make good decisions. What the educator 
might do, however, what some theorists argue he should do, 
is help the educand to develop in such a way that, when 
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faced with having to make a decision, he t 1 
a. east will pos-
sess those qualities which are needed to . 
acqul.re the 
necessary knowledge and understanding. Many qualities are 
needed, or at least are desirable, not all of which Peters 
might be taken to have included under the category of 
skills or practical kno'fledge. Some of these are: curiosity: 
imagination and sensitivity: a talent for learning from 
mistakes, the ability to learn from others: belief that not 
all is vanity, that at least some things "make a differ-
ence". Lacking anyone of these qualities, the educand's 
freedom of choice is as it were 'self-limited', a state of 
affairs for which, it might be argued, the educator must 
share responsibil£ty~ 
Peters gives criteria which, he says, are "necessary" 
to 'education'. The criteria he gives might fulfill this 
condition without, as is being suggested, constituting a 
comprehensive account of education. Nor need the account be 
complete. What knowledge and understanding, co~itive 
perspective over what range, is to be transmitted? There 
are distinctions~between educationally relevant and irrele-
vant, and educationally important and unimportant knowledge 
and understanding. That is, knowledge and understanding of 
language, science and mathematics- can be distinguished 
from both knowing how many hairs there are on one's head 
and from the significance of that number for groups, both 
ancient and modern, for whom such things seem to matter a 
great deal. Similarly, being able to see things from a 
religious, sociological or psychological perspective, can 
be distinguished from seeing things, or at least some 
things, under the aspect of galactic movemerts, and from 
seeing them from the point of vie'f of the man down the road 
who interprets worl~ events according to moods induc0d by 
prompt or tardy delivery of the morning posto In "Criteria 
of' 'Education" at least Peters does not give criteria by 
which such distinctions are to be made. 
Peters in effect responds to these .. cri ticisms in "The 
Justification of Education", a response considered below. 
P.S. lvilson, in "Interests and Educa:;ional Values", consid-
ers the second and third of the three criticisms. He begins 
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by accepting the distinction between what he calls educa-
tional and non-educational learning. It will be recalled 
that Peters does not argue that the distinction is one 
between worthwhile and non-worthwhile learning. There is a 
reason for this, a reason Wilson brings out. He says that 
"it's no help to say that h t d· t· . w a 1S 1ngu1shes educational 
from non-educational learning is that educational learning 
is valuable. Valuable for what? Educational learning might 
be valuable for all sorts of non-educational reasons, such 
as financial ones, as well as for educational ones." 
(181-82) The argument leads either to absurdity--all valu-
able learning is educationally valuable learning, or to 
vacu~ty--all educationally valuable learning is education-
ally valuable learning. Even if ali educational learning is 
valuable, not all valuable learning is specifically educa-
tionally valuable. It remains an open question, then, what 
is it for learning specifically to be of educational value. 
Wilson thinks that "my knowlp,dge has to be instrument-
al to something (that is, it has to have some sort of pay 
off, whether intr'inAic or extrinsic to the subject matter 
which I am learning), or my reasons for valuing i~ cease to 
be intelligible ••• " (189) He contrasts "instrumental" learn-
ing \vith "learning for learning's sake". And, Uto say that 
educational learning is learning for learning's sake is" he 
claims "no more informative than to say that people are in 
the market for money,," (Ibid) 1{ilson wan ts to know "what 
distinctively educational reason do people learn or get 
knowledge for?" because he thinks "lack of an answer here 
reduces ••• educational pursuits to matters of idle curiosity" 
(Ibid). 
It might be objected, however, that curiosity is an 
"intelli.gible" motivation, and that "for the sake of learn-
ing itself" is an intelligible reason for learning. The 
objection, though well-taken, is beside the point. The point 
Wilson is making, if not the arguments he uses to support 
it, is that neither curiosity nor for the sake of learning 
itself is the distinctively educational reason for learning. 
If Wilson were, wrong the implication would be that, because 
anything can be learned uut of mere curiosity or merely for 
its own sake, all learning must be educationally relevant 
and all must be of equal educational importance--at least 
potentially. 
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"What distinctive~y educational reason", then, "do 
people learn or get knowledge for?" nIt seems to mb that 
(the) question (is) to be answered ••• by picking the distinc-
tive feature common ••• to knowledge, namely, that the more 
you have, the more you can therefore get.1I (190) It will be 
recalled that Dewey. in anticipating Scheffler's criticism, 
says that distinctiYely educational growth is growth which 
gives the educand an "added capac:tty of growth u • Similarly, 
Wilson says that "if knowledge is distinctive of education 
••• to value something educationally is to value knowledge 
of it because, the more you have of that form of knowledge, 
the more you can th~refore get. To have an educational 
reason for doing something, therefore, is to want to learn 
something (that is, to get knowledge of it) because this 
learning will put you in a rosition, thereby, to learn 
more." (Ibid) This, than, is Wilson's criterion for distin-
guishing educationally relevant and important knowledge. 
Knowledge is educationally relevant if it gives the educand 
what might be called an "added capacity" for acquiring more 
knowledge, and it is the more educationally important the 
greater the capacity it adds. Further, Wilson's criterion 
can be used to account for the fact that educators transmit, 
as well as knowledg~, those qualities which are necessary, 
or at least desirable, if the educand, on his own, is to 
avail himself of this added c~pacity. 
It wi.11 be argued in Chapter 5 that the sort of 
criterion both Dewey and Wilson employ is OT fundamental 
educational importallce, an importance su~gested by the 
phrase, "learning how to learn". The criterion is of funda-
mental 9ducational importance. It cannot be, however, 
educationally fundamental. The greater the educand's 
capacity to le&rn the better he is educated. But, of two 
educand's with equal capacity--and who have acquired as 
well the same sorts of knowledge--the one who has acquired 
more is better educated than the one who has acquired less. 
And, acquiring knowledge is not, pace Wilson, always 
added capacity for knowledge. l{hether it is acquiring an 
would depend on both the sort of knowledge and the sort of 
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thing it is knowledge of. Knowledge which is little more 
than information is not the same as knowledge which forms a 
part of a general explanation. And knowledge of some, more 
or less arbitrary code, such as highway signs, is not the 
same as, for example, knowledge of human psychology. 
Wilson's criterion does not take account of the fact that 
the person who knows more but does not have a greater capa-
city might, nonetheless, be the better educated. 
Children are taught how to read in part because, 
being able to read, they can acquire knowledge and under-
standing. But, being able to read is in itself educational-
ly important. Even if it were known the educand would not 
use his ability for the specific purpose of acquiring more 
knowledge he would still be taught how to do it, because 
being able to read serves many purposes, only one of which 
is the acquisi tion of knolv-Iedge. C: ... ildren are taught how to 
Uthink scientifically" because, in being able to do so, 
they can thereby acquire scientific knowledge and under-
standing. But, they are also taught the knowledge and under-
standing which i~ the result of scientiats thinking 
scientifically. Indeed, of the two general purposes science 
education serves, it is the latter which has been, at least 
historically, the more important. And if the educand 
acquired scientific knowledge and understanding, but not 
the ability to think scientifically, he would still be 
better educated than he would have been had he acquired 
nothing at all. 
It would be misleading to conclude that "learning 
how to learn" is only one of many things the educand 
acquire~. It is not, however, as Wilson suggests, the only 
thing. Emphasis on the rtmanner" in which the educand comes 
to think is associated specifically with Dewey and general-
ly with what is called "progreselve" education. Emphasis on 
'tv-hat he thinks, the "matter" or Ircontent", though associa-
ted with no one individual theorist, is linked generally 
with what is called "traditional" education. "Nanner" and 
Umatter" are, of course, inextricably bound, and thus, in a 
trivial sense, education can be neither progressive nor 
traditional without at the same time being the other. It 
can be argued, however, as Wilson does, that the aim of 
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education involves only the one, the other being a neces-
sary means. And thus, if the educand could learn how to 
learn, without at the same time learning that something is 
the case, or if he could learn that without at the same 
time learning how, then, so far as his education is concern-
ed, so he should do. Some reason has been given for think-
ing education cannot be equated with either progressive or 
traditional education. The relationship between the three 
is explained in Chapter 5. 
Pe+.ers makes neither mistake. In Ethics and Education 
he says that "the traditional view of .education •••• empha-
sized the matter and cognitive perspective of 'education' 
rather .than its manner; the child-centred view drew 
attention to questions concerned with its manner and rather 
evaded the question of its matter; views which build up an 
account of 'education' by extrapolating what is involved in 
acquiring skills ignore its cognitive perspective. All such 
views are inadequate in the way in which caricatures are; 
they distort the features of the concept in a particular 
direction.': (46 r:' "r-.·'lanner" is here used 'vi th a different 
referrent--manner in educating, not the educand's manner of 
thinking. But, the educator, in emphasizing the first sort 
of manner, must also be emphasizing the manner in which the 
educand comes to think. The educational situation involves 
the educator and the educand working together. The progres-
sive, or "child-centred", emphasis is on how both do what 
they do. The progressive (and the traditionalist as well) 
has a criterion by which educationally relevant and import-
ant knowledge can be distinguished. Peters is correct in 
thinking that neither possesses the whole truth. He has not, 
however, at least as yet, told us what that truth is. 
By way of sur.lming up his preliminary discussion of 
the cuncept of education Peters gives three fIeri ter;.a of 
Education lt • The third, the "process" criterion is that 
"'education' at least rules out some procedures of transmis-
sion, on the grounds that they lack wittingness and 
voluntariness on the part of the learner." Earlier on 
Peters says that "'education' implies that sometl.Ling ••• is 
being ••• transmitted in a morally acceptable manner" (25), 
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but the distinction of which the process criterion makes 
use is not that between "voluntary", or moral, and involun-
tary, or immoral. It is, rather, the distinction between 
learning and conditioning or hypnosis. The point of the 
criterion is that, though "a child might be conditioned ••• 
or induced to do something by hypnotic suggestion ••• we 
would not describe this as 'education' if he has not 
conscious of something to be learnt or understood. The 
central uses of 'education' are tasks in which the indivi-
dual who is being educated is being led or induced to come 
up to some standard, to achieve something. This must be 
presented to him as something which he has to grasp." (41) 
Peters is not saying that if an activity is involuntary, 
that is, if it is compulsory, it cannot be an educational 
activity. On this criterion most schooling would have to be 
ruled out. He is saying that education must involve learn-
ing, and that learning, insofar as it is distinguishable 
from conditioning and hypnosis, involves heing aware 
of something to be grasped or understood. It is only by 
interpreting Peters in this way that the process criterion 
becomes a distinctively educational, rather than a general 
moral criterion. 
In Philosophy of Education McClellan says, I think 
correctly, tha t "if 've take Peters' defini tion as I think 
we should take it, it is directed not toward the use of the 
word 'education' in English but toward the concept of 
education as that concept is slowly penetrating our social 
consciousnesso" And, "it does reflect quite accurately, I 
believe, the most general beliefs about education held (or 
coming to be held) by the concerned and reflective segments 
of our society" (20), that is, by those who, because they 
~ concerned, and ~ecause they have reflected on the 
object Jf their concern, are in the best position to under-
stand education. ItBut" , HcClellan goes on, Itthese beliefs 
are themselves confused and superficial." "Consider just 
one obvious question: What are lve to do when conflicts 
arise from the application of these three very different 
sets of criteria? Many different conflicts might arise, but 
one must arise: criterion (i) mandat~s pedagogical inten-
tions that will inevitably require pedagogical actions 
prohibited by (iii). To speak vulgarly, if you start out 
committed to transmitting what's worth while to kids in 
such a way that the ~ids"will become committed to it, 
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ycu're inevitably going to violate their 'wittingness and 
voluntariness'.1t (Ibid) The "conflict" to which McClellan 
refers is, one suspects, one between education and morality. 
As such, it is beyond the scope of this paper. McClellan 
might be referring, hO"H"ever, to a conflict intrinsic to 
Peters's analysis of education. What might this conflict be? 
It should be noted first that, in the &xample 
McClellan gives, there is a sense in which there is no 
conflict at all. According to Peters, for something to be 
education it must satisfy all three criteria. In McClellan's 
example, however, something is said to satisfy (i) and, one 
supposes, (ii), but not (iii). There is no conflict here: 
the thing in question is simply not education. McClellan is 
being misleading when he says that educC"tors "start out" to 
satisfy (i) and (ii) and then f:1_nd themselves, "inevitably", 
violating (iii). Educators, according to Petp.rs, start out 
.,. 
to satisfy all thred criteria. 
The question remains, hOl"ever, if, and in '''hat sense, 
it is II inevi table tI tha t in transmi tting '''ha t is wortht"hi Ie 
to those '''ho are to become commi tted to it, the latter's 
wittingness and voluntariness will be violated. McClellan 
might be using "inevitable" in +:he sense of "logically 
inevitable". If this is the case he is claiming that educa-
tion, as Peters understands it, is logically impossible. 
1{hy might this be the easel The educand is initiated into, 
say, science. He cannot know what science is for, if he did, 
he would be initiated into it a~ready. Therefore, it might 
be argued, the educand cannot be initiated into science, or, 
to generalize, into any worthwhile activ1ty, without his 
wittingness and voluntariness being violated. A person, how-
ever, can be Rt-lare of what ~le is doing. And, rather than a 
single doing, initiation into science is a process which 
involves countless doings, of all of which the educand can 
be aware while he is doing them. He cannot, of course, know 
towards what his doings are intended to lead him. But, this 
does not imply that education, as Peters describes it, is 
impossible. Peters says that the educand must be "conscious" 
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only of "something to be learnt of understood". He does not 
say what exactly that something must be, nor is it 
plausible to assume that he thinks the educand, unlike the 
rest of mankind, must be aware of what his actions are lead-
ing him to. 
There is, however, a second sense in which it would 
be right for McClellan to say that conflict is "inevitable". 
The educa t or is often faced wi th the fo llo'ving si tua tio!l. 
On the one hand, to initiate an educand into a lvorthwhile 
activity he must, for anyone of R number of reasons , 
present it to him in such a way that he (the educand) is not 
conscious of something to be learnt or understood. The 
child, for example, plays, as a result of which he learns. 
On the other hand, to respect the wittingness and voluntar-
iness of the educand, the educator can only initiate him 
into those activities which have little if any educational 
worth. The educand is not a good "learner", for whatever 
reason, not a willing learner. The educator, then, is 
faced 'vi th a dilemma, a "conflict" , a conflict which, 
the sort of crea fure man happens tv be, ~is inevi table. 
given 
The question arises, what 1S the educator to do? And, 
for our purposes more important, how is he to decide? 
Peters gives three criteria which he says are necessary to 
education. The process criterion, at least as stated, might 
not in fact, as is suggested above, be necessary. Whether 
it is would depend on further clarification of what exactly 
Peters takes to be involved in learning. But., this is not 
the problem Hcr,lellan's criticism raises. The problem is 
that in giving an account of education in which there is 
more than one crite~ion, Peters's analysis is open to the 
criticism of being incoherent. Because there is no obvious 
internal connection between initiation into worthwhile 
activities and wittingness and voluntariness on the part of 
the ini tia te, the educa tor, lvl~en faced wi th the above-
mentioned dilemma, has no better understanding of what he 
is to do after as he had before reading Peters. l.,~at the 
educator needs is a more fundamental criterion, a criterion 
on the basis of which he can make his decision. (It is for 
just this criterion Peters is looking in "The Justification 
of Education".) 
88 
The point of the process criterion is to distinguish 
learning, or perhaps educational learning, from the sorts 
of things a person can acquire from either hypnosis or con-
ditioning. Peters says that "Co d·t·· . +' n 1 10nlng ••• 1S o~ reactions , 
such as salivation and e bl· k d +' ye- ln s, an o~ simple movements 
which are not seen as bringing about anything by the 
subject. Movements of a random sort are made which are 
positively or negatively reinforced. If the movements form 
part of an action, in the sense of being seen by the 
subject as bringing something about which may be pleasant 
or unpleasant, it is only by analogy that the concept of 
conditioning is applied." (42) In conditioning there is 
nothing to be "learnt n or "understood" because, whereas the 
latter always do have, "conditioning ••• in a strict sense, 
has no connection with beliefs." (Ibid) 
It will be recalled that, w:th the exception of the 
worthwhileness condition, Peters's arguments for the 
"Criteria of Education" have the form, Being educated 1S 
not just being X (e.g., skilled, informed), it also involves 
Y (e.g., knowledge, unuerstanding). It will also be recal-
led that a possible interpretation of the process criterion 
is, simply, education must involve learning. A second 
interpretation is also possible. According to this Peters 
is saying, education cannot just involve conditioning, it 
must also involve "learning", that is, the learning invol-
--
ved in acquiring beliefs. Assuming this interpretation to 
be correct, and leaving aside the incongruent worthwhile-
ness condi tion, it can be argued tha t Peters has sho'ofn none 
of his criteria to be necessary to education, only, perhaps, 
to good education. The argument is strengthened when it is 
realized that between "conditioning", as Peters describes 
it, and the sort of learning which comes ab0ut when the 
educand is "conscious of something to be learnt or under-
stood", is learning which is, as Peters notes, lion the 
fringe of things to which the learner is attending" (41n), 
I . wh1 ch, nonetheless, may very well be educational. earnlng ..L 
There is then a more fundamental criterion implicit in 
Peters's account. It is the criterion by use of which he 
distinguishes good from bad education, ttlearning" , know-
ledge and understanding, from "conditioning", skills and 
information. 
Before turning to "The Justification of Education" 
there are two further elem8nts of Peters's preliminary 
account which should be considered. In Chapters 1 and 2 
there was discussion of two answers to the question, to 
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what category does education belong? or, what sort of thing 
is education? There was discussion of education both as a 
kind of development and as a kind of preparation. In 
"Criteria of Education" Peters says education is a kind of 
transmission, that is, transmission of non-inert knowledge, 
understanding and cognitive perspective. In "Education as 
Initiation" (Chapter 2 of Ethics and Education), on the-
other hand, the place which earlier had peen occupied by 
transmission, is now held by initiation, as in initiation 
into worth"\vhile activi eies. Both notions are of interest, 
but it is only with the latter that Peters attempts a 
"definition" or an ttaccount of the synthetic nature tt of 
education. (46) 
'Transmis;ion' is, from several points of view, an 
apparently adequate characterization of education. To 
transmit is to pass or hand on. It pre-supposes someone who 
has something someone else has not, and that the thing in 
question is such that it can be passed or handed from the 
one to the other. It is true that having passed on a 
material object--a bucket of water in fighting a fire, for 
instance--a person then no longer possesses it. But, in 
transmitting a message, for instance, by wireless, there is 
no comparable implication. A teacher knows X. A learner 
does not. The teacher intends that the learner, as a result 
of some activity, will come to know, to possess, X. It can 
be said, if perhaps only metaph0rically, that the teacher 
"transmi tted U X to -i;he learner, there being no implication 
that ln doing so he thereby ceased knowing it. 
Dewey, in speaking of the function of the school, 
says it is "one important method of the transmission which 
forms the dispositions of the young.1t (Democracy and 
Education, p. 4) Further, "as a society becomes more 
enlightened, it realizes that it is responsible not to 
transmit and conserve the whole of its existing achieve-
ments, but only such as make for a better future 
society. 
The school is the chief ag f 
ency or the accomplishment of 
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this end. 1t (Ibid, p. 20) Rather than, as in Dewey, a means 
of social improvement, school education, or education 
generally, can be seen as the means by which a society's 
distinctive way of life is perpetuated, that is, the means 
of social continui ty--Dew'ey' s main thesis. In liThe Concept 
of Education Today" Frankena distinguishes, amongst others, 
what he calls (here echoing McClellan) a "sl)cial science" 
concept of education. "Education" Frankena says, is 
"thought of as a process of 'enculturation' or 'socializa-
tion'." It is defined as "the transmission to the young of 
the dispositions or states of mind ••• that are regarded as 
desirable by their elders." (20) In both, cases education 
involves transmitting to the young what their elders 
already possess. 
Teachers, or adults generally, can be seen as trans-
mitters, learners and children as receivers. I~ might be 
supposed, then, that the distinctive roles of educator and 
~: .. 
educand are, similarly~ those of transmitter and receiver, 
and that education is a kind of transmission. Indeed, both 
participant and, as above, spectator accounts can and do 
lead to the same conclusion. Peters says that 'education' 
implies "the transmission of what is worthwhile to those 
who become committed to it": that what is t~ansmitted is 
"knowledge and understanding and some kind of cognitive 
perspective, which are not inert": that it "rules out some 
procedures of transmission, on the groL~ds that they lack 
wittin?J1ess and voluntariness on the part of the learner. tt 
There is little doubt that education involves transmission. 
But is education itself a kind of transmission? 
The theorist3 quoted above are all prepared, i~ 
clarifying at least some aspects of education, to make use 
of the notion of transmission. But, whc~ they come to 
characterize the sort of thing education is generally not 
one of them is prepared to say it is a kind of transmission. 
Dewey uses "transmission" in discussing some functions of 
the school, but he also says that school "is only one means, 
and, compared with other agencies, a relatively superficial 
means" of forming "the dispositions of the young." (Democra-
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cy and Education, p. 4) And, in his discussion of education 
generally, "transmission" does not occur. ttEducation tt , he 
says, is lJ a fostering, a nurturing, a cultivating, process. 
All of these words mean that it implies attention to the 
conditions of growth. We also speak of rearing, raising, 
bringing up--words which express the difference of level 
lV'hich educa tion aims to cover ••• 1Yhen we have the outcome of 
the process in mind, we speak of education as shaping, 
forming, molding activity." (Ibid, p. 10) Of the three 
concepts Frankena distinguishes, it is the "ncrmative", 
rather than the social science concept he favours. In this 
concept Ufostering" has the place which other~'lise might 
have been occupied by transmission. According to the norma-
tive concept, "education is the enterpri.se, or any 
enterprise, in which anyone fosters desirable dispositions 
in anyone by satisfactory methods. 1t (21) Finally, in 
"Criteria of Education" Peters is primarily concerned with 
the question, who is the educated nan? He is, according to 
Peters, the man of understanding, knowledge, cognitive 
perspective. Butwh8n, at the end of the chapter, he says 
that education is the transmission of these qualities, 
~transmission' is functioning as little more than a place-
holder. There is no attempt to defend the place it holds, 
and, in the follo'\ving chapter, Peters discusses ItEducation 
as Initiation", not as transmission. 
The educator, according to the transmission view, is 
a transmitter, the educand a receiver. Bo~h implication5 
are open to criticism. Fra~kena's social science concept is 
only a kind of transmission view--it specifies that what is 
transmitted to the young are the "dispositions, or states 
of mind ••• that are regarded as desirable by their elders. 1t 
Two of the three criticisms Frankena lev8ls against the 
view, how"ever, can be made, '\vi thou t subs tan tial al tera tion, 
against any transmission V:!.3W. These criticisms of the 
social science concept are, first, that it "takes too 
. ooP the role of those \vho are being educated" passive a Vlew" ..L 
and, second, that it "defines education as essentially 
conservative or traditional, since it limits education by 
definition to the CUltivation of dispositions already 
regarded as desirable by society", the latter despite the 
fact that one can speak of "educating society" and of the 
"younger generation ••• educating its elders" (22-3). Is 
'receiver' an adequate description of the educand? and, if 
not, is it for the reasons Frankena gives? 
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If reception is thought of as in receiving a message 
by wireless, Frankena's criticism that it "takes too 
passive a view of the role of those who are being educated" 
is no doubt well taken. Listening is experiencing, and from 
listening a person can learn; but it is not the only, nor 
is it generally the best way to learn. When compared, for 
example, with listening and thinking about what one is 
listening to, listening can be criticized for being "too 
passive". 'Reception', however, might only imply 'coming to 
possess'. It need not imply anything abo~t ~ow this is done. 
A way of life is 'transmitted' from one generation to the 
next. And yet coming to possess a way of life involves much 
more than just listening to what one's elders say. Frankena 
might have argued, also, that 'transmitter' tay:es "too 
passive a view" of the role of the educator. But, 'transmit-
ting', like 'rec~iving', need not imply.anything about 
means. A way of life is not transmitted just by chatting 
about it. A minimal description of the difference between 
the educated and the uneducated is that the former has some-
thing the latter has not. 'Heceiver', then, might under-
describe, but iT does not, as Frankena implies, mis-describe 
the role of the educand. 
'Transmitter', on the other hand, is, at least in 
part, a mis-description of the role of the educator. A 
person can transmit only what he already has. And thus, 
according to the social science concept, education is limit-
ed "by definition to the cUltivation of dispositions 
already regarded as desirable by society". At least part of 
what th~ educand receives, however, is not received as a 
result of another's transmitting it to him. Not being trans-
mitted learning, neither can it be, according to the view 
under discussion, educational learning. The implication is 
that of two people, both of whom know X, knowing X counts 
as educational only for the person who has acquired his 
knowledge from another. And, decidinb ,.;hether a person is 
educated is not just a matter of deciding what he knows, it 
also involves discovering by what 
means he acquired his 
knowledge. Frankena says that the 
social science concept 
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defines education "as essentially 
conservative or tradition-
al". Transmission vie'\vs generally limi t the scope of 
educationally relevant knowledg t h t . 
e 0 w a 1S already known. 
The implication is that true 'discovery learning' is ~_ 
educational, but that if by chance the educand should 
transmit his discovery to another , then at least the latter, 
if not the educand, will have benefitted educationally. 
None of this makes much sense because being educated is a 
matter of what one knows, understands, etc., not the 
history of its acquisition. 
Education without a transmitter is, according to the 
transmission view, impossible. SelI-transmission of course 
is impossible, but is self-education? A person on his own, 
without the aid of the many, shall we say, "transmission 
media", could not acquire all the knowledge, etc., of the 
recognizably educated person. (See above, p. 7)"But, of what 
one person learns about nature, for example, by studying 
science, at least: part can be learned by anothE:r through 
studying Her directly. And, what one can learn abJut human 
nature from a study of psychology and sociolo~y, another 
can learn from personal experience and from reflection on 
that experience. If education cannot do without the many 
transmitters, not all aspects of education need always 
involve them. The teacher acts with the intention that the 
pupil learn X. In order so to act the teacher must already 
know X. But, a second teacher acts with the intention that 
the pupil learn about X. Because the intention does not 
specify what is to be learned, the pupil might very well 
learn something the teacher does not already know. The 
second teacher would then have to verify what was learned 
in order to determine 'vhether he (the teacher) has succe~d­
ed in fulfilling his intention. The teacher is often a 
transmitter of knowledge. But, he is also, just as often, 
an organizer of learning activities. 
Finally, the transmission view rules out certain 
kinds of knowledge which otherwise would be thought 
educationally relevant. 0ne of the functions of school- as 
opposed to home-education is to bring together the young so 
that, by way of preparing them for 
adult life, they can 
acquire experience of both wo kO . 
r lng and plaYlng as members 
of a group. The knowledge and understanding the educand 
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acquires in this way, kn~wledge of hlomself and othprs, both 
as individuals and as members of a d group, oes not 'exist' 
prior to its acquisition and thus cannot be transmitted. 
The teacher can do little more than--though this in itself 
is to do a great deal--provide an environment of activity 
within which such knowledge and understanding can develop, 
and correct the pupil when it is ~lear he is going wrong. 
The chances of the educand discovering for himself any 
significant truth about the world that was not previously 
known to anyone are so slight as to be negligible (though 
not of course impossible). He is in this respect for the 
most part in the position of being a receiver of intention-
al or unintentional 'transmissions' from other6. With 
respect to what might be called his 'personal world', 
however, the educand's position is reversed. He is, of nec-
essity, an 'explorer', not the receiver of others' 'discov-
eries'. ' ...... 
Transmission views can be compared with developmental 
and contrasted with preparation views. Transmission views 
pre-suppose prior kn01vledge of what qualities the educand 
must acquire before he can become educated. If education, 
for the spectator, is the development of a certain sort of 
person (as it is for Locke, Quintilian, Elyot), then it lS, 
for the participant, the transmission of those qualities 
which together constitute being that sort of person. (quali-
ties of virtue, leadership or, as in Peters, knowledge, 
understanding and c~gnitive perspective). If, on the other 
hand, education, for the spectator, is preparation for a 
certain state of affairs, th8n it is, for the participaLt, 
more than just transmission. Preparation always depends, at 
least in part, on the person Leing prepared. As the educand 
is not fully developed, and as it cannot accurately be 
predicted what sort of person he will be when he is fully 
developed, complete prior knowledge of what he will need 
when he is in the state of affairs preparation anticipates 
ObI Further, regardless of ho,v he does develop, is impossl e. 
of what exactly is the state of affairs for and regardless 
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which preparations are made, one thing the educand will 
need is at least some self-knowledge and understanding, the 
acquisi tion of \vhich, as noted above, is at least as much a 
matter of discovery as it is of reception from others. 
It 'viII be recalled that. for Dewey, "the primary 
ineluctable facts of the birth and death of each one of the 
constituent members of a social group determine the necessi-
ty of education." "There is the necessity" he says that the 
"immature members be not merely physically perserved in 
adequate numbers, but that they be initiated into the 
interests, purposes, information, skill and practices of 
the mature members: otherwise the group will cease its 
characteristic life. 1t (emphasis mine) Th~ implication is 
that, according to Dewey, such an initiation is education. 
Within Dewey's "general", or spect~tor, concept, Oakeshott, 
it will be recalled, wants to distinguish a Itproper", or 
participant, concept of education. He says that though 
"education in its most general significance" is a "trans-
action ••• in which new-comers to the scene are initiated 
into the world they are to inhabit", that is, their "local 
\vorld", " education, properly speaking, begins ,.,hen ••• there 
supervenes initiation ••• into a human inheritance of 
sentiments, beliefs, . .. " :Lmag:Lnlngs. •• , and so on. Both Dewey 
and Oakeshott ~ the notion of initiation. Only Peters, 
however, attempts to justify its use. 
In Ethics and Education Peters follows his account 
of the "Criteria of Education" with a chapter entitled 
"Education as Initiation". In introducing the latter he 
says th:t.t "so far three main criteria of 'education' have 
been considered, the first concerning its matter, the 
second its manner, and the third its cognitive perspective. 
No attempt has been made either to produce a definition of 
'eoucation' or to attempt any account of a synthetic nature 
which pays due attention to all three criteria." (46) 
Peters then goes on to give a "synthetic sketch rather than 
a definition" {Ibid} of education. He says, first, that "an 
educated man is one who has achieved a state of mind which 
is characterized by a mastery of and care for the worth-
\o[hile things that have been transmitted, which are vie\fed 
in some kind of cognitive perspective. The requirement 
built into 'education' that it should be of the 'whole man' 
implies the possibility ~f a man being trained in some more 
limited respect. In other words the concept of 'education' 
presupposes not only the development of beliefs but also 
the differentiation of mind in respects which can be deY9l-
oped to the exclusion of others." (46-7) "How then" he asks 
"is the development of such a differentiated mind to be 
conceived?" (47) After giving w:':1.at he says has been a 
"necessarily brief and selective U (51) account of the 
differentiated mind, Peters concludes that the "process of 
initiation into such modes of thought and awareness is the 
process of education." (Ibid) 
Peters claims that initi['.tion "is. a peculiarly apt 
description of the essential feature of education". This 
"consists in experienced persons turning the eye of others 
outwards to ,.,hat is essentially indepencent of persons", 
that is, to tldifferentiated modAS of thought and awareness" 
in which "both the content and the procedures are intersub-
jective". u'Initi·atlon', too, even when connected with 
various ceremonies and rites, sugeests an avenue of access 
to a body of belief, perhaps to mysteries that are not 
revealed to the young." "Furthermore ••• just as 'education' 
requires that those who are educated should be brought to 
this state by various processes which only have in common 
the minimum requirements of 'vi ttingness and voluntariness, 
so too does 'initiation' convey the same suggestion of 
being placed on the inside of a form of thought and a-'tvare-
ness by a wide variety of processes which at least inv02ve 
some kind of consciousness and ~onsent on the part of the 
initiate.1t (54) "'Education', however, is more specific in 
tha tit requires ••• tha t s orne thing lvorth w~li Ie should be ••• 
transmitted. Initiation, on the other hand, can be into 
things that are no t worth y;~1i Ie". It I Educa tion " therefore, 
has to be described as initiation into activities or modes 
of thought and conduct that are worth while in order to do 
justice to (the) criteria that are built into it." (55) 
'-That is it to have been "initiated" into activities 
or modes of thought and conduct? Peters says it is to be a 
participant in (53), or to be lion the inside" of them. 
.. ---. 
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(52, 53, 54, 62) And by getting "on the inside" of some-
thing he means "incorporat(ing) it into (onels) own mental 
structure" (52). What would count as successful initiation? 
Peters says that "the final reward of e. teacher (is) the 
emergence of a pupil who has developed enough skill and 
judgment to correct him U (60). "The cardinal function of 
the teacher, in the early stages, is to get the pupil on 
the inside of the form of thought or awareness with which 
he is concerned. At a later stage, when the pupil has built 
into his mind both the concepts and the modes of explora-
tion involved, the difference between teacher and taught is 
obviously one of degree. For both are participating in the 
shared experience of exploring a common world. The teacher 
is simply more familiar with its contours and more skilled 
in finding and cutting pathways. The good teacher is a 
guide ,.;ho J.lelps others dispense with his services. If (53) 
Peters's contention, in "Criteria of Education ll , 
that education is the transmission of knowledgn and under-
standing rather than something else, something which makes 
such transmission educationally relevant, has been criticiz-
ed above. There are distinctions between educationally 
relevant and irrelevant, and educationally important and 
unimportant knowledge and understanding, distinctions ,.;hich 
can be accounted for only by supposing that education lb 
something other than the transmission of knowledge and 
understanding o In "Education as Initiation", where Peters 
attempts only a IIsynthetic sketch", not a "definition" of 
education, though the language has changed the problem, as 
will be seen, remains the same. The problem arises with the 
person who, though once a "participant", once Hon the 
inside", once having had "built into his mind" certain 
concepts and modesJf exploration, in time stops part:i.cipa-
ting, CJmes "outside", no longer has the concepts and modes 
of exploration he once hade If education is taken to be 
fundamentally a kind of initiation, two things, only the 
second of which is at all plausible, can be said of such a 
pers on. I t can be said, firs t, that though he \.;as once, he 
no longer is educated, or, second, that though he once 
seemed to be, it is now clear that hb is not, and never was 
educated. If, on,-the other hand, education is not, at least 
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not fundamentally, a kind of initiation, but something 
which makes initiation educationally relevant, whether the 
person in ques tion is educa ted lvould depend on why it 'vas 
h~ ceased to be a participant. It might be that the aim of 
education is served even by initiation which subsequently 
is rejected. 
In "Aims of Education--A Conceptual Inquiry" Dray 
raises what is, substantially, the same problem. He says 
that, Italthough at one point (Peters) makes it a criterion 
of being educated only that a person be capable of pursuing 
worth-while activity 'for what there is in it', he goes on 
almost immediately to tell us that what is required is 
commitment 'to what is internal in worth-while activities'. 
This seems to me to interpret the concep~ in far too 
behavioral a way. One paradoxical consequence would be the 
impropriety of calling a man educated who revolts against 
his own culture. It would require Jews, for exa~ple, to say 
that St. Paul suddenly los t his ed~.lca tion on the road to 
Damascus, whereas they are much more likely to regard him 
as an educa ted re'Ile:~ade. And it would make ques tions abou t 
a man's character logically redundant, once 've have assur-
ance that his moral education is impec·c().h\t...) whereas I 
should want to leave logical room for saying that it was, 
in part, the excellence of a man's moral education that 
enabled him to be so wicked: he fully grasped the moral 
enormity of what he nevertheless chose to do. tI (37) Peters's 
claim, if true, would of course not "requ:i.re" Jews to say 
of St. Paul that he had "scddenly lost his education" on 
the road to Damascus. They might say, on the basis of this 
new evidence, that afterall st. Paul is not so well educat-
ed as we thought he was. This, however, does not contradict 
Dray t s lTlain poin t. Of some people a t lea~ t who lose or who 
renounce their commitment to those worthwhile activities or 
modes of thought and awarep.r~ss into which, by way of educa-
ting them, they have been initiated, it would be more 
accurate to say that they were "educated renegades" than 
that they were uneducated people, whether renegades or not. 
Dray gives what he takes to be a counter-example to 
what, in "Criteria of Education", Peters says is the second 
of the two "non-inertness lt criteria. (See above, p. 68) The 
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counter-example, however, is not altogether clear. What is 
it for a person to "revolt against his own culture"? The 
criticism can be interpreted in a number of ways, one of 
which is to be found in Peters's "Reply" in "Aims of Educa-
tion". He says that "Professor Dray's ingenious objections 
to my suggestion that an educated person is one who is 
'committed' to what is internal to worth-while activities 
involve a too substantive rendering of what I had in mind." 
(41) Peters distinguishes, within such activities, their 
(propositional) "content" and what might be called the 
.tmental virtues' without which a person cannot be truly "on 
the inside" of them. He then says, "I am not sure to what 
extent (the educated person) would have to accept any part-
icular content, for example, the law of supply and demand 
if he had been initiated into economics. But in the case of 
science, for instance, a man must think that,uo a c~rtain 
extent, truth matters and that relevant evidence must be 
produced for assumptions; in the case of morals, the suffer-
ing of others, or fairness, must not be matters of 
indifference to him." And "wha t 501. t of philasophical 
education would a person have had if ne did not bother much 
about consistency or cogency in argument?" Generally speak-
ing, "a person must care, to a certain extent, about the 
point of the activity and not b~ unmoved by the various 
standards of excellence within it." (Ibid) 
This interpretation of the criticism is suggested by 
Dray's example of St. Paul on the Damascus road. Paul 
revolted against one religion, one culture, not against 
religion or culture as such. And thus Peters is invited to 
reply as £'ollo,vs. ttHhat the Jews would have said about Paul 
••• I am not sure. It would depend on the extent to which 
they believed in indoctrination, with the rigid insistence 
in an unshakable content of belief that goes with it. But 
certainly they would have sai~ that he was not educated if 
he had been quite insensitive to all aspects of religious 
experience. 1f (41-2) It is not clear whether Dray would 
think this an adequate reply. There is, however, a second 
interpretation of his criticism which makes the distinction 
Peters draws irrelevant, and thus his reply beside the 
point. 
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Peters assumes (perhaps correctly) that the case 
under discussion is one in which it might or might not be 
denied that a person (St. Paul) is educated the reason 
. , 
being that his initiation into worthw"hile activity has been 
inadequate. He speaks of a person who might have acquired a 
certain body of belief, but for whom truth, relevant 
evidence, consistent and cogent argument do not matter, of 
a person who is indifferent to fairness or to the suffering 
of others, of a person who is insensitive to religious 
experience. The quest~on, for Peters, which Dray's criti-
cism raises is what evidence is to count for or against 
successful initiation. This, however, is to assume the 
truth of what, on a second interpretation of the criticism, 
is in fact being contended. For on this interpretation the 
question is not what counts as successful initiation in 
education, but whether education is fundamentally initia-
tion at all. 
Imagine a person who has been successfully initiated 
into some worthw"hile activity. He possesses the appropriate 
'ti.'· 
body of knowledge and the relevant mental virtues. He tlLen 
renounces or "revolts against" the activity. Imagine, for 
example, a Paul who, though sensitive to all aspects of 
religious experience, and possessing all the other virtues 
of the person who has been successfully initiated into 
religion, renounces and revolts against all Gods and all 
religions. Further, imagine that the person revolts neither 
whimsically, nor ~s a result of having acquired a commit-
men t to a new and conflicting w"orth1.;hile activi ty. Rather, 
imagine that what were once little more than niggling uncer-
taintie3 develop over time into nagging doubts, and then 
that doubt, inexplicably and as it were "overnight", trans-
forms itself into loss of commitment. Loss of commitment is 
followed by lessening engagement in the activity, and less-
ening engagement by a slow deterioration of those virtues 
which were specific to the activity. Finally, given that 
the length of time a person remains committ~d to an 
activity is one criterion by which success in initiation is 
judged, imagine that the loss of commitment occurs quite 
"late in the person's life, and only after years of exemplary 
and fruitful devotion to the activity in question. With 
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respect to a case such as this it would be highly implausi-
ble to say tha t though it once "appeared" as if he l.,ras, it 
is now clear the person is not, and never was, successfully 
initiated. The question remains, however, of whether he was 
and thus still is successfully educated. 
A person who becomes indifferent to religious 
experience, and, say, adopts another way of life: a person 
who becomes indifferent to fairness and to the suffering of 
others-~even employs, as Dray suggests, his moral educa+'ion 
in being ul.,ricked"-- but who, nonetheless, keeps mostly to 
himself: a person who becomes unconcerned about cogency and 
consistency in argument and ,.,rho, as a result, stops arguing: 
a person who comes to be one for whom truth and evidence 
matter little and, as a consequence, relies solely on faith: 
such a person need not have been badly, or even inadequately 
educated. There is the revolt against science, philosophy 
and religion that only the true scientist, philosopher, 
only the truly religious person can make. One thinks of 
Augustine's revolt against the hedonistic, and Tolstoy's 
revolt against the literary life, and one does so without 
the least temptation to doubt whether they truly had been 
"participants", had truly been tlon the inside" of those 
lives. And, given the sorts of activity and modes of 
thought and awareness Peters takes to be lvorthwhile--phil-
osophy, science, economics, morality, etc.--and given what 
he says counts as successful initiation into them, if it is 
to bp possible at all education can be, at best, ~ 
initiation into only a very small number of such activities 
and modes of thought and awareness. Such being the case, 
revolt against those activities into which, by way of 
education, a person is initiated, far from being just a 
thecretical possibility, or, perhaps, a possibility only 
for the "great", is in fact thoroughly commonplace: as the 
academically educated go into business, the vocatic~ally 
educated go on the dole, and over the years neither is 
likely to lose his education. 
Education,- then, is not itself initiation. It is some-
thing with respect to which initiation is relevant. What? 
In "The Jus tifica tion of Education n Peters imagil.leS a 
situation in which a person must decide for himself what to 
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think and l.,.ha t to do. The educa ted person is the one who 
has been well prepared for such a situation. He has the 
knowledge, understanding and cognitive perspective with 
wh~ch to do well. And ho~ does he come to be well prepared? 
According to Peters, correctly I think, by being initiated 
into what he calls worthwhile activity and modes of thought 
and awareness, that is, those activities and modes best 
suited to prepare the educand to think and act for himself. 
If the educand subsequently should revolt against these 
activities and modes of thought this is not necessarily 
evidence of inadequate preparation. The po~nt is that it 
would depend on the reasons for the revolt whether or not 
it was, for the person involved, ~ good decision to make. 
To take just one of the cases mentioned above: a person 
might find that as a result of having certain experiences, 
experienC€3 his former educator could not have anti~ipated 
his having, he is no longer able to feel anything other 
than indifference in the face of the suffering of others. 
What is he to do? Without further description of what is 
invo I ved it seems' it would be bes t if, qS much as is 
possible, the person kept to himself, or, at least, avoided 
situations which might call for action to ameliorate suffer-
ing. And if he is prepared to do this one would think that 
rather than being inadequate, in fact the person's moral 
education had been espacially, indeed, uniquely good. It 
will be recalled that, according to Peters, the good 
teacher is the one who sees his pupil through to the point 
where he (the teacher) is corrected, a~d his services are 
dispensed with. In the above case the moral educator's 
services are dispensed with, but only after a decision has 
been made to avoid as much as possible situations which are 
likely to prove morA.lly problematic. The decision, given 
the cirsumstances, is evidence of good rather than bad prep-
aration, of useful rather than useless initiation. 
Peters discusses the justification of education in 
"Worth-lvhile Activi ties" (Ethics and Education) and, later, 
in uThe Justification of Education lt • The problems raised in 
the latter are, "What ••• are the values which are specific 
to being educated and what sort of justification can be 
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given for them?tI (239) Peters then says that "it is to 
these limited questions that I propose to address myself ••• 
rather than to wider questions of value with which I was 
concerned in Ethics and Education, and with which, ~n 
places, I confused these limited questions--owing perhaps 
to certain inadequacies in the analysis of the concept of 
'education' with which I was then working." (Ibid) Peters 
does not say what ~nadequacies there are' in his earlier 
analysis, nor does he say how these might have led him to 
confuse "wider" and more "limited" questions 0f value. It 
is clear, however, that he intends tiThe Justification of 
Education" to superSede "l'iorth-While Activities". 
The "values specific to being educated" are, :for the 
most part, the same as the ttCriter~a of Education". Peters 
says, "(a) the educated man is not one who merely possesses 
specialized skills ••• he ••• also possesses a considerable 
body of knowledge together with understanding ••• He knows 
the reason why of things as well as that certain things are 
the case ••• (b) There is the suggestion, too, that his 
understanding is"":::not narr01.;ly specialized. He not only has 
breadth of understanding but is also capable of connecting 
up these different ways of interpreting his experience so 
that he achieves some kind of cognitive perspective." (240) 
And, (d) The processes of education are "processes of 
learning, and this always involves some kind of content to 
be mastered, understood, remembered. This content ••• must be 
intimated ••• in the learning situation. There must, there-
fore, be some link of a lo~ical rather than a causal sort 
between the 'means' and the 'end' if it is to be a process 
of learning. tt (241) 
T,.;o values are added to the earlier "cri teria", and 
no explicit mention is made of the two non-inertness 
criteria. The additional values are, tI(c) In contrast ••• co 
the instrumentality so often associated with specialized 
knowledge, the educated person is one who is capable, to a 
certain extent, of doing and knowing things for their own 
sake" (240). And, under (a), Peters adds to the knowledge 
and understanding criteria the requirement that "the 
educated man ••• has a devvloped capacity to reason, to just-
ify his beliefs and conduct." (Ibid) Of the neglected non-
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inertness criteria, one, the commitment criterion, 1S open 
to the sort of criticism Dray levels against it, and is, 
perhaps, deliberately dropped, whereas the second can be 
construed as b9ing redundant. In "Criteria of Education" 
(see above, p. 68) Peters says that "the kind of know'ledge 
which an educated man must have ••• must charRcterize his way 
of looking at things rather than be hived off ••• 'Education' 
implies that a man's outlook is transformed by what he 
knows." But, without saying how a man's outlook is transfor-
med, this is to say no more than "!That is in any case 
pre-supposed by the process criterion, namely, that rather 
than having been "hived off", the educand has learned some-
thing from-what his educator has transmitted. 
Peters considers four different j~stifications of 
education, only one of which will be taken up and examined 
in detail. He considers both "instrumental" (o:J.' extrinsic) 
and tlnon-instrumental" (or intrinsic) justification, the 
former in terms of either social or individual benefit, and 
the latter in terms of either "absence of boredom" or 
rationality. For our purposes only the last is relevant. In 
extrinsic justification it is argued that education is 
justified because it stands in a certain relation to some-
thing else, something \v"hich, it must be shown, is itself 
justified. Thus Peters is forced to ask, "lvhat, in the end, 
constitutes social benefit? On what is the individual going 
to spend his wages? •• 'fhat account is to be given of the 
states of affairs in relation to which other things are to 
be thought of e.S ins trumen tal? II (246) In fo llowing these 
justifications, though one might come better to understand 
what benefits socie~y and the individual, rather than 
explore they simply assume an understanding of education, 
and are thus, for our purposas, irrelevant. 
Peters considers two sorts of intrinsic justifica-
tion. He says +hat trquestions about the intrinsic value of 
states of mind and of activities are often put by asking 
whe ther they are 'worth whi Ie ' • It However, the term ".fort.h 
while' is ambiguous. tt(a) It can be used to indicate that 
an activity is likely to prove absorbing, to be an enjoy-
able way of passing the time. (b) Alternatively it can 
point to 'worth' that has little to do with absorption or 
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enjoyment. Socrates obviously regarded questioning young 
men as being worth while; for it was an activity in which 
they came to grasp what was true, which, for him was a 
state of mind of ultimate value. But at times he may have 
found it a bit boring." (247-8) The argument from "absence 
of boredom" (248), like, and for much the same reason as , 
the extrinsic arguments, will not be detailed here. To make 
the argument, though one must consider what it is to be 
educated, one need do no more than ~-consider the "values 
specific to education". That is, whether the activities and 
modes of thought characteristic of the educated man are 
"likely to prove absorbing" depends for its answer less on 
having a better understanding of education than it does on 
at least borne understanding of human psychology. Besides, a 
stronger justification of education would seem to be possi-
ble. 
Peters develops, in some detail, a second and a much 
stronger intrinsic justification of education. There are 
three parts to the argument. These are, in outline: (1) the 
values specific ~o edu0ation are generally rational values: 
(ii) justification is an activity which, if undertaken 
seriously, pre-supposes the rational values: and thus (iii) 
serious questioning of the justification of education is 
impossible, pre-supposing, as it does, the value of what it 
purports to question. 
Peters begins with the observation that (i) nTo 
t know" implies tha t wha t is sairl or thought is true ••• " He 
then asks, (ii) "How ••• is the concern for truth relevant to 
the attempt to justify knowledge and understanding? Surely" 
he says "because the activity of justification itself would 
be unintelligible wIthout it." "If a justification is 
sought for doing X rather than y ••• such proping must be 
conducted at least on the presupposition that obvious 
misconceptions of what is involved in these activities are 
to be removed. There is a presumption, in other words, that 
it is ~~desirable to believe what is false and desirable to 
believe what is true" (and so on) (252). And thus, (iii) 
"There are links of this sort between justification and 
forms of knowledge in that to ask for reasons for believing 
or doing anything is to ask for what is only to be found in 
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knowledge and understanding." (253) (emphasis mine) Under 
(i)--which is only outlined and then illustrated in the 
above--Peters says that the educational values are also 
rational values. He does not claim, at least not as yet, 
that all educational values are also rational values. With 
this qualification in mind, what he says under (i) seems at 
least plausible. 
Under (ii) Peters attempts to explain--not of course 
to justify--the value of rationality itself. "Human beings" 
he says--here echoing what Kant says in "Education"--"do 
not just veer towards goals like moths towards a light; 
they are not just programmed by an instinctive equipment. 
They conceive of ends, deliberate about them and about the 
means to them." "Man is ••• a creature who lives under the 
demands of reason ••• Any man who emerges from infancy tries 
to perceive, to rememcar, to infer, to learn, and to 
regula te his 'van ts. If he 15 to do this he mus t have 
recourse to some procedure of assessment." (254) In other 
words, man, not being blessed with a particularly well-
developed instinbtive endowment, is forced to rely on his 
reason, his 1-'o1vers of "assessment". Further, the individual 
must rely either on his o"\Vn or on the powers of others. HIn 
their early years all human beings are initiated into human 
life by their elders and rely for a long time on procedures 
(of assessment) connected with authority and custom ••• Many 
manage most of their lives on such procedures." (254-5) But, 
"this fact" Peters '3ays "is a reflection of human psycholo-
gy rather than of the logic of the situation; for ultimately 
such procedures are inappropriate to the demand that they 
are meant to serve. For belief is the attitude which is 
appropriate to what is true, and no statement is true just 
because an individual or group proclaims it. For the person 
whose word is believed has himself to have some procedure 
for d~termining wha t is true ••• There may be good re~.sons, 
in certain spheres of life, for relying on authorities; but 
such authorities, logically speaking, can only be regarded 
as provisional." "Thus those who rely permanently and 
perpetually on custom or authority are criticizable because 
they are relying on procedures of assessment whi~h are not 
ultimately appropriate to the nature of belief and conduct. 
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To say, therefore, that men ought to rely more on their 
reason, that they ought to be more concerned with first-
hand justification, is t~ claim that they are systematicallY 
falling dow"n on a job on '''hich they are already engaged." 
(255) 
Under (iii), the final part of his argument, Peters 
uses the notion of the "demands of reason" to justify the 
"values specific to education". Peters's preliminary analysis 
of the "Criteria of Education", it will be J:'ecalled, failed 
to account for the distinctions between educationally 
relevant and irrelevant, and educationally important and 
unimportant knowledge and understanding. "This argument", 
however--that is, the argument concerning the value of 
rational procedures of assessment--tldoes not make a case 
for the pursuit of any kind of knowledge. It only points to 
the importance of knowledge that is relevant to the assess-
ment of belief, conduct and feeling. It does not show, for 
instance, that there is value in amassing a va3t store of 
information, in learning by heart every tenth name in the 
telephone directory. And this a~cords well with the account 
of the. sort of knowledge that was ascribed to the educated 
person. For to be educated is to have one's view of the 
lvorld transformed by the development and systemization of 
conceptual schemes. It is to be disposed to ask the reason 
why of things. It is not to have a store of what Whitehead 
called 'inert ideas'." (256) 
Further, "this type of argument for the value 0f 
knowledge helps to explain the value ir-herent in being 
educated ••• of ,,,hat was called 'cognitive perspective'. 11hat 
was suggested is that an educated person is not one who has 
his mind composed of disconnected items of knowledge. What 
he knows and understands should be seen to be interrGlated 
in terms of consistency, relevance, evidence, 
(261), that is, interrelated in those respects 
required for rational assessment of belief and 
implication" 
which are 
conduct. 
Cognitive perspective is associated with breadth of under-
standing. Peters's "basic argument" here is, quite simply, 
that "it would be unreasonable ••• to deprive anyone 
in an arbi trary way to forms of undel.'s tanding which 
throw light on alternatives open to him." (25 6 ) 
of access 
might 
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Finally, how is the non-instrumental attitude to be 
justified? "This is not difficult" Peters says, "for the 
justification of it is implicit in what has already been 
said. It is presupposed by the determination to search for 
justification. Anyone who asks the question about his life 
'Why do this rather than that?' has already reached the 
stage at which he sees that instrumental justification must 
reach a stopping place in activities that must be regarded 
as providing end-points for such justification." (262) It 
will be argued below that all possible justif~cation is in 
part intrinsic justification. The rational assessment of 
alternatives, then, must always involve intrinsic assess-
ment. 
It is in "The Justification of Education", not in 
"Criteria of Education", that Peters gives his most general 
and most fundamental account of education. It is, roughly, 
that the educated person is one who is hoth able (he has 
the required kno'vledge, understan~ing, cognitive perspec-
tive, and so on) and willing (his knowledge, etc. are not 
inert), that is, ht is prepared to base 4 his beliefs and his 
conduct on a rational assessment of the alternatives open 
to him. It is this criterion Peters uses to answer at least 
some of the questions "Criteria of Education" only raised, 
such questions as Cognitive perspective over what range? 
and Transmission of what knowledge and understanding? The 
criterion, as has been anticipated, can also be used to 
overcome problems in the use of the notioils transmission 
and initiation. Preparatioil for rational assessment marks 
no distinction between knowledge and understanding acqu;xed 
by discovery, and that acquired as a result of others' 
transmission. And, rather than make irrelevant to education, 
such a conception emphasizes the importance of the acquisi-
tion of self-knowledge and understanding, the alternatives 
open to a person depending in large part on the sort of 
person in question. Finally, as the educand develops, and 
as the society in which he lives changes, a situation might 
arise in which it would be rational for the educand to 
revolt against just those activities and modes of thought 
into which, by way of education, "-he· had:;been initiated. And, 
depending. on the circumstances, depending in particular on 
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whether the educator was in a position to predict the 
course both of educand development and of social change, 
such revolt need not be evidence of inadequate preparation. 
How well does _the criterion deal with McClellan's 
criticism of the "Criteria of Education"? The criticism, it 
will be recalled, is that "if you start out committed to 
transmitting what's worth while to kids in such a way that 
the kid~ will become committed to it, you're inevitably 
going to violate their 'wittingness and vOluntariness'.u On 
the basis of the description of the problem McClellan gives 
no straightforward solution is possible. But, in using 
Peters's fundamental criterion, it at least can be seen 
what courses of action are open to the educator. He might 
begin with learning activities in which the educand is 
interested, and then, over time, slowly transform the acti-
vities in such a way that, wittingly and volun':'arily, the 
educand becomes involved in activities of greater and 
greater educational value. He might, on the other hand, 
risk ini tial violation of 'vi ttingness and voltlntariness by 
initiating the eQucand into educationally valuable activi-
ties which he (the educator) thinks wlll.eventuallY prove 
to be of interest to the educand. What the educator should 
keep in mind, according to Peters, is that education 
prepares a person to think and act rationally. In each case 
he must decide whether it would be more helpful if the 
educand were allowed to go more or less his own way, make 
mistakes, hopefully learn from his mistakes, as a result 
make more and more rational decisions, or whether it would 
be better if he were to submit to the (no doubt better 
informed) decisions of the educator, acquire as a result 
what in the future will give him the basis for rational 
decision-making, that is, go the educator's way. The differ-
ence here is closely related to the differen~e between 
progressive and traditional e~ucation. And the former, like 
the latter, would depend for their appropriateness both on 
the sort of person the educand is and the sort of society 
in which he lives, for rational action is always someone's 
action in some particular social context. 
The c::,iterion Peters gives in "The Justification of 
t " "overcomes some, but only some, of the difficult-Educa l.on 
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ies with his "Criteria of Education". Two problems remain. 
First, like the "Criteria tt , the criterion is narrowly 
cognitive. People rather than minds are educated or unedu-
cated. Having made a rational assessmeut of the alternatives 
open to them people, being people, then believe and act 
non-rationally. Peters might sa: r that it is precisely his 
willing as well 
But, if it does, 
non-inertness criterion--the educand being 
as able--which rules this possibility out. 
he s~iJl can be criticized for failing to 
must be transmitted 0: otherwise acquired 
ledge, understanding, etc. if the educand 
say just what 
apart from know-
is to both decide 
and act rationally. The second problem, however, is more 
fundamental and is not to be dismissed so easily. The pro-
blem is whether Peters is correct in saying that what is 
fundamental to education is rationality, or whether funda-
mentally education is something else, something which makes 
preparation for rational assessment both educationally 
re levan t o.nd impo rtan t • 
... .. ~. 
Peters is a 'rationalist'. The values specific t~ 
education are, he says, rational values. Peters sees the 
individual faced with a situation in which he must choose 
what to think and what to do. The educated person believes 
and acts on the basis of a rational assessment of alterna-
tives. The uneducated, according to Peters, believe and act, 
amongst others, on the basis of authority or of custom. 
Rousseau, on the other hand, thuugh he thinks rationality 
of great educational importance, does not think that 
fundamentally education concerns rationality. In the Emile 
he says "there are two kinds of dependence; dependence on 
things which is the work of nature and 
dependence on men '''hich is the work of society. Dependence 
on things, being non-moral, does no injury to liberty, and 
beGets no vices, dependence on men, being out of order, 
gives rise to every kind of vice." (49) l{hat then of 
children? ItMankind has its place in the seqpence of things; 
childhood has its place in the sequence of human life; the 
man must be treated as a man and the child as a child. Give 
each his place, and keep him there. tt (44) liThe only useful 
habit for children is to be accustomed to submit without 
difficulty to necessity, and the only useful habit for 
is to submit without difficulty to the 1 f ru e 0 reason. 
Every other habit is a vice." ( 125n) 
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Education, according to Rousseau, is preparation of 
a person in a state of necessity f.2..!: a state of "liberty". 
And being free is (or at least importantly involves) submit-
ting only to the rule of reason. "No doubt (man) must submit 
to the rules (of society); but the chief rule is this--be 
able to break the rUle(s) if necessary." (94) IIWhen I w?nt 
to train a natural man, I do not want to make him a savage 
and to send him back to the woods, but that living in the 
whirl of social life it is enough that he should not let 
himself be carried away by the passions and prejudices of 
men; let him see with his eyes and feel ~ith his heart, let 
him own no sway but that of reason. n (217) Rationality, for 
Rousseau, is of great clducational importance. For without 
it men cannot free themselves from dependence on other men, 
they cannot help but be "carried aw"ay by the passions and 
prejudices of (other) men", something which, Rousseau 
""" thinks, "glves rise to every kind of vice. 1I Rationality is, 
as it were, one of the rtweapons" with which the individual 
"defends" his liberty. 
For Peters, on the other hand, it is rationality, 
not, as he puts it, freedom from "authoritylt and "custom", 
which is fundamental. "Those who rely permanently and 
perpetually on custom and authority" we have quoted him as 
argujl1.g, "are criti0izable because they are relying on 
procedures of assessment which are not ultimately a?propri-
ate to the nature of belief and conduct." (emphasis mine) 
And by tlappropriate lt Peters means "logically appropriate". 
The person 1vho relies on custom or authority is criticiz-
able, he says, because "belief is the attitude which is 
appropriate to what is true, and no statement is true just 
because an individual or group proclaims it." What :?eters 
says is no doubt true. The second problem with his criter-
. h er is not that values specific to education ].on, Olvev , 
might be non- or ir-rational values. The problem concerns 
whether they are, fundamentally, rational values. 
What difference would it make if one accepted 
Rouss eau ' s rather than Peters's order of justification? 
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Acceptance of Rousseau's view implies the belief that the 
educational value of rationality is in need of justifica-
tion--and it is to accept a certain sort of justification. 
Peters says, I think correctly, that a general justifica-
tion of the rational values pre-supposes acceptance of the 
very values apparently in question. The problem remains, 
however, of whether a specifically educational justifica-
tion is needed. No one can base all his beliefs and actions 
on a rational assessment of alternatives. There is always 
some question still to be asked, some problem still to be 
solved. Inevitably a person must rely, at l~ast to a 
certain extent, on 'tV'hat he takes to be authoritative, or 
the product of the collective experience of those who have 
gone before him. If he tries to make of himr-elf an author-
ity in one sphere, he only confirms his continued dependence 
in others. If he tries to make himself competent in man~ 
spheres, he only succeeds in remaining, though to a lesser 
extent, dependent in all of them. 
What is he to do? How is he to decide? It is not 
decisive to say,as Peters migh'~, that he should concentrate 
his efforts in those spheres which are most relevant to his 
belief and action. These are not wholely pre-determined. 
Indeed, they are in part determined by the sort of education 
he gets. Some progress is made ,{hen one takes into consider-
ation the sort of person he is, and the sort of society in 
which it is anticipated he will live. Some, but not all. He 
might develop in anyone of a number of '-lays. He might come 
to occupy anyone of a number of positions in society. And 
both dp~and in part on his education. Finally, if one con-
centrates on those spheres in which everyon~, somehow, Must 
think and act, one then neglects those other areas which 
might become uniquely his or hi5 but not everyone's, areas 
which for him might be the more important. 
The Rousseavian response to the ~uestion Peters 
leaves open is that the person should "concentrate" develop-
ment of rational belief and conduct in those spheres jn 
which he is best able to think and act freelyo Consider the 
following two beliefs: nI am ill because the doctor has 
said that I am", HI have five toes because teacher, who has 
counted them, tells me I have". The two beliefs have the 
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same logical status, and thus Peters's criterion cannot be 
used to distinguish them. But, Peters also says, what is 
without question true, that "there may be good reasons in 
. , 
certain spheres of life, for relying on authorities". 
Accepting Rousseau's rather than Peters's criterion allows 
one to take account of these spheres. Though it is logically 
inappropriate, it might be educationally appropriate to 
distinguish between reliance on medical authority in matters 
medical and reliance on teacher authority ln matters, such 
as counting, with respect to which one is an "authority" as 
well, it being in only the latter that freedom might be 
possible. 
A second implication of accepting Rousseau's order 
of justification is a belief th~t education is a more 
, 
comprehensive enterprise than Peters says it is. Rationality 
is an aspect of human thought and conduct. ULiberty", on the 
other hand, is a possible characteristic of human relation-
ships. People as such, and not .iust aspects of their thought 
and behavior, as it were 'relate', and thus Rousseau's is 
the more compreh~nsi.ve of the two view·s. This might be a 
reason for preferring Rousseau's view. It might not. Short 
and simple answers being in short supply, all one can do is 
develop the Rousseavian view, as Peters has done his, and 
compare the two as completed accounts. This will be done in 
Chapters 5 and 6, where attention will be focussed on two 
main differentia: it will be accepted that the ideally 
rational person is also very well educated, but it will also 
be argued tha t education hz.s a place even in those spheres 
where the individual cannot be or just is not rational {at 
least in the sense in which PetErs uses "rational"), and 
that education being thus a more comprehensive enterprise is 
a view ~hich is consistent with other and equally important 
beliefs about education. Before doing that, however, at 
least some of the differenc'3s between the tyO accounts can 
be illustrated. 
Peters sees education from the point of view of the 
participant. Rousseau (like Dewey) takes the wider, specta-
tor view. The former limits education to the sorts of things 
that can occur in, and result from, human activity, activity 
such as transmission and initiation. The latter, on the 
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other hand, extends education to include anything that 
might happen to humans, whether in or resulting from activi-
ty or not. Left to his own devices a child will acquire 
information, skills, practical understanding. But, Peters 
says, education must also include propositional knowledge, 
theoretical understanding, cognitive perspertive: in other 
words, just those sorts of thing that are likely only to 
result from deliberate transmission and initiation. Peters 
emphasizes the latter, Rousseau (and Dewey) give about equal 
emphasis to both. The argument he:-"'e concerns the relation-
ship between education and training, and in Chapter 5 I will 
argue that the implicit Rousseavian view is preferable to 
the view Peters makes explicit in "Criteria of Education". 
A child can acquire many things ~rom deliberate 
transmission and initiation; but the sort of person he 
becomes is less a matter of human intention than it is of 
what happens to him, given the sort of person he already is, 
and given the sort of social environment in which he grows 
up. Peters emphasizes those qualities a child acquires as a 
result of delibefate activity and, in "Aims of Education", 
he distinguishes this, "more recent and more specific 
concept" from one ""hich is "older and undifferentia ted", and 
which, he says, "refers just to any process of bringing up 
or rearing" (55). Rousseau, on the other hand, 1S both 
Emile's teacher and his parent, he both transmits and ini-
tiates and rears or brings up. In Chapter 5 I will argue 
that the relationship between education and upbringing is 
better accounted for in Rousseau's than in Peters's view. 
The participant is CO:lcerned with intrinsic justifi-
cation of education. Being a participant in, and thus 
responsible fo::, something, he ~.,ants to know whether he is 
justified in doing what he dos,s. An intrinsic justification 
of the claim, W has value, 1S the same as a justification 
of the claim, W has intrinsic value. or, W has non-extrinsic 
value. Consider first extrinsic justification. For "V has 
value" to be extrinsically justified it must be the case 
that both, W stands in a certain relation· to X, and X has 
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value. (It must also be the case that W has value in part 
because it stands in relation to X. Assume that this is so.) 
Supposing that 'f stands ~n the required relation to X, for 
X, and thus for W, to have value it must be the case that 
either, X has intrinsic value or that both, X stands in a 
certain relation to Y, and Y ha~ value. Again, supposing 
that X stands in the required r~lation to Y, for Y, and 
thus for both X and W, to have value it must be the case 
that either Y has intrinsic value or that both, Y st'ands in 
a certain relation to Z, and Z has value. And so on. Extrin-
sic justification either makes reference at some point to 
intrinsic value or it does not. If it does not, I will call 
the justification "systematically extrinsic". 
But, systematicallY extrinsic jus·tification is not 
possible. If, as in the above, no two elements of the justi-
fication are the same, there must be infinite regress. There 
is still need f~r thinking Z has value. Whatever might be 
appealed to can itself only be justified by appeal to some-
thing else--and so 0n, without possibility of stopping. If, 
';:'0 
on the other hand, t"\"o elernents of the justification ~ 
the same; if, for example, it lS argued that Z has value 
because it stands in relation to W, and W has value; then 
justification is assumed rather than demonstrated. It might 
be objected that rather than having shOlm it impossible the 
argument only show's that systematicallY extrinsic justifica-
tion cannot give warrant for certainty. But, in such a 
justification the truth of each element (e.G-, W has value) 
depends solely on the t~uth of the succeeding element (X 
has value). One starts with war~~ant for claiming only that 
uw has value" might or might not be true, and one ends with 
warrant for claiming only that, for instance, nz has value" 
might or might not be true. But, because the truth of each 
element depends solely on the truth of the succeeding 
element (and there being the required relation), if it can 
be cl~imed of the final element only that it might or might 
not be true, thers is warrant for claiming vf the first 
element--that is, that which is to be justified--only that 
it might or might not be true. In the end everything depends 
on the final element, but this dependence is always 
misplaced. The only reason it is final is that there is 
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nothing to be said either for or against it. 
If systematically extrinsic justification is impos-
sible, all possible justification must be at least in part 
intrinsic. The ontology of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinc-
tion is, there are only things and relations between things. 
To make it an evaluative distinction one need only add, 
only things can have value. If a thing is not valuable 
because of what it is, if it does not have intrinsic value, 
it must be valuable (assuming that it is) because it stands 
in some relation, whether direct or not, to something which 
is valuable because of what it is. Just as one might explain 
something by showing how it relates to something already 
understood (that is, as in Part I above, explain it extrin-
sically), one might justify something by show'ing that it 
relates to something already as~umed to be justified. But, 
it is only because one assumes the latter justified that 
one thinks systematically extrinsic justification possible. 
Systematically extrinsic justification for some limited 
purposes might be all that is needed. But, a general, phil-
oEophical justif±cation must always be ~t least in part 
intrinsic. What, then, is intrinsic justification? 
In intrinsic justification one shows a thing to Lave 
value because of the sort of thing it is, not because it 
stands in relation to something else of value. One argues, 
iv has value because \v is x, y, and z, and because x, y, and 
z have value. Dow'nie, Loudfoot and Telfer argue tha t educa-
tion is justified because it involves self-realization. 
Oakeshott argues that Ifeducation proper" is justified 
because its very aim is personal autonomy. And Peters argues 
that education, as lt is understood in "Criteria of Educa-
tion", is justified because fundamentally it involves pre-
paring a person to make a rational assessment of alterna-
tives. 
To justify an intrinsic value claim it must be shown 
that both, the thing in question is such and such, and i~ 
has value because it is such and such. Intrinsic justifica-
tion goes wrong, then, if it assumes that the thing in 
question is or involves' something it is (or does) not. A 
particular justification might assume the thing js more 
than it is, that is, it includes extrinsic elements, or that 
it is less than it is, that lS, it excludes intrinsic 
elements. ~ntrinsic justification of education depends for 
its validity on a correc~ analysis of education, but it is 
just here, lve have argued, that Downie et aI, Oakeshott, 
and Peters (see Chapter 5) go wrong. All fail for lack of 
compreh~nsiveness, for excluding elements which are in fact 
intrinsic. Downie et al include the theoretical but exclude 
the practical. Oakeshott includes "education proper!! but 
excludes education "generally" (perhaps beCt:'..use he does not 
see how important for autonomy the latter is as well). An~ 
Peters includes knowledge, understanding, cognitive perspec-
tive, and then the specifically rational virtues generally, 
but excludes the possibility of education consisting solely 
in information, skills, practical unders"tan~ing (perhaps 
because he over-emphasizes the education/training and 
education/upbringing distinctions). 
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There is a reason for the participant's chara~teris­
tic failure to give a general account of edl1.ca~ion, a reason 
connected with the fact that he also, and also characteris-
tically, fails to give a fundam8ntal account. The partici-
pant typically begins with an account of how he thinks 
education should be (here implicitly or explicitly arguing 
wi th other participants \vho do not share his vie1';). Downie 
et al think education should involve the realization only 
of the theoretical II self" (perhaps arguing lri th Dewey and 
Rousseau). Oakeshott thinks education should only involve 
schooling (clearly arguing with educational 'de-schoolers'). 
Peters thinks education should always involve perspective, 
propositional knowledge, theoretical understanding (perhaps 
arguing with a theorist such as Pestalozzi). One sides with 
the teacher of academ£c subjects, and opposes the teacher of 
of practical subjec~s. One sideD with the traditional 
educator, and opposes the progressive. And one sides with 
"educated people and those" \vho are pro:f8ssionally concerned 
with education", and opposes (though not ¥ithout the signi-
ficant qualificatio~ mentioned above) trainers and parents. 
Having stated his position, the participant then 
tries to jus tify it. He appeals to lvha t he takes to be the 
nature of education. One simply asserts that education does 
not involve the "","hole manu. One appeals, qui te plausibly, 
118 
to the notion of autonomy. And one, again quite plausibly, 
appeals to the notion of rational belief and conduct. But, 
how does the participant know that he is now dealing with 
the nature of education? How does he know he is not dealing 
with a feature which is only more fundamental than those 
with which he opened his account? The spectator, the anal-
yst who deals in extrinsic explanation, can only assume 
education to be that which stands in the specified relation 
to something else. He can only rlo so because he assumes 
rather than examines the nature of education. Similarly, 
the participant can only assume that his justification 
makes appeal to what is most fundamental in education. He 
can only do so because he assumes rather than examines the 
fundamental differences between education and other things, 
it being in only this way that the nature of education is 
revealed. Further, having typically failed to reach the 
fundamental, the participant is forced to argue that educa-
tion excludes elements which are in fact intrinsic to it. 
He claims to be education what is in fact only one of two 
or more aspects 6f'oducation, all of wh~ch are deducible 
from what is in fact the nature of education. 
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Section III Preparation for Independence 
Chapter 5 Education 
Extrinsic or spectator views typicalJy fail because 
they miss the point. If education is explained solely in 
terms of how it relates to only one of an indefinite number 
of other things, th~ chances of the relationship proving 
particularly illuminating are not very great. Some failures, 
hOvlever, are more illumina ting than others. In Chapters 1 
and 2 we discussed views in which education is explained 
either in terms of the development of a certain kind of 
individual (one who is virtuous, religious), or in terms of 
preparing an individual for a certain kind of social 
situation (the occupation of a social role, membership in 
society itself). We concluded that education is not the 
development of a parti~ular individual, but neither is it 
the development of just any individual; and that if educa-
'O"!, .. 
tion is a kind of preparation it is not preparation for any 
of the situations we have so far considered. We also 
concluded that of the two a preparation view would have more 
explanatory power. If education is preparation for a certain 
state of affairs, educational development can be distin-
guished from development which is either non- or mis-educa-
tional, and many, but not all kinds of development might 
be equally educational o 
Intrinsic or participant views typically fail 
because, even though by definition they cannot "miss the 
point", the account~ they offer are at best either incom-
plete or partial. In focusing attention on one, more or 
less fundamental aspect of ed~cation, but not, as extrinsic 
views do, on how education as a whole is to be distinguished 
from other things, intrinsic views cannot but fail in 
giving a general account of education. Nonetheless, we 
found that there ",;is reason to emphasize the theoretical 
as opposed to the practical, and initiation into a "human" 
as opposed to a ulocal tt inheritance, the reason being their 
connection with autonomy. And we concluded that though a 
view stated simply in terms of the acquisition of knowledge 
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and understanding only served to raise problems it itself 
could not solve--problems both of completeness ('vhat know-
ledge? what understanding?) and of possible partiality 
(why not other mental qualities?)--if, more fundamentally, 
education anticipates a situation in which a person is to 
think and act for himself, rather than relying on the 
authority or customs of others--in other words, a situation 
very like one of autonomy--then preparation for such a 
situation would justify both the acquisition of knowledge 
and understanding gen~rally (as well as other mental quali-
ties), and a distinction between knowledge and understand-
ing which is more or less educationally important. On the 
basis of our investigation so far, then, we have at least 
some reason to believe both that education is a kind of 
preparation and that what it prepares for is a situation 
very like one of autonomy, very li:~e one of having to think 
and act for oneself. 
Of those notions intrinsic to education perhaps the 
most illuminating is that of training. Indeed, education 
and training are~'often confused. In the~first part of this 
chapter it will be argued that education, like training, is 
a kind of preparation, but that whereas training is prepara-
tion to do something, education is preparation for a certain 
kind of situation. Of those notions extrinsic to education 
perhaps the most usefu.l is that of upbringing. Upbringing, 
as Peters says, is an older and undifferentiated concept of 
education itself. In the second part of this chapter it 
will be argued that education is a part of upbringing, 
specifically the part of preparing a child for adulthood. 
Education, however, is not confined to childhood, and thus 
a general account cannot employ the t~rm 'adult'. It will 
be argued that childhood is a situation of cependence, 
adulthood one of independence. Lnd in the third and final 
part of the chaptdr it will be argued that education gener-
ally is preparation for independence, not, as Rousseau 
thinks, for "libertylt or freedom. 
Education and training are closely enough related to 
be often confused. In ItCriteria of Education" Peters dis-
tinguishes them in terms of different but related states of 
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mind. He says, "'trained' suggests the development of 
competence in a limited skill or mode of thought whereas 
'educated' suggests a linkage with a wider set of beliefs." 
(32) In support of this ,ihypothesis" Peters adduces the 
fo llo"\ving evidence. Firs t, "w'e talk more naturally of educ-
ating the emotions than we do of training them ••• because 
(whereas) the different emotions are differentiated by 
their cognitive core" (Ibid), and thus, if "we are contem-
plating changing people's emotional attitudes ••• our main 
task consists in trying to get them to see the world differ-
ently", if "'ve speak, as we sometimes do, of training the 
emotions, the implications are different." "1ve think, for 
instance, of schooling a person not to give way to grief in 
a public place and to show courage in the face of danger 
and adversity. There is no suggestion of transforming a 
person's appraisal of ~he situation by working on his 
beliefs." '''Training' suggests the acquisition of appropri-
ate ••• habits of response in limited conventional situation~; 
it lacks the wider cognitive implications of 'education'." 
(33) 
Seconc.(, ""\.Je speak of 'training the will' rather than 
of 'educating' it. For 'will' is associated with holding 
steadfast to some principle, purpose or plan in the face of 
temptation and distraction. Its sphere of operation is 
defined by the purpose at hand; it is a reinforcement of 
purpose, not a source of alternative purposes." (Ibid) With 
education, on the other hand, there is no comparable 
"purpose at hand" to "define" its "sphere o:f operati.on". 
Third, "we talk naturally of 'the training of character' ••• 
because, in one sense of 'character', when we talk of 
people as 'having character', what we have in mind is the 
development of persistence, inc0rruptability, and integrity 
in relation to theiI practice of principles." "We might, on 
the o~her hand, be thinking of 'character' in a more non-
commital sense, as when we speak of a person's character or 
character-traits. 'The training of character' would then 
suggest efforts to ensure reliability of response in 
accordance with a code. This would essentially be a rather 
limited sort of operation. It would not suggest ~ny 
endeavour to get the trainee to understand the 'reason ,,,,hy' 
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of things. When, on the other hand, we speak of 'moral 
education' we immediately envisage tackling people's 
beliefs." (34) 
}I~inally, II to make the ••• pain t even more sharply: 
'sex education' consists in initiating adolescents into a 
complicated set of beliefs about the working of the body, 
personal relationships, and social institutions. 'Sex 
training' consists in passing on various skills to do with 
making love." And, "'physical training' sugc;ests merely 
disciplining the body in relation to a narrowly conceived 
end such as physical fitness", whereas "'physical education' 
suggests the cUltivation of physical fitness as a necessary 
foundation for a balanced way of life. 1t (Ibid) In conclu-
sion Peters says that lithe general point .••• :i llustrated by 
these examples is that the concept of 'training' has 
application when a skill or competence has to be acquired 
which is to be exercised in relation to a specific e~d or 
function 0r in accordance \yi th the canons of S0me specific 
mode of thought or practice. 1I ItWith 'education', however" 
< .... 
the matter is very·different; for a person is never describ-
ed as 'educated' in relation to any specific end, function, 
or mode of thought." (Ibid) 
The hypothesis to be tested was that education and 
training are to be distinguished as resulting in two 
distinct but related states of mind. Belief and understand-
ing are to be contrasted with skill and competence. In test-
ing the hypothesis the difference is explained in terr.s of 
different purposes education and training are said to have. 
Trainin~, it is said, is concerned w·ith a "purpose at hand", 
a "narro"\vly conceived end lt , "a specific end or function". 
Education, on the other hand, is said to concern non-speci-
fic ends--in the ca0e of physical educa tion, for exanlple, 
a "balanced way of life". If we accept the explanation, 
however, we must reject the hypothesis. For whatever st&te 
of mind would count as 'trained' depends solely on the 
trend" or "function" involved. Training a competent lover is 
not the same as training a competent lawyer. The former, 
perhaps, need only involve the acquisition of skills and 
competences; but in training a lalryer not only is the first 
requirement the acquisition of knowledge and understanding, 
there is 
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little if any scope for the acquisition of skills 
and competences. It might be objected that 'legal education' 
has still wider "cognitive implications", and this no doubt 
would have been plausible when law students did little more 
than read and study important cases. But, legal training 
has come to involve the acquisition of a general knowledge 
and understanding of the law: legal education has become a 
part, and only a part, of legal training. Training does 
always take a specific end or i'unction, but Some ends are 
more specific than others. And education generally is 
indeed non-specific and non-functional. But, what mental 
qualities are acquired in training depends solely on the 
end or function involved~- a point which, incidentally, 
Peters neither denies nor I think would find objectionable. 
In fact, he seems to accept the point when, in Democratic 
Values and Educational Aims, he says, "by training is mean'~ 
knowledge and skill devised to bring about some specific 
end." (464) (emphasis mine) 
Training is a kind of preparation or getting ready. 
Tt is preparatioI1 to do something, to perform some function. 
Peters makes the point that "if it is said that a person is 
'trained' the questions 'To do what?', 'For what?', 'As 
what?', 'In what?' are appropriate; for a person cannot be 
trained in a general sort of ,{ay." ("Criteria of Education", 
p. 34) And, in being trained for, in or as something, the 
"something" refers to some behavior, or set of behaviors. 
To train in the law is to prepare for legal practice: to 
train as a swimmer is to prepare to swim competitively: to 
train for a race is to prepare to run in it. A person 
cannot be trained in a general sort of way for, if he could, 
it should make sense for him to be both trained (success-
fully) and not able to do anythingo In preparing to do some-
thing the qualities developed depend solely on what 1S tJ be 
done. Whatever might effect performance is relevant. General 
knowledge and understanding of the world might be of little 
use to the sprinter, but all important to the metaphysician. 
Skills and competences might be of only limited value to the 
historian, but essential for the lathe operator. Consider 
Peters's example of tltra~ning the emotionsrt. To train the 
emotions is to prepare a person to act in certain ways, 
e.g., "not to give t 
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way 0 grief in a public place", "to 
show courage in the face of danger and adversity". There is 
no suggestion of II transf~rming a person.! s appraisal of the 
si tuation by '<lorking on his beliefs" because, first, there 
are more straightforward ways of getting him to act in the 
required way and, second, there is no guarantee that he 
will so act even if there ""ere to be success in changing 
his beliefs. And yet, if it 1·S a person's appraisal of the 
situation which prevents him from acting, training ~ 
involve changing a person's belief's. The rugby football 
coach gets the player to tackle cooUy, and thus efficiently, 
by getting him to see his opponent merely as a moving body 
to be stopped, not, for instance, as is often the case, as a 
'criminal' to be 'punished'. Again, consider Peters's 
example of "training the willll. Not only is the will to act 
directly related to the act itself, but being well prepared 
to do something, being well trained, is being both able and 
wi lling to do it. In s::;>ort this is knOlVll as the "problem of 
motivation". The "specific end or function" training always 
takes, then, is s'orne behavior or set of ~behaviors, the 
reason being that training is always preparation to do some-
thing. 
Education, like training, is a kind of preparation, 
but rather than preparation to do something, it is prepara-
tion for some state of affairs. The important difference 
between the two is that whereas training anticipates acting 
in a certain \<lay, educa tion an ticipa tes a si tua tion in which 
anyone of a nember of different actions is possible. In 
training a person one wants to so act that, as a result of 
what one does, he d0es something well. In educating him, on 
the other hand, one wants so to act that, as a result, in 
the situation anticipated he does well. Given that a nurr.ber 
of things he might do might all be equally good, in educa-
ting, unlike ip training him, one cannot anticipate that he 
will do anyone thing. Education is, in this sense, "non-
specific ll and ttnon--runctional". Sex training anticipates a 
lover, sex education cannot. For neither chastity nor less-
than-skillful loving need indicate less-than-adequate 
preparation ~or life as a mature sexual being. And whereas 
physical training anticipates use of the body in a number of 
quite definite ways, physical educatl.·on can 
only assume 
that in a "balanced way of life" the body must be used 
some way) and thus that ~t should be healthy and its 
'o'\vner t sufficiently knowledgeable to lceep it healthy. 
training generally what the trainee is to do is already 
decided: it is only after a dec~sion has been made that 
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training for it can begin. In education , on the other hand, 
what the educand is to do remains open--or, at least, it 
does within certain limits. Though there are, in any situa-
tion, things which should not be done, within these limits 
it is the educand, not the educator, who chooses what he is 
to do. Preparing a person to meet a situation is preparing 
him to make what would count, given the sort of situation, 
and given the sort of person he is, as a. good choice about 
what he is to do. 
Consider the difference bet\veen vocational education 
and training. Vocational training is preparation to take up 
a particular vocation. Vocational education, on the other 
hand, is preparation for a situation in which it is assumed 
~:. 
that, in order to do well,the educand must have a vocation, 
but which vocation is not specified. In the former the 
concern is that the trainee come both to want and to be able 
to do what the vocation will demand of him. Or, if this is 
not possible, as for the most part it is not, the concern 
is that the trainee will so be prepared that on taking up 
and practising the vocation he will be willing and able to 
learn what is req~ired of him. ~n vocational education, 
hO'~ever, the concern is only that the educand want and be 
able to take up a vocation, if available, one for which he 
is suit~d. Rather than concentrate on a particular vocation, 
one might want him to acquire some familiarity with a wide 
range, the point being that he acquire the knowledge and 
understanding on which to base what for him would be a good 
chcice Q 
Vocational education can be contrasted with liberal 
education. In the former, but not the latter, the situation 
anticipated is one in which the educand will have a voca-
tion. In liberal education what is anticipated is the most 
general of all possible situations, namely, one in which as 
a human being the educand confronts other human beings. 
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There is nothing the educand must do: there is no liberal 
training to correspond to liberal d e ucation. In a society 
such as ours, however, few have either the means or the 
talents to live well withoat at least some sort of vocation, 
and so, whether in school or graduate school or on the job 
itself, liberal edu~ation gives over to both vocational 
education and training. Finally, consider the difference 
between education and training within a particular vocation. 
As long as the teacher was someone who did this, that ard 
the other thing, teacher training was adequate. Now, how-
ever, the teacher is a professional, that is, someone who 
assumes a greater responsibility and a greater freedom in 
deciding wha t he ;s to do 1.That . . d· ~ • n 1S requ1re 1S not prepara-
tion to do anything in particular, but preparation for 2 
situation in which he is, within limits of course, to decide 
for himself what he is to do. If he is to choose what to 
tea~h, he must understand the principles involved in making 
such a choice: he must understand curriculum theory. If he 
is to choose how to teach, he must have knowledge of learn-
, ... ~ 
ing theory. Teacher training must become teacher education. 
Preparation is always for something in the future. 
And for anything in the future one can be either prepared 
or not, either well or ill prepared. Depending on what it 
is for, ho\{ever, preparation, like education, might be life-
long. The situation prepared for might be one a person is in 
until released by death, and a person might go on until then 
becorr.ing better and better able to deal with it. A person's 
future consists in doings and happenings, in things he does 
and in things 1"hicp happen to him. Being prepared to do 
something, assuming it can be done, is, at its widest, 
having done prior what is sufficient to ensure doing it suc-
cessfully. tHe was prepared to uo xt is sufficient (though 
of course not particularly illuminating) explanation of his 
having done it successfully. And 'He was not prepar~d to do 
X. is sufficient (if unilluminating) explanation for his not 
succeeding in doing it. Two sor~s of failure in preparation 
can be distinguished. Either the person failed to prepare 
himself (that is, trained himself) to do X, or he failed to 
prepare 'the world' for his doing it. With respect to the 
second sort of failure: if he is prevented from doing X, for 
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example, by someone's interfering, because prior to doing 
it he did not take steps to forstall interference, it can 
be said that he failed t~ prepare adequately to do X. 
Preparing for something's happening, on the other 
hand, is doing prior to l.·ts h occur~e~~~ w at is sufficient 
either to maximize the value or to . 
ml.nimize the dis-value 
of its happening. 'He was prepared for X' and 'He was not 
prepared for X' are sufficient explanations for its going 
either well or ill for him. A happening mig~t be an event 
or a state of affairs. The reason education is said both to 
stop at a certain time (e.g., at the age of 16) and also to 
be life-long is that it is preparation for a state of 
affairs which, unlike events in a person's life, at least 
in the caSe of educating children, begins at a certain time 
(it is argued below when they reach adulthood), a beginning 
for which preparations are made, and then continues until 
death during which time adults typically become even better 
prepared for, and thus better able to cope in adulthood. 
('On-the-job education' one might say.) The state of 
,~ 
affairs is given; '\vha t is no t given is the person's Olm. 
state and the state of his 'world'o To prepare for a trip 
abroad, not only might one read-up on the various countries 
one plans to visit, sample locally what passes for the 
various national foods and drinks; one might also purchase 
sun hat and sandals, put in a fe", hours und8r the sun lamp. 
One cannot acquire an education in the shops, ho",ever, the 
difference bet'\veen being educated and uneducated beinG a 
difference in the sort of person one is, not the sort of 
hat one wears. Education is preparation for a certain kind 
of situation. It must be assumed, however, ihat it is always 
preparation of a person. This is not to suggest that the 
state of one's 'world' is educationally irrelevant. But, 
insofar as it is, education is preparing a person for that 
world, not so altering it that, unchang3d, he is prepared 
for it, not, for example, eliminating the 'adult ",orld' 
(as attractive as that alternative might be), but preparing 
children for it. 
One can prepare oneself for some states of affairs 
simply by clenching one's teeth. For what, then, is educa-
tion a preparation? 
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The Concise Oxford Dictionary says that education is 
the bringing up (of the young). In "Aims of Education--A 
Conceptual Inquiry" Peters distinguishes an "older and 
undifferentiated lt concept of education which he says "refers 
to any process of bringing up or rearing" (55). And Delvcy, 
in Democracy and Education, says that education is Ita fos-
tering, a nurturing, a cultivating process. All these words 
mean tha t it implies attention to the condi tions of grolvth. 
We also speak of rearing, raising, bringing up--words which 
express the difference of level which education aims to 
cover. Etymologically" he says "the word education means 
just a process of leading or bringing up." (10) lYhat is it, 
then, to 'bring up' the young? 
XiS bringing up Y implies changing the spatial 
relationship in which they stand by changing Y's relative 
position. Bringing up implies raising, rut, unlike raising, 
bringing up implies that the level to l"hich Y is brought is 
the one on which X already stands. Further, bringing up 
.... ~, . 
implies bringing· to, but, unlike bringirtg to, bringing!:!E 
implies a certain direction Y must travel. Bringing up the 
young, then, is so changing their spatial location that 
they come to stand on the same level as the 'old', the dir-
ection of movement being up. Ifhy 'up'? Age might be 
associated greater, and youth w~th lesser physical stature. 
Or, growing old might be likened to climbing a ladder, 
scaling a mountain. Are we then to suppos.:: that the old 
make the young bigger or oider? The old are assumed to be 
'above' the young. And people generally are 'above' or 
'below' others, they 'go up' or 'come down' in the world, 
'fall below' or 'come up to' standards. 'Up' is used as a 
metaphor for betterment or improvement. In bringing up the 
young, then, the old are raising them to a standard which 
they (their 'betters') hav~ attained already. 
Who are the 'old'? The 'young' are children, the 
'old' adults: parents bring up their children to be adults. 
It is not, hOlvever, as has been said, what age, but rather 
what standard must be achieved before the young become 
adult. In "Some Recent Developments in Philosophy of Educa-
tion in Europe" Langeveld says, for example, that "adults 
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are ••• de:fined by their responsibility.tI (100-01) "If educa-
tion ••• is a process, among other things o~ "i 
, ~ Wean1ng n a 
figurative as well as in a literal sense, then evidently it 
is not supposed to go on for ever. It seems to be a process 
o:f emancipation. Morally, the child gradually ceases to be 
carried around and has to t d h" 
s an on 1S own feet. This means 
not only to go when and where he wants, but also to cope 
w~th the consequences of that freedom, that is, to be 
responsible." (100) "We must ask what it Ls ••• that (educa-
tors) are engaged in." "It is" says Langeveld "helping 
people to take responsibility for their own acts ••• Children 
don't stay small and they can't run a world ••• lt is 
precisely the chi~dren or the young in general who can not 
be held responsible. 1ney did not ask for their lives, they 
live initially in complete dependency ••• The aim of educa-
tion, then, is not just independence or self-rvliance, but 
taking and bearing complete responsibility." (85-6) 
If being adult is, as Langeveld says it is, being 
responsible, then there are some qu~te close, but inexact, 
connections between some of the vibws we have discussed and 
the notion of upbringing. Thus, for example, the person who 
assumes responsibility for what he does is closely related 
to the person who, as Peters describes him, bases his 
thought and action on his own assessment of alternatives. 
In taking responsibility, however, he might either succeed 
or :fail. Wheth~r he does depends, as Peters suggests, in 
part on the sort of belief or action involv~d: choosing a 
doctor is not the same as conducting one's own open heart 
operation. But, whether one succeeds depends generally on 
how well one is preryared to assume responsibility. And 
upbringing, though it includes, as we shall see, preparation 
(as well as education), also extends beyond it. Again, we 
have discussed education in terms of learning, of acquiring 
knowledge and understanding, ~nd the adult, the more 
experienced of the two, has learned more, has acquired more 
knowledge and understanding than the child. But, he will 
also have mis-learned more, have acquired, for instance, 
more false beli-efs and more and better ways to mis-under-
stand. It is only the adult prepared to assume responsibil-
ity who, because o:f the connection between having knowledge 
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and understanding, rather than their contraries, and think-
ing and acting well, will have had his false beliefs 
corrected and his m~s-understandings 1. 
e 1minated, only he 
who will have learned without mis-learning. 
Whether a person is well brought up depends in part, 
but only in part, on how well he has been prepared to 
assume responsibility. The child is brought up; he does not 
bring himself up. When he assumes (or has thrust upon) 
responsibility for what he does, it is not he but his par-
ents who are responsil>l.e for the sort of person he is. Our 
-
upbringing explains the young adult we once were. We speak 
of the sort of home and community in which we lived, family 
customs and practices, parental rules and whims to which we 
were subject. We speak of ourselves as the products of a 
world over which we had no (or only very little) control. 
Our education was a part, but only a part of that world. 
The sort of person we became was determined by everything 
which happened in it, and yet not everything happened as ~t 
did just because we were being educated. Some parents think 
occasionally of' themselves and, when they think of us, jt 
is not always of our future. And being educated is not 
being a certain sort of person; it is, we have argued, being 
a person (any person) who meets certain (as yet unspecified) 
requirements. Further, once we assume responsibility, once 
we become adult, our upbr~ng~ng ceases: we have been 
brought up. But, is Langeveld correct when he says that 
education Italways tries to free the older generation :from 
itc; task of looking after children", that "education is 
never a life-long process tl ? What are we to think. of the 
"Dutchm-an" when we hear that "'adult education' i.s good 
English but I am a Dutchman ±£ I believe that it really 
makes sense in essentially educatio.nal terme-"? (100) Thi.s 
could be the case only if 'adult' is being used to refer to 
a certain kind of person, and if being educated is being 
that kind of person. A person is either adult or not, 
educated or uneducated: 'adult education' is self-contra-
dictory. Upbringing might cease when a person becomes adult, 
but education need not. A person who has responsibility 
need not ~ responsible; the adult might be educated, uned-
ucated, mis-educated. In fact, Langeveld seems to accept 
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this distinction. He says that "education ~s 
- preparatory. 
Adulthood is not only a matter of mature personality, ~t is 
also a social attribute,. the recognition by society that a 
person has reached an age and position roughly defined by 
custom or law. Adulthood is not only assumed by the young 
person, it is also, irrespective of his Wishes, conferred 
on him." (101) At a certain age the youth becomes adult, 
acquires responsibility; but it might only be as he grows 
old that he acquires a "mature personality", becomes rerpon-
sible in his belief and conduct. Education, then, is not 
only only a part o:f upbringing, it is also something which 
can continue long after upbringing has been brought to a 
close. 
It is the child who is brought up. But, what is a 
child? Relative to other humans he is younger, weaker, 
slower, physically smailer and less well developed. He is 
less experienced, less knowledgeable, less able, lacking in 
understanding, immature. And unlike the adult he is unable 
to bring children into the world. Dewey says that for some 
"':r~' .. 
purposes the adult should be as the "little child", the 
implication being that the latter has "positive" as well as 
"negative" qualities, qualities the adult lacks, rather 
than those which, relative to the adult, are defined as 
lacks. The child is sometimes said to be 'imaginative', 
adults presumably being 'realistic'; but might not the 
'imagination' of the child, unlike that of the adult, merely 
be i~orance, or, m~re plausibly, the wilful ignorance of 
the person who naively re-makes the world in accordance with 
his own wishes? The child is said to be 'innocent', the 
adult no doubt 'corrupt'; but rather than the positive 
ethical quality an adult might possess, might not 'inno-
cence' in the child merely be illexperience? The child 
'plays' while the adult 'works'; but are these descriptions 
of two different and, depending on the circumstance~, 
equally valuable attitudes--as, for example, 'childlike' and 
'matura' might describe adult a+.titudes--or are they rather, 
as Dearden suggests, descriptions of two different, and 
opposed kinds of moral status, the one non-serious, or non-
moral, the other "serious"? The ability to imagine how 
things might be, whi.le at the same time knowing how things 
in fact are: innocence co-existent with experience: the 
ability to be both serious and non-serious depending on 
circumstances--all are p~sitive qualities a person might 
have. It is not clear, however, they are qualities which 
distinguish the child. 
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~hildren are adults, only less so. And yet 'child' 
and 'adult' are contradictories, not contraries. A person 
is either child or adult. And, assuming adolescents to be 
chLldren, all persons are either adult or child. Being 
adult is being not-child, and vice versa. The child is 
young, weak, slow, inexperienced, ignorant, unable and 
morally not-responsible--in a word, he is immature. The 
adult is old, strong,:-faet, experienced, knowledgeable, 
able and morally responsible--that is, mature. The reali-
ties from which 'child' and 'adult', like 'masculine' and 
'feminine', derive are only different, but the terms them-
selves are opposites. When we describe a six-year-ol~ as a 
'little adult', or a sixty-year-old as 'childl~ke', the 
force of the description depends on the fact that in doing 
"'i.>. 
so the hearer's expectations aro contradicted. A child is 
one sort of person, living one sort of life; and adult is 
and lives another. Preparation for adulthood, then, is 
preparation for not-childhood. 
What sort of life is childhood? Adults are mutually-
dependent. Cooperation amongst equals, even amongst leaders 
and followers, is necessary if all are to survive. Children, 
on the other hand, are dependent. They depend on adul~8, 
but adults do not, at least not in the same way, depend on 
them. TQough an adult might find himself in a situation in 
which to survive he must depend on a child, the ch~ld, as 
we have described him, is unlikely to be of much help. 
When old and unable to care for himself a parent migh-~ 
depend on his child, but if his dependence is not to have 
been misplaced by then his child had bSJt be an adult. The 
child, on the other hand, in a simple and straightforward 
way, depends for hi~ survival on the adult. He must eat, 
eat the right things, but at first he does not understand, 
does not know what it edible. The adult must explain 
nutrition to him, or at least show him what to eat, if 
necessary, compel him to eat it. The child must care for 
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his health, but at first he does not know what risks injury 
or disease. He depends on the adult to protect him, to 
restrict him, to tell him what risks there are. As Peters 
and Kant point out, humans are not particularly well-endow-
ed as far as instinct is concerned. Survival is a matter of 
learning. But, as learning by trial and error, at least at 
first, might be fatal, the ch~ld depends on the adult to 
tell him how he (the adult) managed to survive as long as 
he lias. 
To survive to adulthood the ch~ld must endure a 
situation which is, with respect to freedom, ambiguous. Pro-
tected from the possible consequences of his own ignorance 
and w~lfulness, protected from those who might take advan-
tage of his weakness and stupidity, the .child is free :from 
many things the adult is not. Unlike the adult, however, he 
is not free from the authority a parent must assume if he 
(the parent) is to provide adequate protection. The necessi-
ty of protection creates a situati~n in which the child is 
not free to 22 those things which place his survival at 
risk. He is, howeve~, free to do some things whichp if done 
by an adult, would place him at risk, but which, because of 
the protection of the adult, the child can do safely, if 
not always with impunity. Being dependent on the adult, it 
is the latter who assumes responsibility bo·th for the chi.ld 
and for what he does. But, ~rresponsibility involves both 
freedom and bondage: the child is not respons~ble, but res-
ponsibility still exists and it exists wi~h another, on& 
who might have to coerce t~e child in order to meet his 
responsibilities. The child is, as it were, free to do what 
he pleases, but only in a paddec. cell for which the adult 
holds the key. 
30w does this situation come abou~? Adults (for the 
most part) knowingly and voluntarily act such that as a 
result of their action a being comes into a world in which 
without care he will not survive, without nurture he will 
continue to need care, and who :loTi.ll eventual.ly face a 
situation in which, his parents having pre-deceased him, he 
must, but without preparation he cannot, care ~or himself. 
It is as· :L~ without his consent an adul t were to be trans-
ported to the antipodes where, without the possibility o~ 
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escape, he depends for his survival solely on h~s ' 
... age"'o. and 
~ 
progressively weakening kidnapper. In becoming a parent one 
assumes responsibility for care f nurture and preparation of 
one's child. Few are compelled to become parents; but, if 
they are, though they are not 
.. , those who compelled them are 
responsible for the ch~ld. Few have intercourse without at 
the same time knowing that pregnancy and birth are possible; 
but, when knowledge was neither definite nor widespread. it 
was not so much the adult who was seen to have responsibil-
ity for the child, but the child who had a duty to the 
adult because of all that the latter (no doubt solely out of 
the goodness of his heart) did for him. Adults have children 
to propagate the species, contribute to the national cause, 
continue the family na~e, to have someone to love, someone 
who will love in return, someonf; to help around the hou&e, 
even someone just to care for and nurture. The~e are all 
sorts of reasons adults have for wanting children, but they 
have them because they want the~, not because they are com-
pelled to have them--because the 'urge' ~s 'irresistable'--
and not because they are prone rep~ated~y to make silly 
mistakes. 
The si tua tio~"'1 of the child, as we have so far 
described it, is one in which, having been, without his 
knowledge or consent, brought into a world where on his own 
he cannot surv~ve, those responsible for his entrance 
assume an obligation to care for, to nurture (or bring up), 
and to prepare him for the time when (as it must be antici-
pated), the" responsible parties being dead, the child must 
care for himself. The situation, of course, is not as simple 
as" this. Given the sort of creatures they ar-e, and given the 
the sort of world in which they are condemned to live, in 
order to survive humans must cooperate with each other. We 
are, and we make ourselves mutually-dependent, and we 
acknowledge our dependence in cooperative, as opposed to 
purely self-seeking thought and behavior. Cooperative indi-
viduals become members of a cvmmunity when they acknowledge 
themselves 'parts' of a greater 'whole', that is, indivi-
" . 
duals with a part to play in something upon which all 
depend. Parts are defined in terms of rights and duties: 
individuals become subject to praise and blame, reward and 
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punishment, depending on how well they fulfill their duties, 
how well they exercise their rights. Individuals restrict 
and control their behavior (or others do it for them) in 
order that the community; without which they could not sur-
vive, be preserved. Communal, as opposed t o merely coopera-
tive behavior is intended to be, amongst other things, 
predictable, life in a community more secure. In the former 
everyone is 'in it together'. In the latter there is nothing 
to be tint. Contributing to something seen to be separate 
from, but something upon which all individuals depend is, 
for everyone but the supremely strong and the supremely con-
fident, a better arrangement than having to scratch 
another's back in the hope that he will scratch one's own in 
return. 
In a community the situation of the child is as 
follows. He enters unable to fulfi:.l the duties, or make 
good use of the rights, which members assume, and yet his 
very membe~ship, apart from which he cannot survive, 
depends on his being able to do so. If the community is to 
assume, as it mus.t assume, the right to expect the child to 
fulfill his duties, and to make responsible use of his 
rights, it must also assume an obligation to prepare him to 
do so. Whether the child lives up to expectation depends on 
the situation he is in,the life and experience he has, the 
things he learns. The situation in turn depends on adult 
behavior, behavior which is subject to communal control and 
restriction. Two general sorts 0f situation can be distin-
~ished. In the first, the knowledge and abilities to be 
acquired by the child, and the demands placed by the commun-
ity on ~dults, are such that at home, without much in the 
way of formal instruction, and what there is given by 
parents or other family members themselves, the child can be 
adequately prepared to assume t~d rights and duties of full 
membership in the community. In the second, either the 
knowledge and abilities to be acquired, or the demands 
placed by the community on adults, are such that home pre~ 
parat~on is impossible. Not all adults, for example, have 
the knowledge and abilities to transmit, or, if they have, 
they have not the time or the talent, or the time to 
acquL1'e the talent, to do the transmitting. The responsibil-
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ity of' the community in the f'irst situation is to ensure 
that home preparation continues to be possible. In the 
second, in order to f'ulfill its responsibility the commun-
ity must become more directly involved. It must assume 
direct responsibility for those aspects f' th hi ' o e c ld s pre-
paration which, because of' the sort of community it is, the 
parent at home can not. Social preparation, transmission of' 
specialized knowledge and advanced understanding, would be 
typical examples. 
As a community assumes more and more of the respon-
sibility for preparat~on, it also assumes more rights in 
determining in what sort of situation the child is to be. It 
might, for example, restrict the f'reedom of adults in 
choosing whether to have children. Some adults, their likely 
offspring, or the arrangements ~ community ~s in a position 
to make, might be such that adequate preparation would be 
impossible, or at least highly unlikely. If, on the other 
hand:, the communi ty allows wide freedom o:f choice wi th 
respect to becoming a parent, it might limit :freedom in the 
exercise oe parental authority. Most important, it might 
. ~ 
restrict the length of time during which that authority can, 
by custom or by law, be exercised. Parents might want to 
free themselves o:f responsibility for their children as soon 
as they are big enough and strong enough at least to make it 
sufficient distance from home that, being out of sight and 
mind, whatever might happen to them need not be of' concern. 
(No doubt the 'urge' was tirresistable'.) Other parents 
might want to make their children dependent on them for as 
long as they (the parents) continue to live, might want 
servants they could not otherwise afford, or subjects for an 
authority they would not otherwise be able to exercise. In 
its own interests, however, and in the interests of: children 
of' course, the commpnity might assume the right to de~ide on 
an age between the above extremes when the child shall be 
(by " law, or by custom), and wheH it is assumed that fie 'Will 
be, p:... .. epared for adulthood, adulthood then being something 
both conferred (or thrust) upon, and something achieved by 
the child. 
Children, given the sort of situation they are in, 
and given the sort of creatures they are, are, as Langeveld 
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says, not responsible for what they think and do. More fund-
amentally, however, they are, and their situation makes 
them, dependent creatures. Not only are they dependent en 
adults to care for, to nurture and to prepare them; they 
are dependent on adults to take responsibility for them, it 
being adults who are responsible for their being and their 
being dependent. Education is a kind of preparation. Its 
place in the bringing up of children, we have argued, is in 
preparing them for adulthood. If childhood is a situation of 
dependence then adulthood, the contradictory of childhood, 
is a situation of independence. Education generally, not 
merely child education, then, must be preparation for inde-
pendence, a part of which, but only a part, is preparation 
to take responsibility. And child education mu~t be prepara-
tion for a situatiou in which the child is no longer 
dependent ~n the parental adult, a part of which would 
involve him in taking responsibility for his own care and, 
if the \i'ord can be so used, his further 'nurture I. 
Independe~ce is the contradictory of dependance. 
"X is dependent on (or independent of) Y" is the same as 
fiX is (or is not) contingent on ytt. Continge,ncy (or depen-
dence) can be either logical or empirical. The truth of a 
conclusion is contingent upon the truth of the premises and 
the validi ty of the argument. The l:i.fe o,f a plant, on the 
other hand, is contingent upon carbon dioxide in the air and 
nutrients in the soil. Only empirical entities, that is, 
persons, can be educated or uneducated, and thus our concern 
is empirical, not logical contingency. X is (empirically) 
contingent on Y if, without Y, X could not exist. For our 
purposes, then, "X is independent of {or dependent on} Y" is 
the same as tlliithoutY, .. X could (or could not) exist.1t No 
one thi~g, in a closed causal system, is independent of 
everything. There is nothing of which it can be said t~at 
regardless of what else changes it would sti~l exist. Inde-
pendence, then, is always of something. Conversely, no one 
thing is dependent on everything. An event, for instance, 
can not depend on contemporaneous or future events. Depen-
dence is always ~ something. Further, no one thing is 
everything, and thus nothing can depend or not depend on 
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something else for everything. Both dependence and indepen-
dence are always for something. "X is dependent (or inde-
Pendent)" is logically ~nco I t It· 
- mp e e. ~s elliptical for 
"X is dependent on (or independent of) Y for (or with 
respect to) Z." 
How can a person be independent? Of what, and with 
respect to what, can a person be non-contingent? Consider 
the following possibility. X ~s independent of Y with res-
pect to Z. Let 'X' refer to the self, rye to everything 
other than the self, ·Z· to everything with respect to which 
the self can be independent of everything else. The self is 
thus non-contingent, sufficient unto itself, self-suffi-
cient. Self-sufficiency is a species of independence, the 
least qualified species imaginable_ Nothing, and thus no 
one, is literally self-sufficient, and yet the term is used 
to describe the situation in which at least some people fipd 
thems9lves. The notion of personal self-sufficiency invOlves 
distinctions between a person and all other persons, and 
between who a person is and what he does. A person is self-
suf":ricien t i:r he'·,·does not depend on others f"or -what he does. 
4 
Being self-sufficient is ~ a matter of a person's rela-
tionship with the natural envircnment--everyone is dependent 
in this respect. Nor is it a matter of how a person came to 
be the sort of person he is--the concern is what Crusoe 
does, not his history, the latter involving, as it does for 
everyone, dependence on others for the sort of person he 
came to be. 
In a mutua~ly-dependent world, unlike the world in 
which Crusoe, at ~east at first, found himself, there is 
nothing a person does which is not at least in some way 
dependent on what others do. Though we do not a~ways depend 
on active cooperation, we always do depend on non-interfer-
ence. We, on our island, depe~d on others much as Crusoe, 
on his, depends on nature. We are our own 9nvironment. How 
can ind~pendence in a mutually-dependent world be under-
stood? Independence is c~ose~y related to Zreedom or 
liberty. Rousseau characterizes the situation for which 
education prepares as one of freedom, the situation of the 
educand presumab~y being one of a lack of liberty. we ~ave 
seen, however, that the situations of both adult and child 
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are, wi th respect to freedom, ambiguous. l{hether the one is 
free, and the other not, depends on what they are supposed 
to be free from and free to do. How, then, J..·s . d 
to be distinguished from'freedom? 
J..n ependence 
The contradJ..ctory of freedom is compulsion. To be 
compelled to do something is to be in a situation in which 
one has as we say 'no choice' but to do it. 'No choice' is 
doubly ambiguous. First, it can be intended either literal-
ly or as an ellipsis for 'no reasonable choice'. There is 
literally no choice involved in psychotic and in physically-
forced behavior; but when a person is told to "Dance!" by 
someone holding a Colt 45 to his (the dancer's) head, 
though he chooses to dance rather than die, because the 
choice was not a reasonable one he was compelled, he had 
'no choice' but to dance. Second, 'choic'e' can be inten(~ad 
in anyone of three ways. It can be a choice made, an option 
one might choose, or it can be the act of choOSing itRelf. 
Thus, 'no reasonable choice~ can mean, not making a reason-
able choice, not having a reasonable option, or it can mean 
not beIng in a situation in whicn it is reasonable to make 
a choice. Being compelled to do something cannot mean not 
making a reasonable choice. We choose either reasonably or 
not. We cannot be blamed for choosing reasonably; but, on 
this interpretation, neither can we be blamed for not doing 
so: we were 'compelled' to choose unreasonably. Being 
compelled to do something cannot mean not having a reason-
able option. In the classic compulsory situation there is 
only one thing a person can do. But, on this second inter~ 
pretation, if it is reasonable then he is ~ compelled. 
Conversely, if a person has to choose from a large number 
of unreasonable options, whatever he does he must, accord-
ing to this view, be compelled to do it. But, a person can 
be blamed for not choosing the least evil thing to do, the 
implication being that in this situation he is not compel-
led. To be compelled to do something, then, is either to be 
in a situation in which there is literally no choice about 
what one is to do, or, if there is, to be in a situation in 
which choosing itself is unreasonable. 
The whole point of compulsion is to get a person to 
do something. If not by force, or by drugs, ona creates a 
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situation in which doing the thing is so much to be prefer-
red to doing anything else that the person will do it as it 
were 'without thinking' (possibly of something else). It is 
essentially a matter of circumventing a person's independent 
judgment, of acting 'through' him rather than allowing him 
to act himself. The clearest cases of compulsion involve 
such things as physical force, brain washing, drug 'thera-
py'--cas9s where there is literally no choice. The sorts of 
cases we are concerned with, however, are at best 'e~ther/ 
or', 'do. or die' cases. The exercise of independent judgment 
is possi.ble--a person has a clear head, time to think, all 
the relevant facts to think about. But, though possible, 
independent judgment is pointless. A judgment has been made 
already--ty someone else: one is presented with a fait 
accompli: one compl.~.es. The cowboy does not choose to dance; 
he complies with the choice of the gunnlan. Given the situa-
tion he faces, the only way to exercise independent judgment 
would be by not dancing. The situation is such that it is 
not reasonable for him to choose, and thus if he dances, if 
he complies with····t;he o+:herts decisi.on, he was compelled to 
.. ~ 
do so, compelled to dance rather than anything else. If, on 
the oth3r hand, he does not dance, as it was reasonable for 
him to choose bet'tveen compliance and resistance, between 
life and death, h~s resistance was voluntary. To be compel-
led is always to be compelled to do something. It is to be 
in a situation which precludes doing a~ything else. The 
dancer could not reasonably have done anything else. The 
dead cowboy could. 
To be free, then, is to be in a situation which 
invites, rather than precludes, choosing what to do. If a 
person's doing something cannot satisfactorily be explained 
without reference to his choices then he was, at least to 
some axtent, free. As many have 'lrgued, rather than contra-
dicting, freedom ?ssumes determinism, freedom concerning 
whether an act of choice must be included in the causal 
chain to explain ~hat was done. Included where? There are 
two possibilities. First, a person chooses to do something, 
and he does it. Second, he chooses and acts to create a 
situation in which he is compelled to do something, and he 
does it--as, for example, in choosing to play and playing a 
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compelled 
to continue 
game, by the rules of which one is subsequently 
to make a particular move. One is not compelled 
playing, but, if one decides to do so, the move is compul-
sory. And, finally, what'compels? Of interest are three 
possibilities. One can be compelled by one's own nature (as 
in psychotic behavior), by other persons (as in physically-
forced behavior), or one can be compelled as we say by 
'circumstances' (that :L' thO th s, any :Lng 0 er than ourselves and 
other persons). 
'Compulsion' refers, in some contexts, to a kind of 
dependence, 'freedom' to a kind of independence. For X to be 
compelled by Y to do Z is the same as his being (solely) 
dependent on Y for doing it, the point being that without y, 
and only without Y, Z would not have been done. Conversely, 
for X t? be free of or from Y w~th respe~t to the doing of 
Z can be the same as being independent of Y, the point being 
that, in other circumstances, he would have been dependent 
on 'f for doing it. Bu t , freedom and independence are no t the 
same in all contexts. Freedom concerns whether a person ~s 
either in a situa.tion 'Which invites hi.s .choosing what to do 
or whether he has chosen the situation he is in (regardless 
of how inviting). In both cases freedom prirnari1y concerns 
the nature of the situation, not the nature of the person 
who is in ~t. Becoming free is essentially a matter of so 
changing one's situation that one's nature, other persons 
and circumstances no longer compel. If compelled by his 
nature to drink alcohol, whenever drink is put in front of 
him, a person becomes free by avoiding situations in which 
he will be offered drink. If compelled by someone to do 
things he does not uant to do, a person become:s free by 
avoiding the other's company. And if, given certain circum-
stances, he must do work he does not enjoy, a person might 
free 'himself by so altering his circumstances that he no 
longer need work at all. Of course the alcoholic might be 
'cured', the ti.nid might learn 'Co stand up to the bully, 
the w~rker might so change himself that material things no 
longer seem important. Freedom is a relational notion and 
thus whether a person is free in part depends on the sort 
of person he is. Eut, the important point is that, being a 
relational notion, freedom can and typically does depend 
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on other persons and on the situation J.°n which a person 
finds himself. Being educated, on the other hand, does not 
depend on others, or on the situation one is in. The differ-
ence between being educated and uneducated is a difference 
in the sort of person one is. One can become free by avoid-
ing bars, moving to another town, or by robbing a bank; but 
in doing none of these is one necessarily changed, and thus 
one need not become better educated. 
Independence concerns whether a person is in a situa-
tion in which he does not depend on others for what he does. 
X is independent of Y with respect to the doing of Z either 
if he can do Z himself or if he does not need Z done by 
anyone. Becoming independent is essentially a matter of so 
changing oneself that one no longer needs thin~s done or, if 
one does, one can d~ them oneself. Independence is not c. 
relational notion: it is personal rather than, as is free-
dom, inter-person~l. Though a person is always independent 
of someone else, whether he is independent depends not on 
the sort of person the other is, but rather on the sort of 
person, he is hims·elr. A person becomes i .. ndependent of" his 
parents when he can care for and direct himself. A person 
becomes independent of his teachers when he has learned all 
they know. On the other hand, a person becomes free of, but 
no less dependent on, parents and teachers when~ unable to 
care for or to direct himself, not knowing very much, he 
either runs away or is abandoned by them. Broadly speaking, 
then, whereas freedom is essentially a political and moral 
notion, independence is essentially educational. 
Consider the difference between being free from and 
independent of authority. To be free is to be in a situation 
which invites choosing what to do. An authority, like the 
state, makes choices on behalf of one. To become free from 
authority a person can do either one of two things. First, 
he can take control of the state, that is, put himself in 
the positicn to mak& choices. Or, second, he can abolish the 
state entirely, that is, render the situation one in w~~ch 
no one makes choices on behalf o:f him, not even himself. To 
be independent, on the other hand, is not to be dependent on 
o tiJ.ers for what one does. Au thori ties, like the stat e, do 
for one what one cannot do for oneself. To become indepen-
143 
dent of authority a person can do either one of two things. 
First, he can become the sort of person who does not need 
done what the state would otherwise do f or him, for example, 
a healthy person, and thus not in need of the NHS. Or, 
second, he can become the sort of person who can do for 
himself what the state would otherwise do for him, for 
example, knowledgeable about, and skilled at nursing him-
self, a~d thus, again, not in need of the health service. 
The significant freedom in a mu~ually-dependent world is 
well illustrated by tak~g control of rather than abolishing 
authority. In such a world being free is largely a matter 
of having at least some control over the things upon which 
one depends. The significant form of independence, on the 
other hand, is qui.te different. Ra'ther than take control of 
that upnn which he depends, a person becom~s independent 
of that over wh~ch he has no control--he stays healthy or 
learns to nurse himself, he does not form the ambition of 
becoming Health Minister. Freedom and indepondence are some-
times confused because together they suggest as an ideal a 
situation in which a person depends only on whet he controls. 
Education is preparation for independence. How is 
preparing a person for independence to be distinguished 
from preparing or making an independent sort of person? 
Given the sort of educand involved, and given the sort of 
society in which he must lj~ve, preparing an independent 
sort of person might be a very bad way of preparing him for 
independence. Some people are simply not able to go ~t 
alone, and in some societies going it alone is a crime, and 
thus to develop an ind9pendent person would be a way of 
crippling the. educand both personally and sccially. Emile, 
and some Soviet dissidents, however,.~ ~ble--indeed, 
it might be that they are ££aLle not to go it alone. The 
educator would be concerned here that they know exactly 
what th~y are getting themselves into, and that they be as 
well prepared as possible. On the other hand, there are 
some societies in which not to go it alone iS t if not a 
crime, certainly very much despised. The educand who is 
either unable or unwilling to do so must know that ~his is 
the case and be prepared to live with it--if, that is, like 
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the dissident, he has not the choice of life in another, 
more congenial society. Education, as has been said, is not 
preparing anyone sort of person. It is not even necessar-
ily preparing an independent sort of person. 
Independence ~s not seen as a personal ~d I "t 
.... ea --~ is, 
rather, a situation everyone to some extent must face. And 
even if" i..t were an ideal the aim of- education, as has been 
argued, can not be deduced from it, for it makes just as 
much sense to reverse the argument and claim that personal 
ideals can be deduced from the aim of educat~on. Similarly, 
the aim of education can not be deduced from some supposed 
social ideal. Society, we argued, depends as much on educa-
tion as education depends on society. But, if education is 
preparation for independence would not a society of ideally 
educated persons be one of a ce:.:"tain kind, namely, an 
anarchistic society? And if this is the case i~ there not, 
contrary to what was said above, a direct dependency rela-
tionship between education and society? It is true that if 
all individuals were ideally well prepared for independence 
~hen, because ~h8y would have no np.ed for authorities, a 
- -.
society composed solely of such individuals would indeed be 
anarchistic. But, h~w are these individuals to be prepared 
for independence? They are not born prepared and so they 
must learn. And, what conditions would be necessary before 
such learning could take place? Nore important, what but 
some sort of author~ty could ensure that these conditions 
actually obtained? Education and society are mutually-depen-
dent. It is only by supposing us to be other than we are 
that a relationship of simple, rather than mutual dependence 
can seem plausible. 
Education is preparation for independence. This is a 
view arrived at primarily by our attempts to overcome the 
weaknesses of oth3r, rival theses, while at the same time 
recogni.zing and fully account:i.ng :for the strengths which 
justif~ed our considering them in the first place. Elyot 
and Quintilian think educatior~ is preparation for leader-
ship. Education, of course, can be practised Ln an equali-
tarian society; but,in thinking of education only in a 
hierarchical socie,ty, because the scop~ of independence i.s 
so much greater for the leader than it is for the follOller, 
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it is understandable that Elyot and QUintilian should over-
look preparation for followership Locke tho k d i 
• 1n s e ucat on 
is the development of a virtuous person. At times this 
seems to mean little more than that the educated person 
does what he does well, and of course doing well is evidence 
of having been well prepared to do it. At other times, 
however, Locke speaks specifically of moral virtue. This is 
to narrow the scope of educational. developmGnt (perhaps to 
bring it into l.ine with a. personal °d ) 1 eal , but, nonetheless, 
there is only a very subtle difference between developing a 
moral person and preparing a person for moral independence. 
There is always the possibility, . the latter, that J.n the 
prepared person will act immorally, but, generally speaking, 
so acting is evidence of some failure of preparation. Act-
ing morally is, if nothing else, at least a~ good a strategy 
as others. 
Dewey emphasizes grouth itself' , rather than gro\vth in 
any particular direction, and also social growth within a 
particul.ar society rather than social growth itself. Unlike 
Elyot and Quinti'lian, De'vey is thinking of education in what 
he calls a democratic and progressive society. In such a 
society the educator cannot predict, at least with any hope 
of detailed accuracy, what sort of situation the child will 
find himself in when the independence of adulthood is thrust 
or conferred upon him. The educator cannot fonsee what sort 
of person the educand will have become, nor can he fonsee 
how society might have changed. If he could, as Elyot and 
Quintilian could, the educator would prepare the child for 
independence in the sense of' equiping him with all he will. 
need to face the 8i tuation. As it is{ the educator, accordilig 
to Dewey, can only prepare him for independence in the sense 
that when the educand comes to need something he will have 
the ability and the knowledge to get it for himself. Thus, 
for Dewey, school or child education and, at least accord-
ing to his "technical defini. tion" ,'" : education generally, is 
ai.ded growth which prepares a person for future unaided 
growth. In emphasizing development within a particular 
society, Dewey recognizes that for most people the society 
into which they were born is likely to remain a permanent 
feature of their li'Ves, something with which they must learn 
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to cope. But, learning how to cope with society--like learn-
ing how to cope with moralitY~-is not 
necessarily becoming 
a person of a certain social 'stamp'. J t 
us as emigration is 
a possibility for the few, working to change society is the 
,,,ay many come to cope, the way many come to 'f1 t in'. 
Downie et al and Telfer restrict the scope of educa-
tion to exclude the practical, and Oakeshott to exclude 
initiation into a merely "local", as Opposed to a "human" 
inheritance. The concern of both is intellectual and 
cultural independence (or "autonomy"), that is, the concern 
is with preparing a person to think for himself, rather 
than leaving him in a posi tion ,,,here, if he is to think at 
all, he must depend for his thoughts on others. Needless to 
say, 'thinking! does not exhaust the possibilities of 
independence. And those for ,,,ho:a there are other and no 
doubt more important t~ings to be getting on with need not, 
on the whole, be any less well prepared for independence 
than those who flourish, if not on ttoutdoor adventure 
. 
courses", at least in "School". 
}I-'inq,IIy'Eangeveld thinks tadult education t self-
. , . . . 
contradictor~r. It is with children that education is clearly 
most important. In all societies, whether by custom or :aw, 
an age is fixed w'hen, regardless of whether his parents are 
still able and willing to care for and to direct him, it is 
assumed the child can take care of himself, it is assumed, 
tha t is, that he is responsible :for what he does. A..nd if he 
should fail, the punishments and penalties can be very hard 
indeed. But, if only in a different and perhaps less import-
ant way, adult preparation for independence is still 
possible. Adult education sewing classes, for ~xample, 
would not have fulfilled their purpose ~f the student, on 
arriving back home, found he could not sew properly indepen-
dently of his instrpctor. And, more seriously, recidivism 
(at lqast where crime is not a 'way of life', with prison an 
integral part) pointedly commeno;;s on inmates t social 
educae;ion, and on the supposed educational value of punish-
ment itself, the recidivist having failed in trying to live 
independently of the "padded cell for which (another) holds 
the key." 
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Chapter 6 His-education 
tion 
wi.ll 
Education is preparation for independence. Prepara-
for dependence is mis-education. Indoctrination, as 
be seen, is preparation ~or a certain kind of depen-
dence. It is, roughly, so acting that a person comes and 
continues to be dependent' on one for the beliefs he holds. 
Indoctrination, however, is also preparation for a certain 
kind of ~dependence. Being dependent on the one, a person 
is not dependent eLther on himself or others. The question 
arises, 'then, of '\vhat place, if any, indoctrination might 
have in education? 
For the participant 'indoctrinatio.n' is,. to use 
Cooper's phrase, an Hevaluative term", that is, a term lAsed 
to express~ in this case, a negative evaluation. Snook will 
"assume that indoctrination is always blameworthy." (1972a, 
p. 4) Hare says, "I believe in a distinction between educa-
tion and indoctrination; and I believe that indoctrination 
is a bad thing. u,>, (Hollins, p. 47) There are of course 
~pectator, and thus non-evaluative, uses of the term. Flew 
recognizes this but says he will consider irdoctrination 
only "where it is taken to be a bad thing." (Snook 1972b, 
p. 86) 
Wilson and White are less complacent. Wilson admits 
that "'indoctrination' represents, to most of us, something 
pernicious, though lie are not quite sure what: an area 
whose features, if we only knew what they were, we do not 
want to cross." (Hollins, p. 26) But Wilson does not think 
indoctrination all-;ays unjustified, always a "bad thing". 
There are, he says, occasions when it is "absolutely neces-
sary" (Snook, 1972b, pp. 20-4), though what these might be 
he does not say. White agrees that 'indoctrination' "has 
come to be used pejoratively in most cases". But, he po,ints 
out, "not in all: the American Army clearly a.pproves of the 
Indoctrination Courses it arranges for its troops." (IJid, 
p. 120) Wilson, however, thinks indoctrination on occasion 
might be "absolutely necessary" in education. It is not 
clear White agrees, for in concluding- one of' his articles 
he warns that the "moral educator has to be careful that his 
pupils do not grow up indoctrinated ••• lf (Ibid, p. 130) 
Most of the authors whose work will be discussed 
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assume that indoctrination is a bad thl."ng, b d b th a 0 morally 
and educationally. They want to know why. The approach here 
will be different. Rather than assumed, it will be asked 
whether, and in \vhat way, indoctrl.°natl."on i s specifically 
mis-educational, the point being to show that this is the 
same as asking whether, and in what way, indoctrination is 
preparation for dependence. 
Indoc~rination is often contrasted with conditioning. 
(See, for example, Snook 1972a, p. 104ff.) It is said that 
whereas only behavior can be conditioned, only belief can be 
indoctrinated. (Wilson in Hollins, p. 17ff.) The significant 
difference between the two is as follows'. Bt;lief (that X) 
implies some understanding (of X). In classical stimul~us­
response conditioning, on the other hand, the sort of 
response obtained is wh01(lj explicable in terms of the 
stimulous given (and the organism·in question). It is 
because there is.,.no need to posi t some intervening variable 
4 
such as understanding (or intelligence) it is thought the 
response is conditioned. 
Either verbal or (it is inferred) mental behavior 
might be conditioned. And yet it is primarily on the basis 
of verbal (and inferred mental) behavior that a person is 
thought to be indoctrinated. The difference between the two 
is that in indoctrinat~on, but not in conditioning, to 
satisfactorily explain observed behavior one must assume 
the existence of belief (and thus of understanding). A 
person is asked, "Do you believe in God?tf He says, "I 
believe lin God." The question is repeated, and so is the 
answer. If forced to choose between the two, and ~f the 
person involved is only 18 months old, one would say "I 
believe in God" is a conditioned response, not that the 
child is indoctrinated to b9liev~ in God. Again, th~ US 
Army claims to indoctrinate its troops. If soldiers came to 
believe that the 'chain of command' is something to be 
broken, 'platoon loyalty' a subject suitable for mockery, 
or if' they failed completely to understand what thede 
phrasse, at least for their officers, are supposed to mean, 
one would suppose the Indoctrination Courses not to have 
fulfilled expectations. 
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People are said to be indoctrinated to 'think' in 
certain ways. Hare, for example, says that the indoctrina-
ted person does not think for himself; he is a person who, 
as both Hare and Wilson suggest, allows another, in his 
absense, to do his thinking for him. 'Thinking' is ambig-
uous. What a person thinks is not the same as how he thinks. 
What is thought is roughly equ~valent to what is believed, 
whereas 'how' refers to mental performance or behavior. A 
person 'thinks politically'. His vocabulary extends not far 
beyond, 'input', 'output', 'decision-making', 'consensus', 
'power'. If forced to choose between the two, and if, 
thinking ill (or well) of himself, he comes to speak in such 
a way that others confirm his salf-perception, one woulu say 
the person had been conditioned to speak (and ~o think) 
politically, not, at least not necessarily, that he had been 
indoctrinated to believe anything in particular. If, 
however, it were discovered that he speaks as he does 
because he belie'Yes men and societies to be little more than 
political phenomena, one would have reason, though not as 
yet sufficient reas0ll, for thinking him indoctrinated. 
Indoctrination has 'advantages', advantages which 
arise because, unlike conditioning, it involves at least 
some understanding. The US Army wants its troops to obey 
orders and to ident~ty their personal interest with the in-
terests of their platoon. A soldier might be conditioned to 
behave in militarily desirable ways, but the scope of 
conditioning is limited. Some behaviors require understand-
ing the cvnditioned person does not have. To obey an order 
to repair his rifle, for example, the soldier must under-
st~J.d what is or what is likely to be wrong with it. 
Further, because fie does not understand what he is doing the 
conditioned person cannot adapt his behavior in the light of 
relevant differences between the situation in which he is to 
act and the situation as it was fo~een when he '\-las condi-
tioned. Having been conditioned. always to stay with his 
platoon, the soldier is unable to act appropriately when, 
for his plat00n to survive, he must leave it and make 
contact with company command. The scope of conditioning is 
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limited, but not necessarily so. If one had both unlimited 
time in which to complete it, and perfect knowledge of the 
situations it is intended to anticipate, a person could be 
condi tioned to do anything and everything. l{ars, however, 
will not wait. 
The advantage of indoctrination is obvious enough. 
Had the soldier been indoctrinated to believe in the chain 
of command, and in platoon loyalty, neither of the above-
mentioned problems need have arisen. In fact, the success-
fully indoctrinated soldier is something of a military 
ideal. In situations in which the lives of many depend on 
the behavior of a few, the indoctrinated soldier above all 
else is dependable. And, further, it is only his native 
capacity ~nd the quality of his training, not the fact of 
his having been indoctrinated, upon which depends how intel-
ligentl~ reliable the soldier is. ~ndoctrination, of 
course, is not unproblematic, not even in the army. The US 
Army indoctrinates in order to overcome the very real 
problem of soldiers acting on their own initiative, perhaps 
foolishly. There""are, n.owever, occasions~ when a command 
should not be obeyed, when loyalty would be inappropriate, 
and it is with occasions such as these that the indoctrina-
ted soldier is not able to cope. 
Conditioning is not the same as indoctrination, but 
neither is it a particularly good behavioral analogy. The 
indoctrinated person has at least some understanding of the 
object of his belief, but the conditioned person does not 
und.erstand, or at least it is not because he understands 
that he thinks and behaves as he does. A better analogy 
would be with the person who does what he does because that 
is how he was trained to do it and because, having been 
trained, the behavior has become habitual. As Hare and 
Wi~son might say, he does not 'Think' (manner, not content) 
for himself, but ~llows in his absen6e his trainer to do his 
thinking for him. The indoctrinated person, as will be seen, 
cannot adapt his beliefs, nor can the 'trained' person adapt 
his behavior, should adaptation become necessary. But, the 
indoctrinated person, in changing circumstances, can intel-
ligently adapt his (primar11y verbal) behavior so as to 
remain consistent with his unchanging belieZ. And, similar-
151 
ly, the 'trained' person, unlike the person who has been 
conditioned, can intelligently adapt his other behaviors in 
order to. protect and to preserve his habit. One thinks of 
the skilled argument of the doctrinaire, of the ingenious 
defenses of the alcoholl.·c. A d n one can contrast both of 
these with the person who, conditioned to respond to argu-
ment, to the offer of a drink, when left to his own devices, 
and without the above stimuli, seems to lose his taste for 
argument and drink entirely. 
Indoctrination poses much the same problem for the 
educator as it does for the army. It is better that the 
educand come to do his own think~g (content, not manner). 
But, if the alternative is that, as it were, no one does any 
think£ng at all, it might be better that the educator act-
ing as an indoctrinator come an~ continue to do the edu-
cand's thinking fo.r hi"l. With this in mind, let us turn to 
the literature, literature, it should be noted, relevant not 
just tc the problem of indoctrination, but to the problem of 
mis-education generally. 
Indoctrinating someone involves getting him to. 
believe something. So too would convincing him that his 
shoes are unlaced. ~~at more does indoctrination involve? 
Gregory and Woods, Flew, and Wilson all think indoctrination 
involves getting someene to hold a certain kind of belief. 
They give epistemological accounts of indoctrination. l{hite, 
Snook, Hare and Noore, on the other hand, think indoctrina-
tion involves getting someone to hold a belief in a certain 
wax. They give psychological accounts of indoctrination. 
Thus, Gregory and Woods, and Flew, think indoctrination must 
involve doctrine, Wilson, uncertain belief. Snook and Moore, 
however, think it involves getting a person to believe some-
thing regardless of the evidence, White, fixedly or unshak-
ably. Hare does not attempt a definitio.n of indoctrination. 
He does say, however, that in indoctrinating one is trying 
to pr~vent another thinking for himself. Contained in each 
view, I think, is a partial account of mis-education. I will 
argue, however, that only White gives an adequate account of 
indoctrination, indoctrination being only one, tpough per-
haps the most serious form of mis-education. 
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Indoctrination, it is said, must involve doctrine. 
Why? F'lew distinguishes doctrine from the sorts, of belief' 
a child would acquire in learning to speak French, or learn-
ing the multiplication tables. Suppose the beliefs acquired 
in studying the latter were false. tiThe faults involved" he 
says "would not be i~doctrination; they would be arithmeti-
cal incompetence or malicious dishonesty. Be£ore we can 
speak of indoctrination we have to be dealing with the 
imparting of beliefs, whether true or false, 'tvhich either 
themselves are, or at least which are closely connected with 
others which unequivocally are, of that subsort, whatever it 
may be, which can correctly be described as doctrinal." 
(Snook, 1972b, pp. 70-1) 
Indoctrination, of course, is not the S.mle as "incom-
petence or malicioud dishonesty". As Cooper points out, 
indoctrinetors, more often than not, are quite "sincere", 
that is, they believe what they teach to be true. And, 
whether sincere or not, they can be very competent in carry-
ing out their chosen task. But, the fact that indoctrination 
is not the same as ,incompetence or lying is not itself a 
:."eas on for thinking i t mus t invo I ve do c trine. For the ar gu-
ment to be valid one must assume there to b~ only five rele-
vant possibilities: (i) teaching \V'hat is thought (correctly) 
to be false, i.e., dishonesty or lying: (ii) teaching what 
is thought (incorrectly) to be true, i.e., incompetence: 
(iii) teaching what is thought (incorrectly) to be false, 
i.e., incompetent dishonesty: (iv) teaching what is thought 
(correctlY) to be true: and (v) teaching what is, or is not 
thought to be (correctly or incorrectly) not known to be 
true or false, i.e., at least for 00me, possibly including 
Flew, indoctrination. 
The argument~ as stated, is invalid, for there 
remain ~n indefinite number of further p05sibilities. Flew 
assumes that indoctrination requires an epistemologica.l 
analysis. And it is only ~ accepting this assumption that 
his argument can be found convincing. It might be, however, 
that indoctrination has nothing at all to do with the epis-
temological status of the belief in question. Whether or not 
it does in part depends, at least in this case, on the 
pose to which the analysis is put. Flew makes it clear 
pur-
he is 
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interested in indoctrination primarily as a "t I " 
n ep~s erno og~-
cal problem. He distinguishes 'What he calls"" II d pr1.mary an 
"secondary" senses of 'indoctrination' In"t d 
• 1. S secon ary 
sense 'indoctrination' re~e~ t" " ~ IS 0 certa1n means and manners 
of teaching" (Ibid, p. 86). In its primary sense, on the 
other hand, it refers, as one would suppose from his earlier 
remarks, to the "matter of trying to implant firm convic-
tions or the truth of doctrines which are in fact raIse or 
at least not known to be true" (op cit). ttThe development 
of the second notion" Flew says "is likely to have an 
especial professional appeal to philosophers. For one of 
the main concerns of philosophy is the examination of 
precisely this sort of question about various kinds of prop-
osition and the sorting out of the often unhappy and confus-
ed diplomatic relations between disciplines~" (Ibid, p. 87) 
The general problem this sort of analysis raises is whether 
doing epistemology, doing "philosophy", has any direct bear-
ing on philosophy of education; whether educational 
conclusions, conclusions, for example, about "means and 
manners of" teach~ng~, can be drawn :from epis terr.ological pre-
mises. 
Wilson thinks they can. Indoctrination, he implies, 
is an epistemological concept, a concept which involves what 
Gregory and Woods, though not Wilson, would call 'doctrine'. 
Wils~n says that "the concept of indoctrination concerns the 
truth and evidence of belief." (Hollins, p. 28) "Suppose", 
he argues, "we could teach four-year-old children all their 
mathematical tables whJ.:le they are asleep, or by hypnosis? 
Or suppose that a boy could master A Level physics by having 
an electric charge passed through his brain cells? Is this 
indoctrination or not?" If 've "want to keep the word 
'indoctrination' as the name of a forbidden area, we shall 
probably want to say that these cases are not cases of 
indoctrination." uThen what is the differe"'l.ce between hypno-
tizing a boy to beli.eve in Communism and hypnotizing him to 
master A Level physics?tI (Ibid, p. 26) "Ou.t" objection is 
surely founded on the fact (that some beli-afs are) uncertain 
••• that we have no logical right to be sure of an answer ••• 
Re~ig±-ous, poli tical and moral beliefs are uncertain, in a 
sense in which mathematics and Latin grammar- (and, one sup-
poses, A Level physics) are not.rt (Ibid, p. 27) 
Wilson thinks "the importance of evidence implies 
that we must grade our teaching to fit the logical status 
of the beliefs which we are putting forward. 1t (Ibid, pp. 28-
29) (emphasis mine) "If they are certain ••• they can be 
taught as certainties: if they are merely probable ••• they 
must be taught as probabilLt~es: and if they are totally 
uncertain, they must not be taught at all--at least in the 
sense that we must :"lot persuade people to adopt them." UTo 
avoid indoctrination, we must be more concerned with putting 
forward the evidence for beliefs than with inculcating the 
beliefs themselves." (Ibid, p. 29) 
Hare and Cooper, the former in ~esponse to Wilson, 
the latter to Snook, both give counter-instances to epistem-
ological analyses o£ education. Suppose," Hare says, a crild 
"senses that I disapprove very strongly of lying and there-
fore stops doing it ••• Have I, by using this non-rational 
method of affecting the child's behav~or, been indoctrina-
ting the child? I do not think so. For I do not want the 
child to remain ::;;,uch that non-raiiona1 pe-rsuas±on or influ-
... 
ence is the only kind of moral communication I can have with 
"t If ~ . (Ibid, pp. 50 - 1 ) "He cannot help influencing our child-
ren; the only question is, how, and in what direction ••• And, 
if we are to influence them anyway, w·hat can we do but try 
to influence them in the best direction we can think of? 
But, indoctrination only begins when '-fe are trying to stop 
the growth in our children of the capacity to think for 
themselves ••• " (Ibid, p. 52) That is, it might be justifi-
able, because inevitable, not only to inculcate what Wilson 
calls ttuncertain"--in this case, moral--belie:fs, but to do 
so on a basis--here, fear of disapproval and punishment--
other than that of what evidence, or ""hat reason there might 
be to hold them. 
Though not consistent with his psychological analysis 
of indoctrination, S~ook claims that th~ delibe~ate teaching 
of what is false must be indoctrination. (1972a, p. 36) 
Cooper, however, remembers that "during my first year of· 
Economics, I was taught the theory of Perfect Competition, 
and taught it as if it were true. This ~.lay have been a 
useful tactic on my teacher's part, for had we known that 
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the theory lias no t true, '-Ie mi gh t have paid les sat ten tion 
during those long months." (44) Cooper's point is that "a 
teacher could sincerely and truthfully say, 'I am teaching 
him (Hr. Cooper) that P, 'which is false; but it is certain-
ly not my intention that he will continue to believe Ponce 
he encounters (say in his second year) the evidence '''hich 
shows it to be false. it (Ibid) And such a case, he suggests, 
need not be one of indoctrination. 
Neither counter-instance is entirely convincing. For 
Lt is clear that in both the over-all aim is that the child 
or pupil, when independent of parent or teacher, believe 
only what is true, or at least rationally supportable, 
because it is true or rationally supportable. Suppose, how-
ever, that the child to whom Mr. Hare sh~ws his disapproval 
of lying were to come to maturity, through no fault of 
Mr. Hare's, without the ability to engage in rational moral 
thought and discussion. Would t-lr. Hare have better fulfilled 
his duties as the child's moral educator had he show"n no 
-
disapproval of lying, the consequence being that the child 
comes to maturity belibving that honesty and deceit are 
matters of indifference? Given only that for most people 
these are not matters of indifference, and thus the likeli-
hood the child will have to live ,.,ith those who neither 
trust nor respect him, there is reason to believe that as a 
moral educator f.fr. Hare would have failed. And suppose--
try--Mr. Cooper's Economics course were conducted in a 
rigid, intolerant, authoritarian, Orthodox Capitalist 
so~iety, a society in which doubts concerning the theory of 
Perfect Competition were treated as heresies punishable by 
death. Vould the teacher have better fulfilled his duties 
as Mr. Cooper's economics educator had he taught the theory 
as something uncertain? 
Both Hare and Cooper think that non-rational belief 
has at least some part to play in education. They see the 
educand, nat just as someone who thinks and acts, whether 
well or ill, but also as someone whose thought and action 
develops over time. They claim that the transmission of non-
~ational belief is at least sometimes justified because it 
Ls either necessary (Hare) or desirable (Cooper) for devel-
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opment which is educationally valuable 1J d • ~e argue , however, 
that their counter-instances to epistemological analyses of 
'indoctrination' (or, at least, f i oms-education) are not 
entirely convincing. The 'reason for this is that both Hare 
and Cooper limit themselves to a consideration of the 
development of the educand's capacity for rational tbou~ht 
o 
and action. They do not consider the educand's development 
~ ~ person, as, simply, a think£ng and acting being. The 
consequence, as we pointed out, is that they overlook the 
problems of rational development itself, problems which 
arise because the educand will never be or become an ideally 
rational person, nor will he ever live in an ideally ration-
al society. The problem is the same one Peters overlooks in 
"The Justification of' Education". And it is the problem 
which psychological analyses of indoctrination are intended 
to overcome. 
Consider first, howeve:i.. ... , doctrine itself. Doctrine is 
closely related to dogma, doctrinaire to dogmatic. In fact 
Cooper speaks of doctrines simply as "dogmatically held 
beliefs"~ (51). Bqt4 are beliefs, or set~ of belief's, at 
least held tc be, if not actually true. To be dogmatic is to 
hold belief as true regardless of evidence to the contrary 
available to one. A person can be dogmatic about any belief 
for any reason. The doctrinaire, on the other hand, though 
they are dogmatic, and though they can hold, if sometimes 
only with great ingenuity, any belief as doctrine, unlike 
the merely dogmatic~ the merely closed-minded, there is a 
specific reason for their dogmatism. Doctrines, lilt:e princi-
pIes, func tion as guides to thought and ac tion. They di ft"er from 
principles, however, in at least one important respect. The 
doctrinairian, unlike the man of principle, does not allow 
that his belief can conflict with other beliefs he might 
hold. As a consequen~e, he can deduce a 'code t , a set of 
presc~iptions, that is, a 'doctrine t , to guide his day-to-
day thought and action in as minute detail as. he wishes. One 
thinks of Church Doctrine. The doctrinairian, then, much 
more than the man of principle, is open to the pragmatic 
criticism of being, in the words of the Concise Oxford, a 
pedantic theorist, a person who applies what they call 
"principles" without allowing for sometimes-recalcitrant ex-
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perience. And thus the truly doctrinaire have always sought 
to 'tame' experience by living in a separate community with-
in which experience can be more effectively controlled, 
whereas the man of principle, the man who accepts that prin-
ciples can conflict, is typically more tolerant of the con-
fusions and ambiguities of what he might call, with some 
justificat~on, the 'real world'. 
The proposit~onal content of doctrine might be true, 
false, or not known to be either. The reason it is sometimes 
thought, for example, by Gregory and lioods, to be the 
latter, is confusion between uncertain and irrelevant epist-
emological status. Doctrine, as guide to thought and 
action, is judged by its affective, not its epistemological 
status. Only a philosopher would worry whether there 
'really' is a God. For others, He either 'works' or not. 
Doctrine typically does contain statements about the world 
lihich purport to be true, but which, when taken out of con-
text, often seem unverifiable, if not ludicrously false. 
But doctrine, to be affective, must be convincing. And, per-
haps unfortunate~y, it is not always truth that convinces. 
The Nonroe Doctrine was designed to guide American foreign 
policy. One can reject most of its propositional content and 
yet still hold it well worth retaining, if, that is, one 
thinks it 'works'. There is, then, a difference between 
believin& ~ doctrine, that is, believing the propositional 
content to be true, and believing in a doctrine, that is, 
guiding one's thought and action by reference to it. 
And, further, because neither individuals nor societies are 
ideally rational, it. is not always, as it were, 'pragmatic-
ally irrational' to believe in something whjch is either 
false or not known to be true. 
Indoctrination (or at least a certain kind of mis-
educati0n) involves belief. A person can believe that some-
thing is the case (propositional belief), that something is 
good or ought to be the case (normative belief), or he can 
believe in something (belief, or commitment). Epistemologi-
cal analyses limit the scope of indoctrination to proposi-
tional belief. Flew admits that the "sort of belief system 
which constitutes the content of indcctrination typically 
carries, or is thought to carry, normative implications. Yet 
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any norms as such" he says "are precisely not claims about 
what ~ but about what ought to be the case. Norms, there-
fore, provide a possible content for indoctrination only to 
the extent that they are; wrongly, thought to be and 
presented as a kind o~ fact." (Snook 1972b, p. 82) 
Flew seems to be saying, at least on . one read~ng, 
that it is in only a derivative sense that a person can be 
indoctrinated with ,,,hat wO.uld commonly be taken as primary 
ins tances of indoctrinated belief. One thinks of, beliel' in 
God, authority, ideology, belief that a person should do 
what ideologists, authorities, God (or at least His inter-
pretors) want him to. And if, as Flew believes, indoctrina-
tion must inVOlve doctrine, then it must involve, as we have 
seen, beliefs which .22 have ffnormative implications lt , that 
is, implications for thought an,j action. 
There is, however, a second and more convincing 
reading. The doctrinairian, the ~doctrinated person, and 
the person who holds normative belie~ "as a kind of fact", 
all have at least one thing in common, namely, they are 
certai.n what they believe is trtre. Propositional belief is 
not just true, it is indub~table: it is not just that some-
thing should be done, it must be: God is not thought just 
to exist, his existence is believed in. The doctrinairian 
does not doubt--if he has one--the basis of his belief: the 
indoctrinated person, as Wilson says, is certain of what 
may very well be uncertain: and there is a difference, as 
Flew points out, between normative belief, which is more or 
less well-reasoned, and proposi-cional belie:f, which can be, 
at least in a sense, 'certain', that is, a 'fact'. But, 
neither well-reason~d normative, nor true propositional 
belief is 'certain' in the sense of being beyond doubt. And 
thus, if one of the characteristic :features of the indoc-
trinated person is that he has an unwarranted certainty, it 
must be allowed that any belief--pace Snook, including true 
propositional belief, pace Flew, at least on the fo~@er 
readi~g, including normative belief--it must be allowed that 
any belie:f can be indoctrinated. This is to argue that here 
certainty is to be taken as, and thus that indoctrination 
~s, a psycholo~ical rather than an epistemological concept. 
And, indeed, if it were discovered that a person's belief is 
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true, is a 'fact'--there is a God, th ere is Perfect Competi-
t±on-- this would not in the least . l.ncline one to revise 
one's previous judgment, noW' denyin.? that th 
'-' e person is, or 
was, indoctrinated. For indoctrination is less a matter of 
'getti:ug it wrong' than l.·t l.·s of h ow a person might 'get it 
right' • 
Unwarranted certainty is a kind of mis-understanding, 
and thus, if education were simply the development of know-
ledge and understanding, the transmission of doctrine would 
be mis-educational. It was argued in Chapter 4, however, 
that education only ~volves knowledge and understanding, 
and it only does so, it was argued in Chapter 5, because 
their development is essential in preparing a person for in-
dependence. If the prospective educated person were supposed 
either not to act o~ think at all, or to' act and think only 
under the compulsion of another, q~estions concerning what 
he believes need never arise. Not acting, there is nothing 
to understand, nothing for which the educator can take res-
ponsibility. Acting only under the compulsion of another, it 
is the latter's beliefs which eXplain what is done, and it 
is he who assumes responsibility for it. In fact, however, 
it is supposed the prospective educated person both thinks 
and acts, and thinks and acts for himself. Understanding 
what he does involves understanding what he believes. It is 
he "t'fho is responsible, and it is he for whom the educa tor is 
at least partially responsible. The development of knowledge 
and understanding is essential in education because it is 
upon such development that the educand depends when he comes 
to think and act for himself. Having acquired, ideally, all 
and only knowledge and understaLding, th~ now educated 
person is well prepared for independence in that he already 
po;sesses, and thus no longer depends on anyone, including 
himself, for the acquisition of \vhat he needs to think and 
act well. 
Knowledge and unde~standing, however, are l~mited 
in at least two r~spects. First, of the knowable little is 
known, of the known little is knowable by the individual, 
and of the knowable little is worth knowing. Second, and 
more important, being well prepared for independence 
involves having more than just knowledge and understanding. 
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Is it then impossible to imagine cases in which to thiru< 
and act well a person must be doctrinaire about at least 
something? If as a result of religious education a person 
comes to believe without'doubt in the existence of God must 
the case be one of educational failure? Or, to take up a 
case described by White, if as a result of his schooling a 
person comes to believe without doubt that, though not for 
the army or the universi ty, he is fi tted for "helving wood" 
and "drawing water'i, must his schooling have been mis-educa-
tional? 
Other than because they have good reason, and because 
they do not, people typically believe because either they or 
others lVant them to. ,If ,ve do not, if we can not make of 
ourselves something tha world can live with, we make of the 
world something we can live with. For the educator, as 
opposed to either the partisan, the already do~trinaire, or 
the purely rational, there is a genuine dilemma. He knows, 
on the one hand, that unwarranted certainty, for example, in 
the existence of God, can play a central role in an other-
wise satisfactory l~fe, indeed,th~t it can be essential to 
; t. He also knows, ho\"rever, tha t jus t because certain ty is 
unlvarranted. any life 1-rhich depends on it is always vulner-
able. But, depending on the child, and on the society in 
which it is an ticipa ted he liill live, the dilemma need not 
be insoluble. If not to hold with certainty a particular 
religious, political or social belief is, in effect, to dis-
qual~fy the child from ever participating in society, the 
responsible ecucator will do his best to convince him of its 
truth if he is responsive and, if not, at least to teach him 
behaviors lvhieh are consistent wi th his he lding the belief 
to be true. Again, if without certainty the child is or is 
likely to become mentally or emotionally unstable, and t.hus 
unable to cope wi-eh Ii va on his own, the re~ ponsible educa-
tor will either encourage certainty in beliefs the child 
might already have or try as it were to tgive' the child the 
sort of belief with which he then can cope. One thinks of 
'belief in self', 'belief in man', 'belief in God'. Assum-
ing, on the other hand, a more tolerant society, and 
assuming a c~ild for whom it seems he and his world are as 
they should be, the responsible educator will get on with 
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the perhaps more agreeable task of developing the child's 
knowledge and understanding of that '-'orld Th . 
n • ere 1.S no 
dilemma because what the child wants, what the child needs 
to believe happens also to be both rationally supportable 
and open to doubt, to possible revision--perhaps by the 
child himself. 
The imparting of doctrine, then, can have a place, if 
perhaps only a very limited one, in educating the young. As 
Wilson says, it can at times, and with certain children, be 
absolutely necessary. Nonetheless, the justification common-
ly given to extend its scope, justifications in terms of 
either individual or social good, are explicitly non-educa-
tional and implicitly mis-educational. Consider the doctrine 
of 'natur~l inferiority'. Its transmission is typically 
justified on the ground that, if they di~ D0t believe it, 
women, members of' racial minorities, peasants, workers--
those to whom it might be transmitted would so act as to 
destroy the (perhaps admittedly unjust) society in which 
they live, leaving only chaos and disorder (or an even more 
unjust sociei;y) ,.,.cir·cumstances in ,.,hich everyone, including 
.. 
women, etc., would be worse off than once they were. But, 
such non-educational justification implies the need for 
m~s-educational upbringing. Being 'inferior', women, etc. 
are in some ways not to act at all (e.g., vote, occupy cer-
tain political, social and occupational positions) and, in 
other ways, are to act only under the direction, if not 
always the compulsion of others, of, say, white, middle and 
upper class, husbands or fathers, employers and land o,~ers. 
The doctrine serves the purpose of preparing them, not for 
independence, but, with respect to both what they will be 
permitted to do, and to what must be done, but will be done 
by others, preparation for dependence. With respect to the 
latter, subsidiary lies and confusions might be transmitted, 
or knowledge and understanding simply lvithheld, the purpose 
being t~ make the 'inferior' inferior. It is only with 
respect to the f'o:':'mer, that is, to those areas of quasi-
independent activity, that knowledge and understanding, at 
least of a sort, are transmitted. Imparting doctrine, then, 
though it can enhance, typically serves the purpose of 
limiting either action ~t5elf or at least independent action. 
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If knowledge is pow'er, unwarranted certainty can be weak-
ness, its transmission intended to incapacitate. 
Indoctrination is'a psychological rather than an 
epistemological concept. A soldier in the US Army is certain 
that he should alw'ays respect the chain of command. A second 
soldier, on discovering that this is the case, merely points 
out to the first that, rationally, he should either discard 
the belief or at least suspend judgment concerning its 
epistemological status. He points out, for example, that on 
occasion respecting the chain of command can lead to disas-
ter. The first soldier suspends judgment. In a case such as 
this one would say that the army's Indoctrination Course had 
failed, that if the soldier could lose his belief in such 
manner he had not been successfully indoctrinated. It is, 
one suspects, for reasons such as this that Sneak, Moore and 
White all assume that indoctrination is a psychological 
rather than an epistemological concept, that what matters in 
indoctrination is not the kind of belief, but the way in 
,.,hichit is held';" and furt!1er, that the ~way it is held makes 
it highly unlikely that a person lY'oulJ, discard the belief, 
or suspend jud~lent, as a result simply of a another per-
son's pointing out to him that he should. Disregarding 
Snook's so~newhat mysterious cla~m that transmitting false 
belief "must be subsumed under 'indoctrination''', all three 
imply that beliefs of any kind can be indoctrinated, the 
difference between being indoctrinated and heing in the 
state of mind of the soldier described above being, accord-
ing to Snook and Moore, that the belief is held "regardless 
of the evidence It ann, according to 'lvhi te, "f'ixedly't or 
tfunshakablyft. 
Snook says that "A person indoctrinates P (a prorosi-
tion or set of propositions) if he teaches vith the inten-
tion that the pupil or pupils believe P regardless of the 
evidence." (1972a, p. 47) Hoore, though he seems to think 
ftbehavior" as well as belief can be indoctrinated, and, 
unlike Snook, that indoctrination might be unintentional, 
holds a similar view. He says that "The child naturally 
models his b~havior and, within limits, his consequent value 
reactions on that of others, chie.'.fy adults ••• These observed 
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patterns in others, even '\V'here no i t 
n entional teaching is 
done, are 'authoritative' for the child; and he is being 
'indoctrinated' in terms of what he imitates where no 
reasons are furnished him for doing so." (Snook 1972b, 
pp. 96-7) The vie'\-/ Snook and Noore ho Id is J... n hI· 
, psyc 0 ogJ..-
cal terms, the equivalent of Gregory and Woods's view that 
indoctrination involves belief not kno'wn to be true or 
false. It is not, however, that the belief is not known per 
l."t l."s t k ~; no -nO~l perhaps only, but certainly always, by 
the perso~ who holds ;t. It· t k b ~ 1S no nown ecause the person 
has no reason, no evidence, for thinking it true. 
In Chapter 4 a brief explanation was given in sup-
port of the participant's intuition that truth is of 
fundamental educational importance. What is held to be true, 
however, changes over time, in the lifetime of the indivi-
dual perhaps several t~mes. The person who hOlds proposi-
tional belief because he has reason to think it true is in 
a position to change his belief in the light of new, 
conflicting evidence. The person who holds belief regardless 
o~ the evidence,~on the other hand, is in a less advantag-
eOU5 positioIl. He might hold it because he or because 
someone else wants him to. In either case, should reality 
impinge--or should it fail to--the result might be disas-
trous. One thinks of the belief acquired in adolescence that 
one ~5 (or is not) 'like everyone else', and then of 
discovering (or failing to discover) in adult life that the 
belief is, and always was, completely without foundation. 
But, just as Hare and Cooper argue that there is a 
place in education for transmi tting as certain beliefs ,vhich 
are uncertain, Moore thinks it both inev~table and desirable 
that the child "models" his behavior and his "value reac-
tioI:'.sff on those of adults, in 50 doing acquiring beliefs 
without at the same time acquiring reasons for thinking them 
true. "Only by isolating him from other persons, es~ecially 
from adults, could we keep him from learning in this way." 
(Ibid, p. 96) And, in any case, "This natural imitative 
process is valuable, even essential, as giving the child a 
head start in living in terms of behavior patterns (and, one 
should add, belief's) presumably tested and adoptbd by more 
mature persons. If a child had to learn every behavior item 
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(and belief) for himself through trial and error, he would 
be hopelessly bogged down from the beginning in a world as 
complex as ours." (Ibid, p. 97) Unlike Hare or Cooper, 
however, Moore goes on to suggest that ' 1 
sucn earning can, 
and in some cases should remain unchanged even after educa-
tion has been completed. We should ufrankly admit" he says 
"that learning necessarily begins with an authoritative and 
indoctrinative situation, and that for lack of time, native 
capacity or the requisite training to think everything out 
for oneself, learning even for the rationally mature 
individual must continue to include an ingredient of the 
unreasoned, the merely accepted. The extent to which every-
one of us must depend, and wisely so, on the authoritative 
pronouncements of those who are more expert th~n are we in 
most of the problems lie face is evidence enough of the 
truth of this contention." (op cit) 
Noore, of course, is quite right, at least as. far as 
he goes. In preparing a person for independence it is just 
as important that the beliefs he holds be true, or at least 
the best available~ as that they have a ,sound evidential 
hacking for the person who hOlds them. The latter, as W8 
have said, would be preferable, but the forw9r would be pre-
ferable to having only false beliefs or no beliefs at all. 
And, because a person alw·ays develops in one way, rather 
than in any other, there will always be areas with respect 
to \{hich it would be t'wise" for him to rely on the. authori ty 
of others, just as others might rely on him in that area in 
which he is authoritative. But, if it is the case, as 
certainly it is, that everyone always relies on at least one 
other wlth respect to at least one area of belief, then 
living with authorities is just one more fact of life for 
which the individual can be either well or ill prepared. Who 
is one to rely on, and for what? There is a difference 
between relying on a NASA scientist for information about 
Jupiter and Saturn, and relying on a n6ar-to~al stranger to 
tell one who one i.s, wha t one feels, hOly bes t to conduct 
one's li.fe. Being well prepared for independencG involves 
knowing in what respects one's independence is limited, 
knvlving who to depend on, and for what. It is an 
especially important part of preparation just because, c::.s 
Moore po£nts out, if preparation is to be successful the 
educand himself must be subject to authority. Perhaps the 
most common educational failure is in, albeit unintention-
ally, conditioning the young always to rely on the authority 
of their elders for precisely those things which, it was 
intended, would fre~ them from dependence on authority. The 
result is not just a continuation of a 'child-like' approach 
to life. It might also be the attempt, on the part of the 
educand, to so radically alter his life that his elders no 
longer C01.1nt as relevant authori ties. The latter, of course, 
might be a first step towards independence, but then it is a 
first step taken without the help of those whose job it was 
to help. One thinks of those societies in which education is 
largely academic education, the result being, for the mj.nor-
ity, scholarship which is derivative rather than original 
and, for the vast majo""ity, an approach to life which is 
anti-theoretical, anti-intellectual, that is, so approached 
as to render the authority of their teachers irrelevant. 
Generally speaking, then, Hoore is qui.te right. But, 
is ei ther rie or S'nook talking about somsthiI'.g 'vhich is, 
unambiguously, indoctrination. Indoctrinated belief is, it 
is true, not rationally held. But, wherein lies the lack of 
rationality? If our soldier is pleased to change his belief 
just b&cause another soldier gives him reason to do so, 
reason he has not the means to counter because, as Snook and 
Moore say, he had no reason to hold it in the first place, 
the Indoctrination Course would still seem to have been a 
failure. And, in fact, Snook, if not also Moore, gives a 
description of indoctrination which, though not--as at first 
sight it might appear to be--inconsistent lvith his defini-
tion, does go beyond it in a way ,,{hich seems to me, as it 
woulC'. to White, qui te convincinG_ Whi te speaks specifically 
of "fixed" or "unshakable" belief. And, after giving his 
description, Snook says that l{hi te f s is "close to b0ing a 
1 . t1 correct ana YS1S • (1972a, p. 46) 
"Indoctrination" Snook says "is concerned with the 
llanding on of beliefs. These beliefs are typically regarded 
by the indoctrinator as of some importance. He wants the 
pupils to accept these beliefs fully ••• " (emphasis mine) 
nFurthermore, the indoctrinator wants the students to be 
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able to justify their beliefs to themselves and to defend 
them against criticisms ••• In this situation, the indoctrin-
ator who did not attempt to give arguments, meet objections, 
answer questions, would be obviously inefficient." (Ibid, 
pp. 25-6) This is not to say, however, that the indoctrina-
ted person holds his beliefs for what reason there might be 
to hold them. "A truly indoctrinated person", Snook goes on 
to say, "thrives on arguments for, as ••• Pa~smore points out, 
the drill in ~tock objections is often an important feature 
of indoctrination ••• " (Ibid, p. 39) (emphasis mine) The point 
being made, implicitly, and perhaps unintentionally, is that 
for the indoctrinator it is not enough simply that the pupil 
come to believe without reason, he must believe "fully", he 
must be able to resist those who would try to ~hange his 
belief. resist the temptation to do so himself. 
In qll of these respects the indoctrinated person is 
distinguishable from the person who, as Moore describes him, 
merely relies on ttexpertsfl or "authorities". The latter, 
should he decide, might seek a 'second opinion' and if, even 
then, not satisfied might defer taking whatever ac~ion l{i th 
respect to W"hich he sought out expert opini.on in the first 
place. The successfully indoctrinated person, on the other 
hand, knows only the one opinion, and he acts in accordance 
with it regardless of the consequences. Further, if not sat-
isfied W"ith any authority the first person might decide to, 
and then be successful in, becoming an authority himself. 
But, this, according to Snook, would be to give in to the 
Jtemptation' to doubt the truth of what the indoctrinator 
rnanqu~ has taught, and, further, perhaps in the end to go 
against him. It is for precisely this reason that rather 
than simply teach, the US Army tries to indoctrinate. They 
do, of course, want soldiers to rely on the authority of 
their of'ficers, but in order to get what they take to be 
satisfactory results they take steps to ensure that th~t 
authority wi1·1 never be doubted, that it will be relied on 
even when it is doubtful, even when the soldier might him-
self" assume authority. And, as Snook impli.es, perhaps the 
best way of doing this is to get the soldier to hold his 
beliefs in such a way that, far from seeing himself as rely-
ing on authority, having justified his beliefs to himself he 
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thinks they are his own, he thinks he has arrived at them 
independently of authority. There is, afterall, no belief 
quite so strongly and enduringly held as the belief that, 
ttI, and no one else, am 'right!". And such a belief is just 
the opposite of the one held by th h e person W 0 relies on 
authorities. 
Though he does not say, it is perhaps for reasons 
such as these that Uhi te defines indoctrination as follow's. 
"Indoctrinating someone is trying to get him to believe 
that a proposition 'p' is true, in such a way that nothing 
will shake that belief. 1t -(Snook 1972b, p. 120) Whi.te also 
uses the phrase "unshru~able belief", the ambiguity of 
which, in a later article, he clarifies as follows. "It 
might be argued that if a teacher ••• is reinforcing his stu-
dents' belief in the Laws of Thought, he is indoctrinating 
them, since the Laws of Thought are in fact unshakable--
they cannot but be true if assertive discourse is to 
exist." (Ibid, p. 199) "Now there is clearly something 
wrong in calling this 'indoctrination'. The argument shows 
up the- inadequacy of' the earlier definition (or, at least, 
- ~ 
the earlier phrase) as it stands: the phrase 'unsbakable 
belief' had better be removed. '!'he crucial thing in indoc-
trination is that the indoctrinator tries to implant 
beliefs unshakably, i.e., in such a way that they will 
never be questioned." (Ibid, pp. 199-200) The ideal situa-
tion for the indoctrinator, then, is that, as a result of 
his activities, a person comes to believe something and 
thereafter, regardless of what happens to him, continues to 
believe. 
One further po~nt of clarification. Snook says that 
"According to White ••• indoctrination requires an intention 
of a certain sort, namely the intention that the child 
believes '\-That is taught in such a way that nothing 'tVill 
shake his belief. I want to argue that thi~ is close to be-
ing a correct analysis ••• but that ••• the criterion is still 
inadequa te. tt "Teachers of rna thema tics, chelllis try, and La tin 
have to teach many things which they do not expect to be 
questioned, much less rejected. White's account does not 
cover our unwillingness to call these teachers indoctrina-
tors. t ' (197 2a , p. 46) Perhaps because, according to White's 
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definition, they are not indoctrinators. There is a differ-
ence between teaching without expecting questions or 
rejection, and teaching with the intention that whatever 
questions, ~.,hatever temptations for rejection might occur 
either then or at any time in the future, these questions 
and temptations, should they arise--itself a sign of inef-
ficient indoctrination--will be dispatched immediately and 
without trace. It is just the sort of "questions" Snook 
might have in mind which could lead a person into philosophy 
of maths or science, or into philology and history, but the 
indoctrinator, according to White, is precisely that teacher 
who renders such development impossible. 
Might indoctrination, or at least indoctrination as 
it is understood here, playa part in education, a part in 
preparing a person for independ~nce? 'White himself appalant-
ly thinks not. Or, at least, he says that the "moral educa-
tor has to be careful that his pupils do not grow up 
indoctrinated ••• " (Snook 1972b, p. 130) To indoctrinate 
with justification the teacher would have to have good 
reason to believ~ that, given the ~ort of child he is deal-
ing with, and given the sort of society in which he lives, 
the child must hold l or at least it would be desirable that 
he did hold, for the rest of his life, and inspite of any 
temptation there might be to reject it, the belief in ques-
tion. This would be, as Wilson says, to restrict the child's 
freedom of choice, to diminish his "personality". It might 
be, however, as Wilson also says, "absolutely necessary". 
The child is made as it liere t eternally t dependent on his 
teacher for the belief in question, and thus, other consid-
erations aside, is mis-educated. But, if without the belief, 
if ever without the belief, the child were to be made depen-
dent on ·others~ in the extreme, for everything other than 
the belief, then ~he educational value of in~octrination 
would by far outweigh its educational disvalue. The diffi-
culty, of course, is in trying to find such a belief, or in 
trying to justify the indoctrination of a belief which one 
supposes to have been already "found". 
t · t ' fortunately, are not a verv Indoc rlna ors, pernaps J 
sophisticated breed, the state of their art not being con-
spicuously well-refined. Intentional indoctrination is less 
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of a ",vorry than, if Snook will allo\-! it, indoctrination 
which is the unintended consequence of what is, nonetheless, 
intentional action, that is, indoctrination as 'side-
effect'. Children, perhaps more so tha~ adults, will resist 
either mental or behavioral coercion once they recognize 
that that is the intention. Thus the development ill. parents 
and teachers, not the art of the actor, but the art of act-
ing through indirection. What will always be a side-effect 
of intentional action is the basis upon which that action 
rests. Even when the l:>asis is brought up for discussion, the 
basis upon which the discussion rests is still unexamined, 
and so on. In education the action is typically a direction 
from the educator to the educand to involve himself in some 
activity. The basis upon which the action rests is that the 
activity in question is worthwhile. But, here doubts, even 
resistance on the part of the educ~nd are commonplace. What 
is not so common, because, from the point of view of the 
educand Lt is more obscure, is doubt concerning the worth of 
the environment which is necessary if the activity is to 
tcl~e place at all •. And if that environment constitutes the 
whole of his 'world' prior to his achieving independence, it 
is likely, indeed inevitable, that he will acquire a more or 
less "fixed" and nunshakable u belief in its "\Iortlnvhileness. 
For 'gifted' children in a 'special' environment, for 
'ordinary' children in an 'all in' environment, such indoc-
trination need not be the greatest of worries. There are, of 
course, serious problems to faco, problems of being extra-
orrtinary adults in an ordinary world, problems of being 
ordinary adults in a w'orld in 'vhich not everyone is ordinary 
as wel1~ but these are problems which occur with, not in the 
absense o~ indoctrination, in fact, they are just the sort 
of problems ,.,rhich, if serious enough, 'vQuld lead one to 
object to indoctrination in the rirst place. But, for 
orninary children in a special environment, and for gifted 
children in an all-in environment, indoctrination of the 
sort described will always be a problem. Without extra-ordin-
ary means, the first are condemned always to seek what is 
beyond them, and, with special gifts, the second are condem-
t d th . f ct to pretend they do not ~ed always 0 eny em, 1n a , 
exist and, like the first, always to fail. 
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